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THE CROCE-COLLINGWOOD THEORY OF ART

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IT is not my intention in this brief essay to give an exhaustive critical analysis of the theory of art championed by Croce and his follower Collingwood; I intend only to point out certain confusions in and misunderstandings of their theory, and to make a few critical comments in the light of them. Nor do I wish to imply that the theories of Croce and Collingwood are identical; but although they diverge on some points, and although each develops views that the other discusses only briefly, they are so substantially alike on all important points (at any rate, on any that will be discussed in this essay) that, as reviewers were quick to point out on the appearance of Collingwood's *The Principles of Art*,[1] the two can for all practical purposes be considered as one theory.

I

The aspects of the theory that concern us here are these:

1. The popular view of the artist is that he is a person who has developed a more than ordinary skill in the use of a certain medium—a craftsman who plies his craft much as the blacksmith, the cabinet-maker, and the bridge-builder do in other fields. According to Croce and Collingwood, this view of the artist is completely erroneous: the artist *qua* artist is not a craftsman at all. With training and practice almost anyone can become a good cabinet-maker, or for that

[1] Cf. *Manchester Guardian*, May 27, 1938; *The Nation*, Jan. 21, 1939; *New York Times*, July 17, 1938; *London Times Literary Supplement*, August 13, 1938.

matter a good billboard advertising "artist," but not everyone can become a good artist proper, although he could, for example, learn to paint. Artists are born and not made; but good craftsmen in all fields are made so by training and practice. What the public naïvely believes to be the distinctive characteristic of the artist—his skill in handling a chosen medium—does not characterize the artist *qua* artist at all. What the public takes for artistry is what any dunce can learn if he goes to art school long enough. To regard the artist as a craftsman, then, is to make a fatal mistake.

2. But if skill in handling his chosen medium is not the distinguishing characteristic of the artist, what is? His ability to have artistic ideas—or, as Croce calls them, intuitions. Artists differ from other men, not in that they can skilfully wield a brush or a chisel while most of us cannot, but in that they have intuitions which most of us do not.

> People think that all of us ordinary men imagine and intuit countries, figures and scenes like painters, and bodies like sculptors; save that painters and sculptors know how to paint and carve such images, while we bear them unexpressed in our souls. They believe that anyone could have imagined a Madonna of Raphael; but that Raphael was Raphael owing to his technical ability in putting the Madonna upon canvas. Nothing can be more false than this view. The world which as a rule we intuit is a small thing.[1]

He quotes with approval Michelangelo's statement, "One paints, not with the hands, but with the brain," and Leonardo's, "The minds of men of lofty genius are most active in invention when they are doing the least external work"; and he concludes, "The painter is a painter, because he sees what others only feel or catch a glimpse of, but do not see."[2]

3. These intuitions do not usually burst upon the artist in full flower. They begin as a rule as what William James has described as a "blooming buzzing confusion"; a glimpse here, a spark there, a relation perceived, an experience remembered, a promising avenue developed, and gradually, after much reflection, concentration, uncertainty, setting aside and returning afresh, and long periods of gestation in the unconscious, finally the finished conception is born in the artist's mind. (This is what in coming pages we shall call the art-process.) With some it is easy (Mozart) and with others it is difficult (Brahms), but in every case the artist takes small, half-formed, inchoate intuitions and develops them, organizing, unifying, welding together into a completed work. The artist is distinguished from other men not so much by having the initial, inceptive ideas—many men have these—as by his ability to work them through to completion into a well articulated and organized work of art.

4. The terminus of the art-process is the final artistic intuition—

[1] Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*, page 9. [2] Op. cit., page 10.

the completed work of art as conceived in the mind of the artist, toward which the entire art-process, conscious and unconscious, has been moving. And—here is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Croce-Collingwood theory— when the art-process is completed in the artist's mind, when the final artistic intuition is present to his consciousness, the process of expression is also complete: for the intuition *is* the expression. The gradual development of intuitions in the artist's mind *is* his process of artistic expression; and when the intuitive process has reached its fruition within him, *ipso facto* the expressive process has also.

In this Croce and Collingwood are most at odds with the popular view of art: to most people expression occurs only when the artist is working not with his head but with his hands; it is then that he is "expressing himself." But to the Croce-Collingwood theory this is secondary; it is not expression at all but externalization. Externalization is a craft; expression is not. Successful externalization can be learned; successful intuiting (expressing) cannot. The artist does usually externalize as well, so that we can see the fruits of his labour; but *qua* artist he need not do so. The externalized object, or artifact, is only a means for the communication of his ideas to us.

5. The work of art, therefore, is not (as popularly supposed) the physical artifact—e.g. the painting on canvas—but something that exists in the mind of the artist, and can exist again in the minds of those who (by means of the artifact) come to share his intuitions. The physical artifact, as we have just seen, is only a means towards the attainment of this end: the reproduction of the work of art (the artist's intuition) in the mind of the observer.

6. But the means-end relation does not hold of the real work of art—that is to say, of the artistic intuition (not its externalization). Until one knows what the end of a process is to be, one cannot employ a means toward its achievement; and the artist does not know the exact nature of his work of art (the completed intuition in his mind) in advance. He must move in whatever direction his genius dictates; he cannot give exact specifications for it in advance. It is here that the artist differs most radically from the craftsman: the craftsman, to the degree to which he is an efficient craftsman, *can* specify in advance what the end is to be, and can therefore, with a little practice, employ the best means for achieving it. It would be a sloppy carpenter who, when he started building a house, did not know what its dimensions were going to be, or its floor plan, or what it was to be made of, or whether he had enough materials to finish the job. The artist, on the contrary, cannot work in this way: when he begins he cannot know what the finished product of his intuitive processes will be like.

7. The reason for this is plain: the artist is engaged in *expressing* emotions. In the process of expression, what was turbid and unclear

to him gradually becomes clarified and ordered; and until the process of expression is completed, the artist does not know exactly what it was he wanted to express. The artist's cousin, the portrait-painter, who employs the same physical medium, does know in advance what he wants: he wants the painting to resemble the sitter as much as possible; as such he is a craftsman, not an artist. Such a craftsman, knowing in advance what he wants the end-product to be like, deliberately and "with malice aforethought" seeks the best technique for producing it. If he is a writer of mystery stories who wants to capitalize on next year's market, he writes calculatingly, deliberately, to satisfy that market. He operates in the same physical medium as the true literary artist, but that is where the resemblance ends. He does not himself feel the emotions he wants his audience to feel; he is expressing nothing at all to himself; he is not, indeed, engaged in *expressing* emotion at all, but in *arousing* emotion in others. And doing this is a craft. Propaganda art, religious art, amusement art—all forms of what Collingwood calls "art falsely so called"—all these "know the end in the beginning"; they are crafts involving means to a preconceived end. In any craft, the craftsman must know (the more precisely the better) the result he wants to achieve before he sets out to achieve it; but the artist does not know the result of his achievement until he has achieved it. "The artist doesn't know what he's going to express until he has expressed it." Therefore the artist is not, and cannot be, a craftsman.

II

The theory of art sketched briefly in the preceding section has attained wide currency; but there are confusions both in it and about it which appear to have gained an equally wide currency. I shall now mention a few of these.

1. As we have observed, common usage of language associates the term "expression" with the process of externalization rather than with the process of intuition. When Croce repudiates this, refusing to call the first process "expression" and applying the term only to the second process, what (one might ask) is this but sheer terminological perversity?

It is no doubt true that this reversal of terms has caused considerable confusion in the minds of introductory students in aesthetics. It is also probably true that what Croce gives us is a persuasive definition of "expression": he uses the emotively-tinged term to refer to the activity to which he attaches the most importance. But there are reasons for considering it more important: for if we may assume (what the majority of critics would probably believe without question) that the distinctive activity of the artist is that of expression, then

what Croce is insisting on is that this distinctive activity has to do with the genesis or coming-into-being of the artist's intuitions and not of his externalizations. And if this is so, those who talk of the artist's "ability to express" as if it were simply "skill in handling a medium" (e.g. the slick journalist, the advertising artist) are simply in error, and Croce is pointing out this error to us.

2. The theory is sometimes presented as if the order (1) expression and (2) externalization were a strictly chronological one in which the first step must be completed before the second begins. And indeed neither Croce nor Collingwood specifically try to dispel this idea. Though they do not dispel it, however, it is surely not essential to their theory of art that they should hold it. Those who point to all the admittedly great painters who painted while they worked and to the composers who composed at the piano, and then consider this an adequate refutation of the theory, are surely knocking down a man of straw. It is an empirical fact that most painters "get their ideas" (artistic intuitions) while dabbling in paints, and that artists in all media during their creative processes tend to "play around in the medium" while doing so, but this fact is surely no obstacle to the Croce-Collingwood theory. A Mozart can visualize an entire concerto, down to the last note, "in his mind's eye" before he ever sets pen to paper, but most artists must experiment painstakingly in their chosen medium before their intuitions finally crystallize. In either case what does it matter? The important thing for the theory is that whether or not his intuitions come to him while he is working in the physical medium, it is the having of these intuitions that distinguishes him as an artist and not his ability to manipulate the medium.[1]

3. "Of art there is no technique." What exactly does this mean? It would surely appear, from what the theory has to say about the art-process as opposed to the craft-process, that technique (as the authors want to use the word) belongs not to the process of transforming the artist's initial "blooming buzzing confusion" into a perfected artistic intuition—for this, as the theory insists, there is no formula, no possibility of specifications in advance—but rather to the process of externalization. In other words, there is no technique of artistic inspiration, but there is of putting the product of one's inspirations on canvas. In the light of the sharp distinction they draw between intuition and externalization and their deprecation of technique in the intuiting process, it would surely seem to be a

[1] It would even be possible for the externalization to be completed at the same moment as the final artistic intuition. This might happen if the artist's intuitions grew on him as he continued to apply paint to the canvas, and when he laid down his brush he realized that he would have to change nothing—that the earlier parts of the externalizing process would not have to be changed to accommodate his subsequent intuitions, and that the externalization just completed rendered his artistic intuition exactly.

reasonable conclusion that they want the term "technique" to apply only to the latter process.

Yet, if we maintain this view, we are surely involved in nothing less than an absurdity. In painting and sculpture, no doubt, the process of externalizing one's intuitions involves considerable technical difficulty; it is a difficult business to chisel in stone, and much experience is required before the hand obeys the head. But what of literature, if this view of technique is correct? The only technique involved here would be that involved in an ordinary act of penmanship (or typewriting), which anyone can do whose arm is not paralysed and who has completed the third grade in grammar school. Anyone who can do this would have at his command all the technique necessary for writing poems. Similarly, the only technique involved in musical composition would be that of writing on paper the musical notation corresponding to the tone-relationships intuited by the composer—which again can be done by anyone in a class in elementary music. Even if it is true that good technique in drawing is simply good draftmanship, it is not true that good technique in poetry is good handwriting.

If we are to avoid these absurd consequences, we shall simply have to assert that technique is not limited to the externalization process. Without going into a detailed examination of the concept of technique, but taking the term as it is ordinarily used in daily conversation among artists, it would seem that the technique involved in musical composition includes knowledge of such matters as harmony and counterpoint, which have to do not with the externalization process but with the structuring or arranging of one's musical intuitions; and the "rules of poesy," involving such pedestrian matters as meter and rhyme-scheme, are again concerned with the arrangement of the words in one's poetic intuitions, whether one writes them down on paper or not. (The same surely applies to painting: rules of composition, balance, and colour-harmony are rules about how to shape one's visual intuitions, whether one externalizes them on canvas or not.) Whether the Croce-Collingwood theory would admit this extension of the term "technique" I do not know, but the extension must be made if the theory is to escape absurdity. I can see no inconsistency, in any case, that would result if this extension of the term were admitted into the theory.

It would remain as true as ever that (as Croce and Collingwood repeatedly remind us) good technique cannot assure a good artist, and that one may know all the "rules of the game" or "tricks of the trade" and still be unable to produce art; one may know every rule in the book and still have no artistic intuitions upon which to exercise them. The Croce-Collingwood theory, perhaps more than any other, emphasizes the point that knowledge of technique alone will not

make an artist. Yet it is important to remind ourselves also that an artist may be a better artist for having mastered technical matters: it may give better form and greater scope to his artistic expression. Gershwin was a composer of considerable talent, but in the opinion of most music critics he would have done better had he known about the technical side of musical composition. True, what most would-be artists lack is good intuitions and not good technique; but the latter is not unimportant simply because it must be used in the service of the former.

4. One of the most often-heard criticisms of the Croce-Collingwood theory may be summarized as follows: "According to the theory, externalization is of small importance compared with the process of intuition-expression which goes on in the artist's mind. But doesn't this involve a divorce between the intuition-expression and the artistic *medium*, which is entirely unjustified? It would seem that according to the theory it doesn't matter whether the artist externalizes his intuition in the form of a statue or a symphony or a poem, or indeed whether he externalizes at all. The intuition might be 'materialized' in any of these forms, or in none of them. But this is patently false: the composer can externalize only in the medium he knows, namely music; the painter, only on canvas; and so on. Thus the externalization does matter, and it matters tremendously—and any theory which denies this must be false."

This criticism is, to say the least, a very confused one. It is true that according to the theory the artist, *qua* artist, *need* not externalize, although (for reasons that Collingwood is quick to point out[1]) he usually does. In this sense, and in this sense only, there is a "divorce" between the artistic intuition and the medium. The confusion in the above argument, however, lies in a failure to distinguish between the *physical medium* (the work in the physical medium being the artifact, the result of the externalizing process, e.g. applying the paint to the canvas) and the *conceived medium*. It is as a result of the latter that the former takes place. It is the conceived medium that is important for Croce and Collingwood, not the externalization of it in the physical medium. Thus, the would-be poet who said that he "had wonderful ideas but just wasn't able to find words for them" would, on the Croce-Collingwood theory, not be a poet at all because his intuitions, whatever they might be, were not conceived in the medium of words; until the words of the poem are present, in their proper order, to the mind of the poet, he does not have a poem-intuition, whatever else he may have. Wordsworth said that there are many poets in the world who have "the vision and faculty divine, yet wanting the accomplishment of verse"; if this means that they have a "vision" but "the words just won't come to them," Croce and

[1] R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, Chapter 14.

Collingwood would unhesitatingly say that they do not have *poetic* intuitions at all.

. . . It would seem strange to every one to say that the composer had added or attached notes to a motive which was already in the mind of him who is not the composer; as if Beethoven's Ninth Symphony were not his own intuition and his intuition of the Ninth Symphony. Now, just as one who is deluded as to the amount of his material wealth is confuted by arithmetic, which states its exact amount, so he who nourishes delusions as to the wealth of his own thoughts and images is brought back to reality, when he is obliged to cross the *Pons Asinorum* of expression. Let us say to the former, count; to the latter, speak; or, here is a pencil, draw, express yourself.[1]

Another way of putting this is to say that according to the theory there are no "mute inglorious Miltons," poets who cannot find the words to express what they feel. Many persons, perhaps the majority of mankind, have feelings of great intensity and depth, and the artist is not distinguished from other men by his capacity to have them, but rather by his power of expressing them (even if only to himself) *in a medium*. Mozart probably had no more intense emotions of exultation, bereavement, or melancholy than his siblings and cousins, but he was a composer and they were not because he could express his emotions in the musical medium and they could not.[2] If they were mute, *ipso facto* they were not Miltons.[3]

If this view is true, it is surely of great importance: it does away with the popular notion that first the artist "has ideas" and then he proceeds to find a medium for expressing them: that if one has skill in the medium of paints, one chooses to express them on canvas, whereas if one has gone to the conservatory, one expresses them in musical form. The idea of the separation of the artistic intuition from the medium, after the manner of the separation of a body from its clothing, has done immense harm here: the body can be clothed now with this garment and now with that; but the artistic intuition and its expression are inseparable. There is, on the theory, no such thing as an artistic intuition which can be expressed, now in painting, now in music, depending on the artist's chosen medium; the artistic

[1] Croce, *Aesthetic*, page 11.

[2] What it means to say that one "has expressed his emotions in the musical medium" is indeed a large question, but it is no part of the subject of this paper. See my paper, "The Concept of Artistic Expression," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954–5.

[3] There is a possible confusion even in saying that according to the Croce-Collingwood theory there are no mute inglorious Miltons. In the most important sense this is true: unless the artist's intuitions are conceived in an artistic medium, he has no *artistic* intuitions at all; the artistic intuition is always mediumistic. But in another sense he may be a Milton and yet mute: namely, if he can create Miltonic lines "in his head" but for some reason or other he chooses to refrain from communicating them to other men by writing them down. For him to be a Milton it is enough that he carry Miltonic stanzas in his head which he *can* write down, whether he actually does so or not.

intuition and its expression are one: no expression-in-a-medium, then no artistic intuition.

In the most important sense, then, the Croce-Collingwood theory does not "institute a divorce" between intuition and medium at all: the intuition comes only *in* words or shapes or tones, and if it does not, then as far as art is concerned, the person is still in a state of "blooming buzzing confusion." The very thing, then, for which the theory is so often criticized—that of divorcing the intuition from the medium of expression—is exactly the reverse of the truth.

5. I shall not devote much space to the oft-criticized "mentalistic" direction taken by the theory: that "the real work of art" exists only in the artist's mind and in the minds of qualified observers is a natural enough consequence of the view that the physical artifact is only a means for the production in the audience of the requisite experience. Questions about "where the true work of art exists" usually presuppose (as the prefixed adjectives "real" and "true" so often indicate) a persuasive definition of the phrase "work of art." If the question is asked, "Where then *is* the work of art? in the artist's mind? in the artifact—on paper or on canvas? in the sounds emanating from the orchestra? in the minds of observers or listeners?" I should say, In any or all of these places, depending on what you choose to mean in the first place by the phrase "work of art." If one conceives the work of art as something in the artist's mind, one must accept the consequence that it no longer exists when the artist dies or is asleep or not thinking about it; if it is something in the minds of listeners or observers, one must accept the consequence that there are as many works of art as there are listeners or observers; if it is the physical artifact (as one would ordinarily hold it to be in the case of painting, sculpture, or architecture), then it can no longer be held to exist if the artifact is destroyed; this consequence would be unwelcome in the case of a poem, for example, which might be held to exist even if all the copies were destroyed, provided that someone had memorized it and could reproduce it word for word. In every alternative there will be some consequences that will not square with the way we ordinarily use the phrase "work of art"; therefore I should be more inclined to say that "the work of art exists" if any *one* (not any specific one) of these requirements is fulfilled. In every case, however, it is a matter of how we initially decide to use the phrase "work of art"; one is welcome, for example, to use it to refer to something in the artist's mind if he is willing to accept the consequence that after the artist's death it no longer exists. Croce and Collingwood are, on the face of it, no more jarring to common sense when they say that "*the* work of art" exists only in the minds of the artist *and* those observers who (via the artifact) share the artist's intuition, than are those who say it exists only as a physical artifact.

If they wish to use the phrase "work of art" to refer to an intuition in the minds of artist and audience, they are privileged to do so; this locution will permit them to say, as they do, that the artifact is not the work of art at all but only a means to an end, namely, the reproduction of the real work of art in the minds of observers.

6. The reference to means and end brings to mind a far more tangled situation: the contention of the Croce-Collingwood theory that in craft the means-end relation exists, whereas in art it does not. We have already seen that according to the theory the completed artistic intuition cannot be an end toward which the artist adopts means because, until the intuition has reached fruition in his mind, the artist does not know what it is to be, and therefore he cannot adopt means towards its achievement. The opening chapters of Collingwood's *The Principles of Art* are concerned mainly to exploit this notion. They are concerned with various forms of "art falsely so called"—falsely because in all of them the end is known in advance and the artist-falsely-so-called (craftsman-truly-so-called) adopts means to achieve this end, like the builder who builds to specifications from a blueprint. There is, first, *representative* art, which consists in producing in the audience emotions resembling those evoked by the original: for example, a portrait which arouses feelings similar to those aroused on seeing the sitter because the portrait so closely resembles the sitter; or again, programme music representing the sea, not because it sounds like the sea but because it evokes emotions similar to those felt when one is at the seaside. Here the effect desired is known in advance, and the painting or composition is a way of inducing in the audience the preconceived effect. Second, there is *magical* art, whose purpose is to evoke feelings that will affect subsequent actions, as in religious art, Marxist art, patriotic art; the "artist" knows exactly what emotion he wants to produce, and in setting out to produce it he may not experience the emotion himself. There is also *amusement* art, whose intent is *not* to have the emotions aroused "spill over" into practical life, but rather to "work off" or discharge these emotions in the process of experiencing the work itself (as in Aristotle's theory of catharsis); here again the "artist" knows in advance what he wishes to do: he is expressing no emotion, but arousing in others, in a calculating way, emotions which he may never feel himself. All these, then, are examples of "false art"—false because they are really not art but craft. They adopt means to a preconceived end, and as such they cannot be art.[1]

To all this one is inclined to object by asking such questions as

[1] It is, I hope, apparent that whereas on the theory the process of the builder is one of craft, the process of the *architect* is one of art (whether good or bad). The architect has the ideas (intuitions) for the completed building,

these: "Can't an artist have some end-in-view when he starts to compose a work, even 'in his head'? Surely the tragedian knows that it will turn out as a tragedy and not as a comedy, or an epic, or a symphony! And can't he do it with an end-in-view, such as instilling religious faith in the populace, or making money, or perhaps just producing esthetic experiences in his audience? Surely there *is* great religious art, deliberately designed to serve an end! Great works of art have even been created for money; many, for example, were commissioned. This may not be the best or most usual way in which great works of art are born, but even so it is surely possible, and pretty surely has often happened; any theory which denies such a possibility is certainly mistaken!"

The Croce-Collingwood theory leaves itself wide open for such objections; fortunately not all of them (if any) are fatal to it, since they rest on ambiguities in the concepts of means and end—ambiguities which the theory itself does nothing to clarify, but which we must now try to clarify for ourselves.

One distinction will be useful at the outset. Surely no one could be disqualified from the position of artist because, contrary to his intent, his works were used by his contemporaries or successors as a means to an end. Even if in his artistic process a given artist fulfilled the Croce-Collingwood requirements for being an artist rather than a craftsman, his work may later be *used* as (for example) political propaganda: that is, it may be used as a means to achieve a given end, and in this sense his work is a means to an end. No work of art is immune from such use or abuse. Clearly if a work cannot be a work of "art proper" if it is a means to an end in *this* sense, no work of art is secure. Let us distinguish, then, between the means-end relation in the *use* to which a work of art is put and the means-end relation in the artistic *process*; it is the latter which the theory is concerned to deny. A work of art, then, can be used as a means to an end but it cannot be created as a means to an end.

With this distinction made, however, our troubles are not over. One can still ask: "Why can't the artist know in advance what he wants to do? If he wants his composition to produce the same effect as the sea crashing against the rocks, why should this make him any the less an artist? If he wants to communicate the feeling associated with a calm and simple religious faith, why should this expel him from the ranks of artists? Surely Debussy's *La Mer* and the paintings of Giotto are great art! Why can it not be, not only that a work of art may be *used* as a means to an end, but that at the very inception

and the builder (a craftsman) builds to the architect's specifications. And the end-result of the process of getting architectural intuitions is no more known in advance to the architect than is the end-result of the process of getting musical intuitions to the composer.

of the intuition-expression process the artist may work toward a preconceived end?"

Can this objection be answered satisfactorily without doing violence to the Croce-Collingwood theory? Here again, I am persuaded that the answer depends on the meaning that is given to the term "end." The question, "Can the artist, at or near the beginning of the art-process, consciously aim at an end, toward which the whole art-process is a means?" may have different answers, depending on what the end is conceived to be. It may be (1) the completed intuition-expression in the artist's mind: it may be (2) the artifact, or externalized work (the materialization, as it were, of the artist's intuition-expression). It may even be (3) the effect which the artist wants the artifact to have upon the audience.

A. It seems quite clear that (1) can be and is, in the Croce-Collingwood theory, a means to (2). Once the completed intuition is present to the mind of the artist, he may paint or write, this being the means to the end of producing the artifact. Since this is clearly (on the theory) a matter of "technique," and it is equally clear that (on the theory) externalization is a craft, we need not hesitate to apply the means-end terminology to the relation between (1) and (2).

B. Also, (2) can be and often is a means to (3): the completed artifact may be (and may be so intended by the artist himself) as a means to the production of a certain specific effect, such that if it does not have this effect the artist may reproach himself (or his audience) for the failure of his work to produce this intended effect. This would occur if, for example, *La Mer* did not give people the "feel" of the sea.

C. The crucial question, however, is this: Can the art-process—the gradual process of intuition-expression in the artist's mind culminating in (1), the completed intuition-expression, be used as a means to the production of (1)? On this question, it would seem, the means-end contentions of the theory stand or fall. Even if the means-end relation applies to all the other items, it cannot apply to the relation between the art-process and the finished intuition-expression, in the face of all that the theory has to say against this, without abandoning the theory itself. It is this question, then, which we must now briefly discuss.

Is the art-process a means to the completed intuition-expression (in the artist's mind) as end? (1) In a very general sense, doubtless it is: If the artist were asked what end he had in view in undergoing all the "divine agonies" of artistic creation, he might well (and reasonably enough) reply that the completion of the expressive process—the fruition of his chaotic, inchoate, but developing intuitions in a unified work of art (even if, following Croce and Collingwood, the finished product is conceived only in his mind)—was the end toward

which he was working. In this sense, then, it would be hard to deny the applicability of the means-end relation even to the art-process.

(2) But when Collingwood denies that the means-end relation applies to the art-process, he means something much more specific than this. He means that the artist does not have his final end-in-view (the completed intuition-expression) "before his mind's eye" at the inception of the process; he does not know, for example, just what the completed painting (even as conceived in his mind) will look like until the intuition-expression process is completed. He may have a general idea—e.g. he surely knows that it will be a work of literature rather than a work of sculpture, and even that it will be a drama rather than an epic poem (though even here he may change his mind as his intuitions develop, as was the case with Milton in composing *Paradise Lost*)—but *he cannot specify in advance the details of the completed work* (again, even as conceived in his mind), the way a builder can tell you in advance the complete floor-plan and material specifications for the house he is building; for the artist does not yet know how the details of the completed intuition-expression process will take shape. He must "follow the dictates of his genius." If he could tell you in advance what the completed painting would look like, he would not need to go through the throes of creation. In this specific sense, then, Croce and Collingwood have given us an account of the way in which artists work, as opposed to the way in which craftsmen work; and this account seems to me on the whole to be both true and important—although, as we shall see later, it does not distinguish between good and bad artists.

There is, however, a point to be observed in connection with all this which may blunt considerably the force of the theory. Even if the artist, unlike the craftsman, does not know during the art-process what the upshot of it will be, it by no means follows that he does not know in advance what *effect* he wants it to have in his audience. For example, let us assume for the moment that Debussy wanted *La Mer* to give his hearers the same feeling that they would have beside the sounding surf at a certain place along the French seacoast where the composer once walked—that the experience he wanted his listeners to have was as close as possible to *that* experience of his; in this event he knew exactly what effect he wanted to achieve. Still, he did not know, until *La Mer* was completed, how the composition would sound (even "to his mind's ear")—the composition by means of which he wanted to evoke this effect; in bringing the composition to completion he may well have gone through all the chaos and turbulence that according to the theory characterizes the creative process; but, although he did not know what (1) would be like—the completed intuition-expression—he may have had a very exact idea of what (3)—the effect—would be like. In other words, even if the

art-process cannot, in Collingwood's sense, be a means to the production of (1), it may well—via (2)—be a means to the production of (3).

Some artists, such as Poe in his essay "The Poetic Principle," have given us accounts of their creative processes which seem to indicate a great deal of cold calculation of preconceived effects. Do such accounts—assuming their author to be telling the truth—violate Collingwood's denial of the means-end relation to the art-process? In the sense of the relation of the art-process to (1), the answer seems clearly to be No. But in the sense of the relation of the art-process to (3), which we just considered in the hypothetical case of *La Mer*, the answer seems clearly to be Yes. Collingwood never distinguished between these two, but applied his denial of the means-end relation to art indiscriminately, thus confusing the issue. Let us therefore examine it a bit more closely:

Poe may have had an uncommonly precise idea of what *effect* he wanted "The Raven" to work upon his readers; he may well have known, as he said, that such an effect could best be achieved by repeated alliterations and rhythms, by the repetition of such words as "nevermore," and by the association of gloom and foreboding carried by such words as "raven." Yet Poe did not know and could not have known in advance *what the exact nature of the completed poem* (even in his mind) would be; if he had, he would have needed only to recollect it and write it down, instead of planning it step by step. Thus even for such a case as Poe's, Collingwood's contention remains true that the completed poem was not present to his mind during the creative process (though its effect was), and therefore it could not in Collingwood's sense have been present as an end toward which his creative labours were means, as is the case with the builder and the house. Regarding the relation of the art-process to (1), therefore, Collingwood's thesis remains inviolate.

But it remains so at a cost which there is no evidence that Collingwood was aware of; for, in the face of such examples as Poe's, another aspect of his theory of art, which may have been equally precious to him, must be abandoned: namely, his denial that the artist's activity can consist of *arousing* emotion (as opposed to expressing it). This may not at first be apparent, because Collingwood represents the situation to be as follows

Art	*Craft*
1. No means-end relation	Means-end relation
2. Expressing emotion	Arousing emotion

as if the import of the first and second lines were identical. But they are not, as we can see if we reflect that the end in the means-end

relation of the first column is the *completed intuition* (here Collingwood's thesis about art holds), whereas in the second column the end is the arousal of emotion—and of course the end of arousal is not the completed intuition at all but the *effect upon an audience*. As we have just seen, an artist cannot at the beginning of the art-process know exactly what the completed work of art, even in his mind, will be like; but he *may* know—as in "The Raven"—what he wants the effect of it on the audience to be. And if he knows what he wants the effect to be, he may deliberately set out to *arouse* this effect in his audience, often without feeling the emotion himself. And thus his activity will be that of arousing emotion, which according to Collingwood does not characterize art proper at all. It surely seems quite plain that what Poe was consciously trying to do was to arouse a certain kind of emotion in his readers. What Collingwood apparently does not see is that these two theses—the first: that the means-end relation is not applicable to the art-process; the second: that the art-process is one of expressing rather than arousing—are separable from each other. The example of "The Raven" does not violate the first thesis but it does violate the second. Collingwood's denial of the means-end relation (in his specific sense) to the art-process will not have to be abandoned because of cases like Poe's, but his insistence that the artist's activity is never that of arousing emotion quite surely will.[1]

7. We have just seen that the art-process may involve an end in the sense of a foreknowledge of the effect to be aroused in the audience but that Collingwood is right in holding that the art-process cannot be a means toward the completed intuition as end, if calling this an end implies foreknowledge of the nature of the completed work (completed artistic intuition). Nevertheless, a very damaging criticism can be made even about the point on which Collingwood is right, and it is this: that the art-process cannot be a means of distinguishing good art from bad. Let us grant that Shakespeare did not work to advance specifications as the cabinet-maker does; but then neither does the poet next door. The processes of Shakespeare and the poet next door both differ from that of the cabinet-maker in respect of the means-end relation—we may grant this; but Collingwood's description of the art-process as opposed to the craft-process

[1] "But if intuition *is* (on the theory) expression, how can we say that Poe's is a case of arousing emotion? Doesn't 'aroused' mean 'not expressed,' and doesn't this (on the theory) mean 'not intuited'? And yet you don't deny that Poe had intuitions."

The answer is, of course, that arousing and expressing do not really turn out to be exclusive of each other. The terminus of the expression-intuition process is (1), while that of arousal is (3). Thus Poe was still expressing, for he did not know the nature of the poem in advance and had to "intuit" his way toward the completed poem; but at the same time he was also *arousing* emotion because he had his eye on (3) during the entire process.

provides no criterion for distinguishing the great artist from the merely would-be artist or the divinely inspired sophomore or the "flash in the pan." "Art proper," says Collingwood in effect, "is what's produced in this way (here is appended his description of the art-process); art falsely so called, on the contrary, is not." The most telling criticism of this whole procedure is that it attempts to distinguish art from non-art, not by examining the artifact, but by investigating the process which brought it into being. In other words, Collingwood accepts or rejects something as a work of art on the basis of the *process*, and it is to the process that virtually all his attention is directed, whereas the truth surely is that we must reject or accept it on the basis of the *product*. It is not my purpose in this paper to try to provide any criterion for such evaluation, or to say whether there is one or many, or indeed any at all; the only point I wish to make here is that *an examination of the process is irrelevant to an evaluation of the product*,[1] whatever the criteria for such evaluation may be.

If this is so, what recourse is there for Collingwood in this situation?

A. In spite of the objection, Collingwood might simply define "art" as "whatever was produced in such-and-such a way." To know whether something was a work of art we would then examine, not the work itself, but the processes which led to its existence. In those cases where no knowledge of the artist was available, we would simply have to suspend our judgment of its value. This seems to be a desperate expedient indeed.

B. More interesting, however, is this alternative: We could hold that we *can* know independently of knowing the process whether something is to be called a work of art, but interpret Collingwood's theory as an *empirical generalization*: "Whenever true art exists, there existed in the artist the art-process (such as described by the theory); and whenever the art-process occurs, the product of it is a work of art proper." In other words, Collingwood's theory would assert an empirical correlation between a certain type of process and a certain type of product.

As a process-product generalization of this kind, would the theory stand up? It seems to me that it would not:

(1) Does every example of an art-process, as described by the theory, always lead to an art-product? (Is every A a B?) If this means

[1] It does not matter here whether we consider the product to be the physical artifact or the completed intuition in the artist's mind. Both are here opposed to the *process* leading up to their existence. (If the product is taken to be the intuition in the artist's mind, we have of course the practical difficulty of knowing exactly what that was; therefore it is probably more practicable to take "product" to mean "artifact.")

a product of any esthetic value,[1] the answer seems plainly in the negative. The poet next door may regularly go through all the agonies of the art-process and yet his efforts fizzle out into a wholly inferior product or none at all: the mountain has produced a mouse. For every thousand instances of the art-process there is probably barely one instance of an art-product worth looking at twice. The realm of art would contain an embarrassment of riches, far beyond what it now possesses, if every art-process (à la Collingwood) led to an example of "art truly so called."

(2) Is every example of a product which is "art truly so called" invariably produced by an art-process? (Is every B an A?) This question is harder to answer, because we must first know what part(s) of the theory are expendable as a description of the process. (a) It is probably safe to say that products of esthetic value *usually* come into existence as a result of a process in which the artist was led gradually to his final artistic intuition, unlike the case of the builder who builds to advance specifications; and that therefore Collingwood's denial of the means-end relation (in his specific sense) to the art-process, unlike the house-building process, is justified. But, the processes by which great works of art have come into being are extremely various; and Shakespeare's plays would be no less great if they had been created in a manner far different from that described by the theory. (b) If the expression-arousal distinction is employed to separate them from each other, it will not do the trick either. As we have already seen, great art may come into being in order to give the "feel" of the seashore, or to arouse religiosity, or to honour the Pharaoh, or to preach communism (as with Orozco), or to inculcate materialism (as with Lucretius). It may be that great art is more often created if the artist was not trying deliberately to arouse emotions in others; but this is far from certain—one would hate to stake his life on it. (c) In any case, a negative reply to the question is virtually guaranteed if we put to ourselves this query: If we have once judged a work, such as *Hamlet*, as great art, would our evaluation of it be changed if we suddenly learned that the process of its creation was totally unlike anything described as belonging to "art proper" by the Croce-Collingwood theory? Do we, for that matter, hesitate to describe Shakespeare's works as great because we know nothing about the processes that led to them? Do we suspend our judgment of the artistic merits of drawings on cave walls made by our prehistoric ancestors simply because we know

[1] If *no* reference to its esthetic value is intended in calling it art, then of course the answer is Yes, but it amounts only to a tautology: If an art-product is whatever results from the art-process, then it is true but tautological to say, "Everything that results from the art-process is a work of art (i.e. a result of the art-process)."

nothing, nor presumably shall we ever know anything, about the processes involved in their creation? If our answer is in the negative—as it surely must be if our esthetic judgments are not to be entirely suspended or reduced to utter chaos— then we shall have to hold to Herbert Dingle's judgment that "criticism is of the product only";[1] and anything we may happen to know or fail to know about the process which led to the product, however interesting it may be to us as psychologists, will be entirely irrelevant to our judgment of it as a work of art. Collingwood's theory, then, while it enables us to distinguish between the artist and the craftsman (in his sense)—e.g. the builder who builds to specifications and the sculptor who does not—it fails entirely to provide a criterion for distinguishing great works of art from artistic failures. Indeed, it fails to distinguish the artist from the creative mathematician, the scientific theorist, and the puzzle-solver, none of whom (in their characteristic activities) can "see the end in the beginning" any more than the artist can do so. The artist is (though it is not very helpful to say so) one who creates good works of art; and for them to be good works of art it is in no way necessary for any single kind of process to be involved in their creation.

[1] Herbert Dingle, *Science and Literary Criticism*, page 37.

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PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY IN MORALS

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THE controversy between teleologists and deontologists, whether under these names or in other guises, is one of the long-standing disputes of ethics. In different branches of philosophy the perennial nature of a dispute may point to different things: in some, for example, it may properly incline one to say "a plague on both your houses" and thereafter to look for some way of disposing of the whole problem around which the philosophical problem has raged; in ethics, on the other hand, root-and-branch methods of excision are to be deplored, for here a perennial issue usually draws attention to points of view which have somehow to be reconciled if the problems underlying them are to be overcome. The deontology-teleology controversy seems to me a case in point. Here, if anywhere in ethics, a reconciliation must be effected; and in the present paper my primary aim is to induce deontologists and teleologists to abandon their mutual hostility.[1] I shall attempt to carry out this mission of philosophical good will through examining the ways in which we justify imperatives. In the first section of the paper I shall say something about the controversy itself, making it clear that I consider that it has roots which it would be inconvenient to expose at this stage of the inquiry; in the second I shall study the justification of a number of typical non-moral imperatives; in the third I shall apply the findings of the second to the justification of moral imperatives; and finally, in the fourth section I shall return to the deontology-teleology controversy and attempt to elucidate how it arises, to point out the two levels on which the same dispute (as it seems to me) can be found, and to suggest a way in which the essentials of the rival views may be accepted and combined.

I

What is this controversy about? Much time and labour might profitably be devoted to clarifying the various aspects of the dispute, for it is certainly complex. Initially, however, I shall content myself with a perfectly straightforward account of it, namely, that which Sir W. David Ross gives in his recently published book, *Kant's Ethical Theory*. (Ross narrows the dispute to one between utilitarians

[1] I am aware, of course, that Professor Toulmin, Mr. Nowell-Smith and others have written about ethics from what one might term a combined point of view. But I do not think that any of these writers has made clear how the controversy arises or why it has sometimes been a fierce one. Furthermore, I am not satisfied with any of their attempts at a reconciliation.

and intuitionists, but there is every reason to avoid limiting it in this way, and I shall therefore very seldom refer in what follows to intuitionism and only occasionally to utilitarianism.) On page 21 he writes as follows: "Utilitarianism says we should set ourselves to fulfil promises only because, and only when, doing so is likely to redound to the general pleasure, or the general good. Intuitionism says that the fact that a promise has been made constitutes in itself a reason why it should be fulfilled without our needing to look beyond it. And similarly it maintains that the returning of benefits received and the making of restitution for wrongs inflicted are from their very nature, and not from their effects, duties." Here, then, are two views with regard to our alleged specific duties: the teleologists insist that they should be carried out because, and only so far as, they can be shown to promote the realization of ends which are valued for their own sakes, i.e. because, and in so far as, they further certain purposes; the deontologists, on the other hand, insist that they should be carried out without consideration of the ends which they may serve, i.e. simply because of their nature as specific duties.

While I consider neither of these positions satisfactory as stated by Ross, I sympathize with both parties to the dispute in the sense that it seems to me that they are both drawing attention (however inadequately) to general features of morality that clamour for recognition. I also think that the most cursory examination of what we say and do in our capacity as moral agents is sufficient to provide us with a case for attempting to reconcile the teleological and deontological points of view. Thus, it is surely fantastic to cut moral rules adrift from purposes altogether, suggesting that they function quite independently of purposes and even that it is strictly a matter of moral indifference whether they further any purposes. Such a view makes nonsense of the greater part of all ethical discussion. But the pure teleological position accords only slightly better with what we say, not in our relatively sophisticated or philosophical moments, but in those ethical discussions which sometimes precede or follow upon our actual moral decisions. It is just not the case that we ordinarily survey our own or other people's actions in the light of those ultimate purposes which figure so largely in the literature of utilitarianism. Usually we judge our own or other people's actions favourably or unfavourably according as they conform with or violate a specific moral rule or as they reveal or betray the presence or absence of certain dispositions, e.g. kindliness, courage, loyalty, etc., and neither of these procedures lends any plausibility to the utilitarian position. Thus, challenged by B as to why he has done something, A ordinarily replies, "Because I promised," "Because that was the plain truth of the matter," "Because that was the only honest thing to do," etc. I do not claim

that these are the only procedures; what I assert is (1) that they are the usual ones, (ii) that the references to specific moral rules are commonly accepted as sufficient grounds on which to base a moral verdict, and (iii) that these considerations—simple as they are—constitute a prima facie case for a deontological strand in our ethical thought.

II

I now wish to say something of the ways in which we justify non-moral imperatives. The point of this apparent digression is, first, that such an inquiry is simpler and therefore likely to assist us with the more difficult inquiry which is our principal concern, and secondly, that it may be said to move through waters that have been less muddied by the monster splashings of great philosophers. Of course, one could easily deny the relevance of this subordinate inquiry, either by saying that moral rules are not imperatives, or by maintaining that non-moral imperatives are too dissimilar from moral imperatives for any study of the former to assist us with the study of the latter. But it is plainly impossible to wage war on all fronts simultaneously, and therefore, for present purposes, I shall assume that I have already vanquished those who would wish to mount these particular offensives.

The following should be of assistance to us by way of examples:

(i) Halt!
(ii) You really ought to see that film.
(iii) In future men will stop work for lunch at 1 p.m.
(iv) One ought to make a point of seeing foreign films.

In a broad sense these are all imperatives, although they are not all commands. They can also be thought of as four rungs of a ladder which stretches from the simplest of commands to a large class of moral imperatives, namely, moral rules.

"Halt!" is one of the simplest kinds of commands. In such cases one person gives an order and another person or group of persons is expected to obey it without delay. (ii) is a recommendation rather than an order. It is convenient to call it a muted imperative as this reminds us that whereas when we issue an order it is obeyed or disobeyed, when we give advice it is accepted or rejected. (iii) differs from (i) and (ii) in that it is a rule i.e. it prescribes a series of actions which are to be repeated indefinitely in the circumstances specified in the rule itself. (iv) is another recommendation (if it is an imperative) but it differs from (ii) in that it takes the form of a rule. It differs from all the others, however, in being open to a number of interpretations—and these are worth examining. For Kant it would have been a hypothetical imperative of the form, "If you want x

then do y." Thus, it might be taken to mean, "If you wish to secure some of the benefits of foreign travel or if you want to be considered a member of the intelligentsia, etc., then make a point of going to see foreign films." This is a possible interpretation. But if we accept it we should no longer regard the sentence as an imperative at all, for surely, on this interpretation, the alleged hypothetical imperative turns out to be the disguised statement of a causal law, "If x, then y," "If one goes to see foreign films regularly then such results will inevitably follow." Of course, some true imperatives do use the hypothetical form, but on examination I think it becomes clear that they are quite distinct from Kant's hypothetical imperatives. Thus, a mother might say to her little girl, "If you're staying in the kitchen you've got to keep still." This is not the statement of a causal law describing what happens if one remains in the kitchen; it is equivalent to the following concession and order conjoined—"You can stay in the kitchen or go out; in this kitchen you've to got keep still." It is therefore a strong imperative. Briefly, then, an imperative must do more than inform; in addition, it must seek (in varying degrees of strength and precision) to direct. (iv) could also be taken as a recommendation addressed to a certain group, e.g. "those with such and such aspirations, pretensions, etc." Interpreted in this way it is a piece of advice which exploits the unrestricted "one" so as to achieve a greater exclusiveness ("everybody-who-is-anybody") and may be said to contain a certain threat—exclusion from the select society to which it covertly refers. Alternatively it can be taken as truly addressed to everybody, in which case it begins to be difficult to distinguish it from a moral rule. Normally it would be taken as a recommendation addressed to a certain group however vaguely distinguished.

An imperative, whether stark or muted, can always be challenged; that is to say, it is always possible to ask the person who gave the advice, the order, the warning, etc., to justify his having given it. When a challenge of this kind is thrown out how will the imperative be justified? (i) is a very useful illustration in this connexion for the methods by which it is justified are unusually clear. What sorts of challenges might be issued in response to such an imperative? It would seem that they must take the form of one or other of two questions, namely: (*a*)What was the point of asking me to halt? and (*b*) Have you the authority (or right) to give the order 'Halt!"? Of course, while the sentry (real or false) is pointing his bayonet at your stomach you are unlikely to question the order; but later, when the situation is no longer threatening, you may investigate the incident with a view to obtaining a delayed justification. Now (*a*) is a demand for a teleological justification; you want to be told that ordering people to halt in such and such circumstances serves such

and such military ends. You can then either accept or reject the proferred justification. If you reject it this will be either because you dissociate yourself from the purposes to which an appeal has been made, or because the circumstances in which the order was given were not of the sort specified so that the imperative (in your view) cannot be justified by reference to the purposes cited. But even if you approve the purposes and recognize the legitimacy of the circumstances you do not necessarily consider the order to have been justified for there remains the further question: had the man who gave the order the right to give it? This further question is an inquiry into authority and credentials. It asks to be shown, first, that the order was given by someone with authority of a definite sort (e.g. a member of Her Majesty's Forces), and secondly, that the authority vested in the person who gave the order was sufficient to validate the order which he gave. Clearly, then, a full justification of the order is partly teleological and partly non-teleological, involving a reference to authority.

Is it possible to justify the muted imperatives (ii) and (iv) in both the ways that I have described? It is possible, but in such cases the authority involved is far less clearly defined. If no reference can be made to purposes questions of justification do not arise; one has simply deserted the sphere of reason. If, on the other hand, no reference can be made to any authority, however vague and imprecisely defined, one is outside the orbit of imperatives, for imperatives seek to direct conduct and one directs by right of the authority which one possesses. But can these generalities be made good in relation to my illustrations? If I ask "Why?" when you say "You really ought to see that film," you can give many sensible and acceptable answers, e.g. "I know you'd enjoy it," "The photography is very good," "The direction is excellent," "You are shown a lot of Rome and Paris," etc. Although not all these reasons are obviously teleological (although some of them are), I should want to claim that they are all at least partly teleological. But to what authority, in such cases, can one appeal? In such circumstances a justification by reference to authority would seldom be asked for. But one is always possible, and there are circumstances in which it would be demanded. This becomes sufficiently obvious when one recalls that advice is not proferred to everybody and that sometimes it is withheld owing to disparities of status. Thus, the clerk in an insurance office who might say "You really ought to see that film" to an insurance inspector or the local manager, would be unlikely to give such advice—at least in this form—to the general manager of the company or to one of its directors. Again, the owner of a car does not usually offer advice to the garage mechanic who is repairing it; to go further than to make a very tentative suggestion would be

thoroughly tactless. It is surely a gross error to suppose that an expert is simply one who has more information than the run of people about a certain subject; for, in addition, he enjoys a certain status; and to have a certain status is to have a certain degree of authority. There are circumstances, then, in which we should all be disposed to ask, "By what right do you advise ME?" And to such a question there are innumerable potentially appropriate answers, e.g. "by right of friendship," "by right of seniority," "by right of long association," or even "as one human being to another." My general conclusion is therefore as follows: that a non-moral imperative is always justified, first, by pointing out the relations in which it stands to certain purposes, and secondly, by reference to an authority, however vaguely conceived.

It might be contended against this conclusion, not that our justifications do not commonly have both these aspects (for that would be very difficult to deny) but that they are not on a level, since, in the end, the second mode of justification is reducible to the first. Thus—to return to the first of my illustrations—the authority vested in the sentry is itself to be justified by reference to military purposes. In answer to this objection it would be sufficient to point out that authority cannot be reduced to or derived from purposes any more than it can be reduced to or derived from power. But while this is sufficient answer it may be of value to make one or two further and less general comments. First, there is a passage here from the justification of the order to the justification of vesting the man who gave the order with sufficient authority to give it—quite a different justification. Nothing that the teleologist can say has any tendency to show either that there are not two questions with a bearing on justification that can be asked with respect to that order or that they do not demand quite different answers. The proposed reduction must therefore be effected at a more fundamental level. Secondly, while the vesting of authority can usually be justified by means of an appeal to purposes, one has to remember that it can also be justified by means of an appeal to a higher authority. Thus, one can justify the vesting of authority in the sentry not only by showing that certain military purposes are served by it but also by pointing out that the authority has been conferred by officers with the authority to confer it. Similarly, purposes can be justified either by linking them with more fundamental purposes to which they become the means or by pointing out that they have been chosen by an authority (e.g. the state, the church, the expert) with the right to identify itself with this purpose rather than with that. It would seem that the dualistic character of the process of justification is exhibited at all levels and that it is not affected by the views we may hold concerning the two hierarchies of purposes and authorities.

III

Moral rules have a number of features which set them apart from all other imperatives: for example, they are entirely unrestricted recommendations addressed to everybody; they provide reasons for and against actions which are entitled to outweigh all other considerations, etc. Nevertheless, in the essentials of how they are justified they resemble non-moral imperatives. Thus, in my view, they can be justified in two ways: (i) by showing the relations in which they stand to certain purposes; and (ii) by showing the relations in which they stand to certain authorities. The complete justification of a moral imperative demands the use of both these methods.

Let me use the moral rule "One ought to keep one's promises" for purposes of illustration. Do we ever raise the question, "Why ought we to keep our promises?" Deontologists are surely not so locked away from the moral discourse of the world as not to have heard occasional justifications of moral rules. Kant himself—whether consistently or otherwise—provides us with teleological justifications of promise-keeping; and in so doing he is only following in the footsteps of the common man whose moral acumen or insight he professed to revere, for it is a commonplace to be told what would happen if promises were not usually kept or if people did not customarily tell the truth. (Of course it is universally recognized that some promises should be broken and that some lies are morally obligatory. But I cannot undertake to elucidate the complex subject of conflicting obligations at the present time. I should maintain with Ross that the fact that a certain action would fulfil a promise if it were carried out always creates a moral presumption in favour of doing it, but that we have a number of prima facie obligations and that these can conflict in such a way as to make it unavoidable that we should fail to fulfil them all. Our decisions with regard to which should be fulfilled seem to me to be made by assessing the alternatives in the light of certain purposes.)

But what about the alleged reference to authority? I wish to claim that such references are also to be found in ordinary ethical discussion but that for reasons which I hope to produce later in this section they are both less frequent and less obvious than our references to purposes. However, they can be detected if we look for them. Thus, it is not unusual when one moral agent invites another to approve his plans, for the agent to whom they are submitted, if he does not approve of them, to point out that they are inconsistent with what the agent accepts as his code or set of principles. He may say, "I thought that kind of thing was against your principles," or "I thought you didn't believe in wire-pulling . . ., etc." Here—quite explicitly it seems to me—an authority is being appealed to. What

authority? The only one possible: the authority of the agent himself. In the end—as Kant pointed out—it is we who bind ourselves. What he failed to see (owing to his metaphysic) is that the armoury of righteousness contains many alternative suits of mail, and that we ourselves must choose which to buckle on and which to leave rusting on the walls. If we do what we think right at the time we do not blame ourselves, for, in such cases, we have followed the rules that we have incorporated in our own ethic and it is by that that we judge ourselves and expect to be judged by other people.

At this point in our theorizing we are presented with alternative conceptions of ethics. According to the first view we have a choice between different sorts of ethics, the nature of our ethic depending on what authority we accept as ultimate in this sphere. Thus, all the following offer themselves to us as the ultimate authority in morals: God, the state, society, our social class, the individual moral agent. Each choice gives us a distinct kind of ethic. According to my view, on the other hand, we have only a choice between ethics and non-ethics, for the whole notion of morality disappears if we fail to recognize that the individual is the ultimate authority. The possession of such authority is an indispensable part of what is meant by the conception of moral agency: the individual begins to be a moral agent—he stands on the threshold of morality—precisely when the social mores, etc., cease to possess ultimate authority and the seat of moral sovereignty is firmly held in reserve for himself. Of course his code may be conventional in the sense of diverging at no point from that which is most widely adhered to in his community; what matters from the standpoint of moral agency is that it should be his own code, that it should have been appropriated and interiorized by the agent. Of these rival views surely it is the former that must be rejected. This can be seen, I think, if we consider the moral situation which faces the individual; for that situation forces him to decide not only what he is to do but also what rules and principles he is to accept. Of any principle that is brought to his notice, no matter what its source, he is able to ask, "Is this principle acceptable?" and this question, which must be answered by the ultimate moral authority, can only be answered by himself. To discover that one has the power to choose is the knowledge of good and evil that leads to the setting up of a new moral legislature. Thus, God proposes, but man disposes in the sense of choosing either to obey or disobey; the state commands, but the individual can choose to die rather than conform with its will. Morality therefore pulverizes society, splitting communities, breaking up families, and dividing groups of friends till at last each individual stands alone with his own choices to record. To claim that God, the state, or society is the ultimate authority in morals is to pretend that the ultimate decisions are not

made by the individual; it is the attempt to cast off one's moral agency, and this is as misconceived as to think that one can throw off one's skin in the way that one throws off one's clothes.

Furthermore, I think it can be shown that the view I am putting forward underlies many of our accepted distinctions and practices. All the following, for example, can be said to point to it:

(i) We distinguish between an agent's conformity with a widely accepted rule of conduct and his conformity with a rule that he himself has accepted. Only the latter is thought by us to be moral conduct, at any rate in our attentive moments. A parallel distinction arises in connexion with moral instruction. Standards—moral for us who have accepted them—are thrust on the child who is coerced, in a variety of ways, into conforming with them. But this conformity is premoral. The fundamental characteristic of premorality is that the standards to which we conform are conceived of as quite external to ourselves. It is because others accept them and thrust them on us that we conform with them; we ourselves neither accept nor reject them, for we are still innocent of the knowledge of good and evil that springs from an awareness of the capacity to choose. Premorality is therefore essentially authoritarian just as morality is no less essentially libertarian.

(ii) As Kant insisted—following the almost universally accepted view—respect is due to all moral agents as such regardless of their conduct. This respect, which is owed without its having been earned, is difficult to account for without recourse to the view that there is here a recognition, however dim, of the existence of an independent centre of moral legislation.

(iii) We distinguish between the vindication or exoneration of persons and the justification of actions in a way that surely implies the view that although we may condemn the individual's actions without consideration of the moral rules that he accepts, the individual himself may only be condemned for failure to conform with his own moral rules. A number of common sayings show the extent to which this distinction is recognized, e.g. "At least he practises what he preaches," "I'll say this for him, he acts (or lives) up to his own lights," etc.

(iv) Quite a few of the distinctions of ordinary language seem to point in the same direction. Consider, for example, the words "desirable" and "commendable." It is notorious to all who have been through the mill of undergraduate studies that one cannot pass from either "I desire x" or "He desires x" to "x is desirable"; on the other hand, although one is not prepared to pass from "He commends x" to "x is commendable," one is willing to pass from "I commend x" to "x is commendable." The passage from "I desire x" to "x is desirable" is illegitimate, in spite of my moral authority, because

my desiring x has no connection with any of my moral decisions whereas my claim that x is desirable does have such a connection. The passage from "He commends x" to "x is commendable" is not permitted because the person to whom "he" refers cannot speak with authority for us. But we can speak with authority for ourselves, and therefore we do not require to distinguish between "I commend x" and "x is commendable." Here, it seems to me, the authority of the individual moral agent reaches the surface of language.

In spite of these indications that the individual agent is regarded as the ultimate moral authority this is far less clearly recognized than might be expected. The main reasons for this seem to be the following. First, in any given society the moral rules which are accepted by fellow members can be forecasted with high probability, and therefore one is very apt to take for granted the moral agent's acceptance of them until it becomes clear that he is morally differentiated from his fellows. Thus, one assumes an indifference to the taking of insect life until an Albert Schweitzer appears with an ethic of "reverence for life." Secondly, certain moral rules are all but inescapable features of any moral code. As Nowell-Smith says, "it is difficult to imagine what life in society would be like if we abandoned them."[1] The moral agent's acceptance of these rules may be assumed with a specially high degree of confidence. Thirdly, the observance of certain rules is so vital that conformity with them must sometimes be insisted upon even when the moral agents themselves do not accept them. Many of our most painful tragedies are attributable to this cause, as, e.g., when national leaders feel themselves obliged (sometimes sincerely) to imprison or even execute rebels whose moral stature they have recognized to be greater than their own. In all these ways the moral authority of the individual tends to be obscured especially as the ordinary course of existence does not leave us with sufficient time to apply all the distinctions that we honour in our moments of reflection.

It might be further objected that the moral agent cannot always accord finality to his own moral decisions (as is required by my view of his authority), for, after a moral reorientation, we sometimes retrospectively condemn not only our past actions but also ourselves. Four points may be made in answer to this objection. First, it is much harder to separate doer and deed when the deed is one's own, especially as one may consider oneself obliged to make reparations for one's past actions even although, at the time they were performed, one regarded them as morally unobjectionable. Secondly, one does not normally require to distinguish one's actions from oneself; to condemn the one is to disapprove of the other. Such a distinction is only necessary with respect to one's past actions. It is liable

[1] P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Ethics," p. 18.

to be overlooked, therefore, because it is an exceptional case. Thirdly, intense regret—such as St. Augustine of Hippo felt at the time he was writing his "Confessions" over the theft of a few pears when he was a boy—is not always distinguished as it should be from moral condemnation. Finally—and this is a more substantial point—we often recognize long after we have done something that even at the time we thought it was wrong. Indeed, many of our apparent moral conversions consist of no more than the throwing down of the pillars of rationalization (in the psycho-analytic sense) which formed a commodious ethical dwelling that was never genuinely tenanted. In such cases moral disfavour justifiably attaches to the moral agent as well as to his action. Thus, while it is true that we sometimes wander through the halls of memory and turn them retrospectively into chambers of horrors by insisting on seeing them through the lens of a fresh ethic, we do not apply the lens to our past self but continue to view him through the more friendly lens of our former moral code.

One more objection deserves attention if only on the ground of its great age. This objection is as well stated by Hobbes as by any later writer. Hobbes says: "It was merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself (i.e. to oblige himself), because he can release himself at his own pleasure, and he that can do this is already actually free."[1] In answer to this objection it seems enough to urge the following two points. First, our moral decisions are coherent in such a way that the maintenance of certain decisions when others have been repudiated or the reversal of certain decisions when others are being maintained is quite irrational. Thus, in so far as moral rules are justifiable by reason of the relations in which they stand to certain purposes, it is absurd to repudiate a moral rule if one still identifies oneself with the purposes to which one would appeal in its support. Secondly, to release oneself from an obligation by rejecting a moral rule that formerly one accepted is also to release other people from the same obligation in the sense of eschewing the use of that moral rule when passing verdicts on their actions. For both these reasons the view that I am putting forward does not pave the way for unscrupulous juggling with obligations and moral rules.

IV

It should already be clear that in my view the deontology-teleology controversy arises through the failure to attend to the dualistic character of justification, i.e. through the failure to recognize that there are always two sorts of reasons which can be given for obeying an imperative (moral or non-moral). Utilitarians, and teleologists

[1] *De Cive*," VI, 14.

generally, have perceived and emphasized that moral rules are justified by reference to purposes, or, more simply, that we recommend them to others by pointing out that acting conformably with them furthers certain ends; on the other hand, deontologists have insisted (with varying degrees of obscurity) on the element of commitment in ethics, i.e. on the fact that our having accepted certain purposes or moral rules itself provides us with a reason for furthering them or acting consistently with them. The appeal of the one school is to purposes; the appeal of the other is (or ought to be) to authority. Unfortunately, while the utilitarians have followed their own thread right through the tangled skein of ethics, the same cannot be said for the deontologists, who came far nearer to a clear statement of their essential points in Kant than in the writings of subsequent members of their school, e.g. Ross. In fact, Kant appears to have been the only member of the school who traced the thread of the deontological argument (however obscurely and unsatisfactorily) to its meeting place with the authority of the individual moral agent.

Let me now point out what I consider to be the principal errors of these rival groups of theorists beginning with the deontologists. When the deontologist ignores the teleological aspect of ethics he is making all the following serious mistakes: (i) He is doing far less than justice to the place of reason in ethics, either by refusing to countenance such questions as "Why ought one to keep one's promises?" (in spite of the fact that they are frequently asked and almost as frequently answered), or by returning answers to them, which, as they stand, are almost unintelligible, e.g. Ross's statement that "the returning of benefits received and the making of restitution for wrongs inflicted are from their very nature, and not from their effects, duties." Even the answer which, on my view, they should return to such questions, namely, "Because these are rules which you yourself use and therefore accept," is far less frequently to the point than those provided by the teleologist; for, if the question is a really serious one and does not simply arise out of our tendency to rebel against our commitments, the rule which one has been asked to justify is not one which has been accepted by the questioner. (ii) He is failing to recognize the coherence of our moral decisions, thereby encouraging the view—which is thoroughly mischievous—that they are sometimes *ad hoc* fiats. Of course this might be denied by pointing out that ordinarily he does not accept an imperativist interpretation of ethics, although he is usually something of a Kantian; but this does not answer the objection so much as to necessitate a change in its form, for it remains true that the isolated intuitions of a Ross still retard our appreciation of our moral standards. (iii) Finally, he is denying the community aspect of ethics,

for it is only because moral imperatives are susceptible of teleological justification that we are able to speak as we do to one another about our moral problems. Of course, some communication is possible among pure deontologists; they can exchange news of their intuitions or *ad hoc* fiats, or point out to one another the logical relations subsisting between some wider and narrower rules of conduct; but all this forms a very small part of our actual moral discussions.

Is the teleologist in equally serious error when he ignores the deontological aspect of ethics? It depends on how much he is prepared to deny. If he refuses to accept any deontological dilution of his position his errors are worse than those of the pure deontologist; if, on the other hand, he simply denies that we stand committed to specific moral rules, his errors are less serious than those of the deontologist. Let me explain these two positions, beginning with the more radical. If the teleologist refuses to have any truck with the deontologist, either denying or failing to recognize that he stands committed to the furtherance of certain purposes, it seems to me that he destroys ethics altogether, for then he is denying or failing to recognize that it is by the decisions of the moral agent—who alone has the necessary authority—that the specifically ethical uses of such words as "good," "right" and "ought" are introduced. The teleologist, if he is to enter the sphere of ethics, cannot say simply that people desire certain things, let alone that he desires them; he must say that he stands committed to the task of working for these things and that he recommends that other moral agents commit themselves in the same way as he has done. If asked, "Why should you bother about these ends or purposes?" the pure teleologist can only reply, "Because I'm like that," an answer which is not only devoid of ethical significance but destructive of ethical values; but if he leans on the deontologist he can say, "Because I approve of these purposes, i.e. because I have identified myself with them," an answer which is of ethical import because it records a fundamental moral decision of an agent with the authority to make such decisions. The deontological aspect of ethics is therefore the more fundamental, for without a moral agent endowed with authority ends stand together on the same zero level of ethical significance, the power they exercise in human lives being of no more than psychological interest. But once the moral agent has committed himself he has created an imperative which is categorical in the sense that it issues from an absolute authority and that it is entitled to take precedence over all other imperatives (save some imperatives of the same sort).

The less radical position that a teleologist may occupy—that taken up, it might be claimed, by the greatest utilitarians, e.g. Sidgwick and Moore—accepts the most fundamental of the deontologist's insights (if not in the form in which I think they should be

accepted) but denies a higher level deontological intrusion in the form of commitments to specific moral rules. (This is the level at which Ross chooses to defend the deontological viewpoint.) This is a far less objectionable theory, especially if it is held in a sufficiently flexible form. Thus, it might be contended that our specific moral rules are a medium through which the purposes to which we really owe allegiance manifest themselves. The medium is necessarily opaque for children who are unable to appreciate causal connections owing to their inexperience, etc.; but, as one becomes adult, the medium grows more and more transparent till one's eyes always light directly on the purposes themselves. On this view a deontological element at this level indicates immaturity; the path of moral enlightenment turns us all into good utilitarians. (The germ of this theory is to be found in J. S. Mill as well as in some later utilitarians.) Such a view of the matter might be said to meet the prima facie case for a deontological theory which I advanced at the end of the first section of this paper; I also question whether any absolutely knock-down objections can be brought against it. Nevertheless, I think the deontologist still has the better of the argument, my ground for this contention being that the circumstances of life give us adequate reasons for raising the status of recipes for right actions (as they are to be regarded on the view outlined above) to that of moral rules. I can make my points most easily with the help of an illustration drawn from outside the sphere of morality. Consider the Civil Defence rule that (duties permitting) one should lie down if one is in the vicinity of falling bombs and cannot take shelter. The sole object of this rule is the saving of life. And, in the main, it is an effective means of reducing the number of casualties. But it must sometimes happen (i) that people die in the act of obeying this rule who would have survived had they broken it, and (ii) that people survive in the act of disobeying the rule who would have died had they observed it. Furthermore, it must occasionally happen that a very thorough examination of the evidence after the raid is over would bring to light examples of either (i) or (ii). Suppose that such an investigation is carried out on some occasion and that it is established that A would have died had he observed the rule. The warden of the district is presumably glad that A has survived the raid, but he does not therefore approve of his conduct. This is not due to the aberrations of the official's mind. His displeasure as a warden is due to the facts that A could not possibly have thought (let alone have known) that his disobedience would have saved his life, and that his indifference to Civil Defence practice may have the most unfortunate consequences on some future occasion. What he wants to see is automatic conformity with the rules, such as members of the Armed Forces are trained to display; he is anxious that the rule should

come to be respected as if obedience to it was valuable for its own sake. And the ground of these preferences is simply that it is impossible to dispense with the mediation of rules owing to the fact that in the relevant circumstances we can never have sufficient information to have reason to think (let alone to know) that in this particular instance the rule should be waived. I should claim that the run of situations in which we are called upon to make a moral decision are similar to that which I have described in that we do not know sufficient about the probable consequences of our alternative courses of action to have any reliable grounds for waiving a moral rule. (Of course, if the situation is one in which two or more moral rules come into conflict in the sense of inclining us towards mutually exclusive courses of action we must bring our underlying purposes into play as best we can. Such conflicts are bound to lead to much uncertainty as it is rarely the case that they can be settled with a confident decision.) Of course, all this is fully consistent with the utilitarian position, and a number of utilitarians have advanced similar or identical grounds for regarding moral rules as more than rough guides or recipes.What they have failed to stress is that these teleological considerations lead us to accept moral rules, i.e. to bind ourselves to observe them, and that when we have committed ourselves in this way, our having committed ourselves is itself a ground for obeying them. It is on this that the deontologist should be insisting when he says (to return once more to Ross) that "the fact that a promise has been made constitutes in itself a reason why it should be fulfilled. . . ."

The reconciliation I am attempting therefore amounts to the following: the full acceptance of what the teleologist asserts accompanied by a refusal to deny some of the things which he denies; and the rejection of the deontologist's conclusions with regard to teleology accompanied by the acceptance—in a form that he might not wish to recognize—of what I take to be his essential contentions. The utilitarian, I am claiming, is quite wrong when he says that "we should set ourselves to fulfil promises only because, and only when, doing so is likely to redound to the greatest pleasure," for promise-keeping is a rule to which many of us are committed; on the other hand, the deontologist is wrong in refusing to look beyond promise-keeping to the purposes which it serves.

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ARISTOTLE AND CONFUCIUS

A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

MAX HAMBURGER

Introduction

"The composition of the lectures of which Aristotle's extant works are the notes probably belongs in the main to the twelve or thirteen years of his headship of the Lyceum, and the thought and research implied, even if we suppose that some of the spadework was done for him by pupils, implies an energy of mind which is perhaps unparalleled. During this time Aristotle fixed the main outlines of the classification of the sciences in the form which they still retain, and carried most of the sciences to a further point than they had hitherto reached; in some of them, such as logic, he may fairly claim to have had no predecessor, and for centuries no worthy successor . . . one of the greatest of analytic thinkers." Sir W. David Ross, *Aristotle.*

"Confucius . . . a man of high ability in many lines, a great statesman who was both courageous and high-minded, he sacrificed a successful political career to his state's good. A successful and eminent teacher and scholar . . . a man of deep insight into morality, he proclaimed the highest of ideals—a man must live by the code of complete gentlemanly conduct and by love for others . . . in religion he rose to heights rarely equalled in China . . . He was truly one of the world's greatest men, a treasure to his race and to others." Professor H. H. Dubs in *Philosophy*, 1951.

Professor Gilbert Murray has called Aristotle "the most characteristic philosopher of the Hellenic period . . . he is Greek in his *sophrosyne* or moderation; in his complete remoteness from primitive superstition; in his combination of intense intellectuality with human sympathy and interest in practical life; and in his essentially civic point of view." (*Stoic, Christian and Humanist*, London, 1943.) This statement by one of the most renowned authorities on Greek literature is strikingly suggestive of a comparison of Aristotle and Confucius. In Professor Murray's view Aristotle was "the most characteristic philosopher of the Hellenic period," i.e. the classical period as to be distinguished from the Hellenistic period. Confucius, too, is the most characteristic philosopher of the Chinese classical period, and, what is more, of Chinese philosophy in its totality. This is well borne out by Professor Fung Yu-lan's remark at the beginning and the end of volume II of his *History of Chinese Philosophy*. (Princeton, Vol. I, 1952, Vol. II, 1953.) Professor Fung Yu-lan termed the period discussed in volume I of his work, and extending from Confucius to about 100 B.C., "The Period of the Philosophers," and the age beginning with Tung Chung-shu (179–104 B.C.) to K'ang Yu-wei (A.D. 1858–1927) "The Period of Classical Learning." He admitted that thus far Chinese philosophy had hardly emerged from its medieval period,

and here he passes a remark which also recurs in the concluding pages of his work: "In order to gain a hearing for their ideas, the philosophers of this later period, no matter whether these ideas were new or not, were all obliged to attach themselves nominally to one or another of the schools that had flourished during the Period of the Philosophers, and more particularly, to the school of Confucian classicism." (Op. cit., p. 2, and still more accentuated, ibid., p. 720: all philosophers of the period of classical learning "could gain a hearing for their ideas only by attaching themselves to one or another of the philosophic schools of antiquity—which, for the most of them, meant the Confucian classics.") Thus, the preponderance of Confucian thought in Chinese philosophy is still more stressed than is Aristotle's position in Hellenic thought.

The subsequent remarks of Professor Gilbert Murray are even more suggestive of a comparison between Aristotle and Confucius. Aristotle's "*sophrosyne* or moderation" at once reminds us of the Confucian ideal of the "Mean in Action." Aristotle's "Human Sympathy" and "Interest in Practical Life" point to Confucius' *Jen* (Humaneness) and *Li* (Propriety, Principle of Social Order), as bound up with his interest in everyday life. Eventually Aristotle's "essentially civic point of view" reminds of Confucian philosophy in particular as well as of Chinese philosophy in general. For "Chinese philosophy, regardless of its different schools of thought, is directly or indirectly concerned with government and ethics. On the surface, therefore, it is concerned chiefly with society, and not with the universe; with the daily functions of human relations, not hell and heaven; with man's present life, but not his life in a world to come." (Fung Yu-lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, New York, 1950, p. 7.) Although this description emphasizes the this-worldliness of Chinese philosophy as contrasted with the other-worldliness of other philosophies, its emphasis on the philosophy of human relations is suggestive of Aristotle's "civic point of view" and at the same time the stress on the life in this world reminds of Aristotle's "complete remoteness from superstition." Thus Gilbert Murray's characterization of Aristotle certainly seems to be encouraging for a comparison of the Hellenic and the Chinese sage.

A confrontation of Aristotle and Confucius is furthermore suggested by Aristotle's own advice to the political speaker (who must be a student of rhetoric and political science) to study the constitutions, ethnical laws, travel books and histories of other nations (*Rhetoric* I.4 1360 a 30–37). This suggestion stemmed from notable precedents. Already Herodotus had compiled a considerable amount of comparative history, the Sophists were noted for their collection of laws of different nations, and Aristotle himself is still famous for his collection of 158 constitutions, of which that of Athens has been

rediscovered. That collection laid the groundwork for his comparative study of constitutions set forth in Book II of his *Politics*.

Our comparison is also supported by Professor Arnold Toynbee's monumental work, his encompassing *Study of History*. In that work we find an interesting comparative Table of the rise and fall of civilizations subdivided into "Time of Trouble," "Universal State" and "Universal Peace." If we compare the respective periods, we find for the Sinic and the Hellenic civilization[1] the following eras:—

Civilization	*Time of Trouble*	*Universal State*	*Universal Peace*
Sinic	634–221 B.C.	Ts'in and Han Empire	221 B.C.–A.D. 172
Hellenic	431– 31 B.C.	Roman Empire	31 B.C.–A.D. 378

This is, of course, only a general and schematical tabulation, but it contains an additional support for our comparison. In both civilizations the *Time of Trouble* coincided with the apex of philosophic achievements: In Chinese thought it was between 634–221 B.C. that Confucius, Lao Tzu, Mencius and Hsüntzu flourished. In Hellenic philosophy the time between 431–31 B.C. saw the emergence of Platonism and Aristotelianism on the one hand, and Stoicism and Epicureanism on the other. Since of all those philosophies, both those of Aristotle and Confucius are most representative of classical Greek and classical Chinese thought respectively, a comparison suggests itself. This the more so as in the time of Universal Peace, i.e. the "Pax Sinica" (221 B.C.–A.D. 172) and the "Pax Romana" (31 B.C.–A.D. 378), both Chinese and Hellenic philosophy had lost much of their original vigour and profoundness, and eclecticism and syncretism more and more came to the fore. This becomes particularly manifest if we consider the ascendancy of Stoicism and its oriental ingredients in the Roman Empire, and the intrusion of Buddhism into Chinese thought of the Han Empire.

In 1927 Professor H. H. Dubs published a book on Hsüntze, the last of the three great classic representatives of Confucianism, in which he called Hsüntze the moulder of ancient Confucianism, and in 1928 he published a translation of the essential parts of Hsüntze's work. He furthermore translated Pan Ku's History of the former Han

[1] Professor Toynbee uses the term "Hellenic-Civilization" as a major term comprising both "Hellenic" and Hellenistic Civilization and "Roman" (or Graeco-Roman) civilization. This can only be accepted as a convenient simplification. For as much as Roman civilization was intellectually and spiritually indebted to Hellenic-Hellenistic Civilization, Roman Civilization and its lasting achievements such as Roman law and Administration in spite of Hellenic influences were basically Roman and nothing else in contrast to the incapability of the Hellenes for securing peace and order in the confines of their confederation of little Greek states.

dynasty. (H. H. Dubs, Hsüntze, *The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism*, London, 1927; *The Works of Hsüntze*, translated by Homer H. Dubs, London, 1928; Pan Ku's *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, translated by H. H. Dubs, Vol. I and II Baltimore 1938–1944.) Professor Dubs has—besides the above quoted larger works—written extensively on Hsüntze as well as Chinese History and philosophy in general. He called Hsüntze "the Aristotle of China." In view of the fact that Hsüntze—in the words of Professor Homer Dubs "The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism" and "The Aristotle of China"—was most influential in regard to later compilations or additions of the Confucian texts, and that above all the *Records on Ceremonies* (*Li Chi*) contain some of Hsüntze's most characteristic arguments on the essence and importance of *Li* (Ceremonies, Propriety, Principle of Social Order), there seems to be a strong point in favour of "Aristotelianism" within the scope of the Confucian classics. This fact, too, in itself seems to justify a closer comparison.

Inadequacy of the traditional comparison of Confucius and Socrates, Mencius and Plato, Hsüntze and Aristotle.

In Chinese Philosophy we have the traditional comparison of Confucius and Socrates, Mencius and Plato, and Hsüntze and Aristotle. This comparison of the two triads of Chinese and Hellenic Philosophy is in its typical form expressed by Fung Yu-lan: "Confucius . . . holds a place in Chinese History comparable to that of Socrates in the West. The position of Mencius in Chinese History is comparable to that of Plato, his temperament and philosophy both being idealistic; while Hsüntze's is similar to that of Aristotle's, both his temperament and philosophy being realistic." (*History of Chinese Philosophy* I, p. 106.) There is certainly some external justification in this comparison, and there are some characteristic features in Confucius which do remind us of Socrates as well as of the Sophists in general. (Conf. op. cit., I, pp. 48–49, 52–54.) But to compare Confucius mainly with Socrates would by no means do justice to Confucius' greatness and his importance and influence in Chinese life and thought. After all, the historical Socrates seems to be still more a question of dispute than the historical Confucius.

Socrates (469–399 B.C.) is known to us mainly through three groups of sources[1] which are contemporary and/or close to his era: Xenophon's *Symposium*, *Socratic Reminiscences* and *Apology*, Plato's *Dialogues* and some remarks by Aristotle. The picture we gain from

[1] We may here safely disregard Aristophanes' *Clouds*, since that comedy only gives a rather distorted picture of Socrates, characterizing him as some sort of Sophist who misguided the youth. Still Aristophanes' picture of Socrates as rendered in the *Clouds* in a way constituted the basis of Socrates' trial and condemnation in 399 B.C.

the Xenophontic Socrates widely differs from that of the Platonic dialogues; and within the Platonic dialogues it is only the *Apology*, the *Crito* and the *Phaedo* which at least pretend to give a historical account of Socrates' Trial, Imprisonment and Death, and thereby of the salient features of Socrates' personality. In the other dialogues of Plato Socrates is only the mouthpiece through which Plato expresses opinions which might or might not have been Socrates' and/or Plato's views on the questions at issue. It was, above all, Socrates' martyrdom and death for his philosophical and especially ethical opinions as presented in the inimitable and unsurpassed language of the three above-mentioned Platonic dialogues which raised Socrates from the status of a rather often inquisitive and vexatious market-place philosopher to the heights of one of the great moral sages of this world. He personally left no written works and the real contents of his teachings will never be definitely ascertainable. As a matter of fact, only Aristotle's remarks as set forth in his *Metaphysics* (XIII, 4, 1078, b 28 seq.; see also I, 6, 987, b 3 seq.) that Socrates was the inventor of "inductive argument" and "universal definition" give us some really concrete examples of Socrates' achievements in the domain of philosophy. In addition, from Plato's dialogues as well as from Aristotle's writings we realize two basic tenets of Socrates' philosophy: (1) Virtue is knowledge (or, more precisely, "knowledge of the good") and (2) No man wittingly does wrong. The best proof for the difficulty in ascertaining the real scope of Socrates' teachings lies in the striking difference between the Socrates of Xenophon's *Reminiscences* and *Apology*, and the Socrates in Plato's immortal dialogues. In Xenophon's *Reminiscences* Socrates appears as a man and thinker of high morality, but not as one of the great minds in the history of thought. In Plato's dialogues Socrates stands out as one of the most profound thinkers and at the same time as an unsurpassed moralist. Every possible attempt has been made to attribute this obvious discrepancy to Xenophon, who, according to this school of thought, was merely a noted warrior, a highly cultured country squire, and an excellent stylist, but not a very acute thinker. Even if we were to accept the opinion that Xenophon was only an excellent writer (he was nicknamed "the Attic Bee" because of his immaculate style), it was just that stylistic proficiency that would have enabled him to depict a really profound Socrates in the most winning words. The fact that the Xenophontic Socrates compares so poorly with the Platonic Socrates, does, however, not speak against Xenophon. In the *Socratic Reminiscences* Xenophon obviously only wrote down what he had heard from or about Socrates. On the other hand, the fact that the Platonic Socrates impresses us as a most profound thinker and an almost saintly man does not at all speak in favour of Socrates. It was the philosopher-poet Plato who elated Socrates in

this way. Again we must invoke the authority of Professor Gilbert Murray: "Socrates still remains a problematical figure. A humorist and a saint, a mocker and a martyr, he made different impressions on different people of his acquaintance, but evidently had extraordinary powers as a teacher" (op. cit., p. 37). It was not only "on different people of his acquaintance" that Socrates made different impressions. Up to date his place in the history of thought is disputed, though his high morality is and remains above any doubt.

There is in addition another fact which certainly bars an adequate and conclusive comparison of Socrates and Confucius: Confucius was the first private teacher in China who founded a most characteristic and influential school of philosophy. Whatever may have been the scope of the original teaching of Confucius and whatever may be the extent of later additions and interpolations in the Confucian texts, there can be no doubt about the main tenets of Confucianism: The concept of *Li* in the sense of propriety, of living in harmony with highest morality and the requirements of social order, the notion of *Jen*, humaneness, the ideal of *Tao*, the way of moral perfection ("Sageliness Within and Kingliness Without"), bound up with *Chung* the *Mean in Action*, furthermore the principle of *Filial Piety* and its consequences within family and civic relations, and the principle of education through the study of the ancients, all these features are traceable to Confucius himself, however strictly one might apply the method of textual criticism. These ideals—though in changing forms —dominated Confucianism throughout the ages, and became its hall-mark, though other schools may have adopted one or the other of these ideals, too. In the case of Socrates we are at pains to find out what really was the Socratic school: There is Plato, an avowed pupil of Socrates. In spite of some attempts in this direction, nobody today would in earnest contend that Platonism is simply an elaboration of the basic ideas of Socrates. There is Antistenes, the slightly older friend and pupil of Socrates. He founded the Cynic school of philosophy. This school of thought became most famous through Diogenes, that eccentric and extravagant ascetic, who lived in a "huge earthenware pitcher." (Gilbert Murray in *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (Thinkers Library), 1935, p. 92, rejects the traditional view of Diogenes living in a "tub" and asserts it was an earthenware pitcher.) His life was certainly unique, but in no way fit for being adopted as a general example for the virtuous life of human beings. There was Eucleides of Megara, the founder of the Megaric school which delighted in dialectical niceties apart from its leaning towards the Eleatics and, above all, Parmenides. Eucleides, too, was a pupil of Socrates. And finally there was Socrates' pupil Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy with its stress on pleasure as the highest good. Aristippus was the predecessor of

Epicurus and his school of thought. In view of the fact that schools with such different ideals as the Cynics, Cyrenaics, Megarians, and the Platonists all in a way traced their origin back to Socrates, we must ask ourselves: What did Socrates really teach? He must certainly have discussed a great variety of ideals in such a way as to make it quite difficult to find out whether or not an ideal was "his" ideal. In comparison to this confusion, Confucius and his school represent an unmistakable unity with regard to basic ideals and do not admit of such contrasting elaborations as for instance the ideals of the Cynic school and the Epicurean school. Thus, the external similarity of Socrates' and Confucius' teachings—both using the method of question and answer, both being of highest morality, both stressing that knowledge consists in knowing that one knows nothing or only little—does not justify calling Confucius the Socrates of China.

The same, in a way, holds good of the usual comparison of Mencius and Plato. It is true, Mencius (*ca.* 371–*ca.* 289 B.C.) founded the idealistic wing of the Confucian school of thought. But his work as a whole can never measure up to the much more encompassing work of Plato. The brilliance, the versatility, the exuberance of Plato's thought in almost all branches of philosophy does not admit of a serious comparison of these two ancient thinkers, however profound and idealistic Mencius may have been.

As far as Aristotle and Hsüntze are concerned, the situation is slightly different. Hsüntze (*ca.* 298–238 B.C.)—the founder of the realistic wing of the Confucian school of thought—was definitely the most philosophic of the Confucianists, a truly outstanding thinker. And yet, if we compare the work transmitted under his name with the Corpus Aristotelicum, we cannot but admit that the encyclopedic and systematic edifice of Aristotle's thought was not only by far more encompassing than Hsüntze's work, but also in its quality superior to Hsüntze's excellent achievements. Were it otherwise Professor Dubs would not have seen fit to write an article "The Failure of the Chinese to produce philosophical systems" (Leyden, 1929), nor would Professor Fung Yu-lan have found it necessary to counter the attack on the lacking systematization of Chinese philosophy by his distinction of formal and real system of philosophy. (*History of Chinese Philosophy*, I, p. 4.)

Inarticulateness and lack of formal system (Confucius) and articulateness and systematization (Aristotle) as counterbalanced by the compatibility of "Real System" and "Formal System."

An external difference between Aristotelianism and Confucianism is to be found in the essence of Chinese philosophy as strikingly characterized by Professor Fung Yu-lan: "When one begins to read

Chinese philosophical works, the first impression one gets is perhaps the briefness and disconnectedness of the sayings and writings of their authors . . . according to Chinese tradition, the study of philosophy is not a profession. Everyone should study philosophy, just as in the West everyone should go to church. . . The fact is that Chinese philosophers were accustomed to express themselves in the form of aphorisms, apophthegms, or allusions, and illustrations. . . . Aphorisms, allusions, and illustrations are thus not articulate enough. Their insufficiency in articulateness is compensated for, however, by their suggestiveness. Articulateness and suggestiveness are, of course, incompatible. The more an expression is articulate, the less it is suggestive. . . The sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers are so inarticulate that their suggestiveness is almost boundless." (*Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 11 and 12).

There could not possibly be a more unrestricted admission of the lack of systematization of Chinese philosophic thought than this explanation. Aristotle in his *Politics* laid particular stress on the difference between *Logos* and *Phônê*, between the articulate language and the merely suggestive but inarticulate making of sounds (*Politics* I. 2, 1253 a 10–16). In order to make his philosophy all the more articulate, Aristotle first created what was later on called the *Organon*, thus founding the science of logic. If we were to accept Fung Yu-lan's statement on the inarticulateness and suggestiveness of the Chinese philosophic texts, literally, the question fatal to any philosophic formulation and comparison would necessarily arise: suggestive of what and suggestive to whom? For in the case of a mere and boundless suggestiveness thirty readers might conceivably gain thirty different suggestions from one and the same original passage. This would mean that those formulations were less articulate than Aristotle's inarticulate *Phônê* as opposed to the articulate *Logos*.

It is most satisfying, however, again to quote Fung Yu-lan, who, with his above reproduced statement put us in a difficult situation as regards a possible comparison of Aristotle and Confucius, but who in his *History of Philosophy* very convincingly shows the right way for such a comparison. In view of the above-quoted statement on the boundless suggestiveness of Chinese philosophic texts this statement of Professor Fung Yu-lan on the question of systematization and implicitly the question of parallels between—and thus of the comparability of—Chinese and Greek philosophy is of the greatest importance: "Is it true that Chinese philosophy lacks system? As far as the *presentation* of ideas is concerned, it is certainly true that there are comparatively few Chinese philosophical works that display unity and orderly sequence; therefore it is commonly said that Chinese philosophy lacks system. Nevertheless, what is called system may be divided into two categories, the *formal* and the *real*,

which have no necessary connection with one another. It may be admitted that Chinese philosophy lacks formal system; but if one were to say that it therefore lacks any real system, meaning that there is no organic unity of ideas to be found in Chinese philosophy, it would be equivalent to saying that Chinese philosophy is not philosophy, and that China had no philosophy. The earlier Greek philosophy also lacked formal system. Thus Socrates wrote no books himself, Plato used the dialogue form in his writings, and it was not until Aristotle that a clear and ordered exposition was given on every problem. Hence if we judge from the point of view of formal presentation, Aristotle's philosophy is comparatively systematic;[1] yet in so far as the actual content of the philosophy is concerned, Plato's philosophy is equally systematic. According to what has just been said, philosophy, in order to be philosophy, must have *real* system, and although Chinese philosophy, formally speaking, is less systematic than that of the West in its actual content it has just as much system as has Western philosophy. This being so, the important duty of the historian of philosophy is to find within a philosophy that lacks *formal* system, its underlying *real* system. (*History of Chinese Philosophy*, I, p. 4.)

From this argument we draw further and decisive conclusions as to the possibility and indeed necessity of comparing Aristotle's and Confucius' philosophy: The lack of formal system in Chinese philosophy does not bar a comparison of Aristotelianism and Confucianism. The inherent real system in Chinese philosophy constitutes the bridge between the external difference of systematization and seeming lack of system.

The language barrier: pictographic (ideographic) script (Chinese) and linear script (Greek). Hyper-criticism and the texts of Confucianism.

The Language Barrier.

We have now to enter upon a question which perhaps presents the greatest difficulty for a comparison of Aristotelianism and Confucianism. In the case of Aristotle, we possess the Corpus Aristotelicum of which we can assert that, in spite of the fact that the various Aristotelian treatises—to a large extent—consist of lecture notes, there is but little doubt about what is really Aristotle's teaching or what is later addition or interpolation. It is true that Professor Jaeger and his school laid particular stress on the genesis and stratification of Aristotle's teachings. But even if we were to accept all of Jaeger's hypothetical evaluations, the main bulk of Aristotle's teachings would still remain intact.

[1] As to Plato, the author of this essay would refer the reader to Sir David Ross, *Aristotle Selections*, New York, 1938, p. XIII as quoted below, p. 344.

This is quite different with the Confucian texts. The difficulty of ascertaining the "true Confucius"—we do, of course, not for a moment question the historicity of Confucius and the essential correctness of the usual delimitation of his life (551–479 B.C.)—seems to be somehow connected with the difficulty of ascertaining the true meaning of the Chinese script in which the Confucian philosophy has been transmitted. In this connection it seems advisable to reproduce Professor Derk Bodde's (translator of Fung Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy*) basic explanations on the character of the Chinese written language: ". . . the Chinese written language . . . because it is pictographic and ideographic, and at the same time non-inflected, can express the difference between singular and plural objects, the concrete and the abstract, etc., only with difficulty." (Op. cit., I. 203.) This explanation is amplified and made still clearer in the following passage: ". . . Names or terms are divided into those that are abstract and those that are concrete. The abstract term denotes the universal, the concrete term the particular. The particular is the denotation, and the universal the connotation of the term. In Western inflected languages there is no difficulty in distinguishing between the particular . . . and the abstract . . . In Chinese, however, owing to the fact that the written characters are ideographic and pictorial and lack all inflection, there is no possible way as far as the form of individual words is concerned, of distinguishing between abstract and concrete terms. Thus, in Chinese, the word designating a particular horse and that designating the universal, 'horseness,' are written and pronounced in the same way. Similarly with other terms, so that such words as 'horse' and 'white', being used to designate both the concrete particular and the abstract universal, thus hold two values." (Ibid., p. 206, n. 1.)

Here we at once realize the enormous difficulty of ascertaining the true meaning of a phrase written in pictographic and ideographic script (cf. too E. R. Hughes, *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*. London and New York, 1950, XXXVII ff.). In Bodde's explanations we obviously find one of the reasons for Professor Fung Yu-lan's statement of the boundless suggestiveness, but at the same time inarticulateness of the writings of the Chinese thinkers. It is from the pictographic and ideographic script that the initial difficulty arises. Dr. E. R. Hughes has in addition remarked that another difficulty arises from the fact that the author of a statement, speaking from the standpoint of the familiarity with his own culture, a familiarity also to be assumed in his readers, can afford to write with a succinctness which a foreign reader 2,000 years later finds entirely cryptic (l.c.).

In comparison with this state of affairs, the Greek written language, whose alphabet became the origin of all alphabets of the Western

world, is definitely articulate. The articulateness of the Greek written language, e.g., was such that in the first transmitted encompassing texts, the Homeric poems, although abstractions are as yet not expressed in quite definite terms, the "sense perceptions" are expressed in an even greater variety of terms than the later classical Greek language has preserved. Thus we find, e.g., in Homer at least nine different terms or words to denote "the operation of sight," of which the classical language—in prose and everyday speech—subsequently discarded quite a few (cf. Professor Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 1–7).

Thus already the interpretation of the texts, as they have been transmitted, marks a basic difference between Aristotelian and Confucian scholarship.

It seems indispensable to provide the reader with at least one concrete example of the enormous difficulties inherent in both understanding and translating Chinese classical texts. Dr. Lin Yutang remarks: "The situation is as follows: The ancient texts were extremely sparing in the use of words, owing of course to the method of inscribing on bamboo sticks. Most of the important ideas and characterizations that covered a whole class of qualities were expressed by monosyllabic words, and in accordance with the general nature of Chinese grammar, the meaning was indicated by syntax or word order rather than by the usual English connectives. Here are two extreme instances in the Chinese form: 'Confucius completely—cut —off four—no idea—no must—no *ku*—no I;' 'Language expressive only.' It is clear that unless connectives are supplied by the translator, the translation would be practically unreadable. The extent to which connectives and amplifying phrases are allowable has by necessity to be left to the discretion of the translator, and for this the translator has no other guide than his own insight into the wisdom of Confucius, assisted, of course, by the commentators." (Lin Yutang, *The Wisdom of Confucius*, New York, 1943, pp. 42 ff.) After a brief discussion of the possible and various meanings of the above-quoted words, Dr. Lin Yutang continues: "From these different possible meanings, the translator has to make his choice. That is the terrible responsibility and the latitude given to the translator of ancient Chinese texts, and it is clear that a choice of a different word would alter the sense of the line completely. In this particular instance, I have translated the passage as follows: 'Confucius denounced (or tried completely to avoid) four things: arbitrariness of opinion, dogmatism, narrow-mindedness and egotism.' " (Ibid.)

From this instance we clearly realize the almost bewildering difficulty of understanding and translating classical Chinese texts and the obvious necessity for the translator to resort to the usual commentaries on those texts. This situation becomes also manifest when

one reads E. R. Hughes's Introduction to his *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*. Particularly noteworthy is his remark: "All the texts, therefore, with but one or two exceptions, have been milled over again and again by men of great learning, some of whom have also been men of keen critical ability. With regard to the Confucian Canon, on five occasions between A.D. 252 and 1803 it was solemnly inscribed on stone tablets in the capital, and on two other occasions in other places." (Op. cit., XXXIV ff.) For the rest, Dr. Hughes, in his ensuing remarks on translations, only confirms the difficulties as demonstrated by the above-quoted statement of Dr. Lin Yutang. Thus the critical reader of modern higher criticism of Chinese texts must always bear in mind whether or not a modern text critic in a particular case is really more competent than the author of the text, who might conceivably have lived in the sixth century before Christ or in the second century before Christ and who was certainly more familiar with the subject-matter and the age to which the subject-matter referred, than a modern scholar 2,500 and/or 2,000 years later can possibly be! Thus our attitude towards higher criticism must need be an extremely cautious one, the more so as the results of higher criticism in the case of Homer, Plato, Roman Law and in the Old Testament in very many instances proved completely absurd.

In this connection it seems necessary to quote Arthur Waley as to his method of interpreting the *Analects*. Waley admits that "all existing translations of the *Analects* rely entirely on the 'scriptural' interpretation of Chu Hsi" (A.D. 1130–1200). He goes on to say: "It is the Chu Hsi interpretation which, except in small academic circles, is still accepted unquestioningly everywhere in the Far East and which, in so far as Confucius has not been replaced by Sun Yat-sen, still forms the basis of moral education. Translations such as those of Legge, Soothill, Couvreur and Richard Wilhelm have therefore by no means lost their value; at the same time, there is room for a version such as mine, which attempts to tell the European reader not what the book means to the Far East of today, but what it meant to those who compiled it." (Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius, translated and annotated* p. 76f., London, 3rd impr., 1949.)

It was Goethe who in his "Faust" questioned the exploration of the "spirit of an era" by stressing that what the scholars called the "spirit of an era" only proved the own spirit of the scholars in which the spirit of the era in question was reflected. Still the scholars of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century paid little heed to Goethe's warning: They continued to "dissect" Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* into different layers belonging to different centuries. Furthermore, in the middle of the nineteenth century some extreme textual critics declared the great majority of Plato's *Dialogues* to be spurious, and since the last quarter of that century

the text of the writings of the Roman classical lawyers, above all the fragments as compiled in Justinian's *Digest* were branded as arbitrarily altered by later interpolations of the so-called Post-Classics and/or Byzantines. (As to the latter problem, see, e.g., Max Hamburger, *Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory*, New Haven and London, 1951, pp. 108 and 161, 162.) In the main, all those "explorers of the 'spirit of the era' " proved wrong in the essential questions at issue. Thus there is no reason why Waley should have been more successful and understood the texts better than Chu Hsi of the twelfth century A.D. or Szema (or Siu-ma) Ch'ien, Confucius' biographer, who only lived about three hundred years after Confucius (*ca.* 145–86 B.C.) and is regarded to be the "father of Chinese historians" as well as an outstanding prose master. This brings us to the important problem of modern textual criticism concerning the *Analects* to which modern sinologists ascribe a particular authority in the field of the Confucian texts.

Textual Criticism.

Thus we are in the midst of the Confucian question and the question of the historical ascertainability of the personalities and teachings of the classical Chinese philosophers. If we read the introductory passages to some of the most recent, authoritative and encompassing works on Chinese philosophy, the stress on providing the West with a better understanding of the thought of the East, here especially of China, is everywhere evident. (See Professor Derk Bodde in Fung Yu-lan, *Hist.* I, p. XI and in *Short History*, p. XI.) In Dr. E. R. Hughes's excellent *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*, we find on p. XIII a similar statement to the effect that our Western predilection for Graeco-Roman civilization and thought must be counterbalanced by an acquaintance with Eastern and above all Chinese thought and that the future, whatever its debts to our Graeco-Roman past, and all other pasts, cannot be estimated *solely* in terms of our great tradition. In the same spirit, Professor H. G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung*, The University of Chicago Press, 1953, which is one of the most recent books in this field, begins his preface as follows: "This book is a non-technical account of the main outlines of the history of Chinese thought, from the earliest times that are known to the present day. It does not pretend to be an exhaustive history of Chinese philosophy. It has been written in the belief that it is important, for a number of reasons, that we in the West should know Chinese thought far better than we do, and that many of us would find it extremely interesting if we once got into it. It is hoped that it may serve as an introduction to the subject, which will facilitate the enjoyment of more complete and technical works." (Op. cit., p. V.) What must strike the interest

of the reader in these introductory lines is the assertion in the very first line that the book is a "non-technical" account of "Chinese thought." The critical reader, for whom the book should serve as an introduction to more complete and technical works, of course at once turns to Fung Yu-lan's big two-volume *History of Chinese Philosophy*. However, to his great surprise he will find on p. 20 of Vol. I of that work the following statement: "In treating the philosophy of the ancient period, therefore, the present work will simply try to indicate that, during this period, there existed certain schools of philosophy and systems of thought; but it will not attempt to determine absolutely whether these systems are always actually representative of the individuals by whom they were founded, or have been affected by later modification." Thus the Western reader, eager to learn the essential features of classical Chinese philosophy, and of course to get acquainted with the protagonists of that philosophy, such as Confucius, Lao-Tsu, Mo-Tsu, Mencius, Hsüntze, realizes that the most authoritative and encompassing of the modern works on that subject will only tell him that he must never expect that, what in that work is described as characteristic of Confucian or Mo-ist or Taoist teachings, really originated in Confucius or Mo-Tsu, or Lao-Tsu.

This tendency is strikingly manifest in Professor Creel's large book, *Confucius, The Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949), which decidely rejects Confucius' biography of the *Historical Records* written around 100 B.C. by Szema Ch'ien, and asserts that the author will use the *Analects* for the foundation of our understanding of the life and thought of Confucius. (Op. cit., pp. 7–10.) So we are already warned that such sources as might be found outside the *Analects*, and among them the *Historical Records*, are mainly, not to say solely, sources of *Confucius, the Myth.*

In view of these facts, the untechnical character of Creel's *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao-Tse Tung*, and the above-quoted statement by Fung Yu-Lan, which describes his characterization of the teachings of the classical Chinese philosophers as being only assumptive, the critical reader will, guided by Professor Creel's statement, turn to the most highly esteemed and authoritative work of Confucius' thought, the *Analects*, as translated by Arthur Waley. (*The Analects of Confucius*, translated and annotated by Arthur Waley, London, 3rd Imprint, 1949.) Here we find in the introduction the statement: "The Confucius of whom I shall speak here is the Confucius of the *Analects*. One could construct half a dozen other Confuciuses by tapping the legend at different stages of its evolution. Not that we can regard the Confucius of the *Analects* as wholly original; still . . . the picture of Confucius given in the *Analects*, besides being the earliest that we possess, differs from that of all other

books in that it contains no elements that bear patently and obviously the stamp of folklore or hagiography." (Op. cit., pp. 13–14.) Accordingly A. Waley renders a short account on Confucius' life and work (pp. 14–17) based on a few passages taken from the *Analects*.

Thus the reader, in perusing those few pages, feels some relief that at least here he has some definite and true statements on what Confucius was like and what was the general scope of his thought. But he soon gets alarmed, when he proceeds to peruse Waley's general account on the *Analects*, according to which only books III–IX represent the oldest stratum, whereas books X and XX (First Part) have no connection with the rest; book XIX consists entirely of sayings by disciples, the contents of XVIII and of parts of XIV and XVII are not Confucian in their origin, and XVI is generally regarded as late. (Waley, op. cit., p. 21.) The reader is thus prepared for Waley's final evaluation of the historicity of the Confucian sayings as recorded in the *Analects:* "Bearing all these facts in mind, I think we are justified in supposing that the book does not contain many authentic sayings, and may possibly contain none at all" (page 25). And yet in spite of this statement, A. Waley had construed "Confucius of the *Analects*" entirely based on sayings as recorded in the *Analects* (pp. 14–17) and attributed to it a particular historical value since the *Analects* contain no elements of folklore.

Thus we are confronted with a rather amazing result: Waley, one of the greatest modern experts of the *Analects*, questions the historicity of the sayings therein attributed to Confucius, while at the same time he construes the Confucius of the *Analects* as deserving of a particularly historic interest. And Professor Creel construes his historical Confucius (The Man) by drawing on the same *Analects*, the historicity of which is questioned by Waley. And all this obviously because in the eyes of these authorities other Confucian texts are more or less later compilations and at the same time reproduce myth and folklore. And yet *myth* and *folklore* often proved historically to be more reliable than modern scholarly hypotheses and conjectures. I only want to remind the reader of the discovery of monuments of the Minoan and Mycenean civilization which confirmed the historicity of basic features of the Homeric Epics and refuted the hypotheses of nineteenth-century scholars as to the much later date of the milieu and the narration of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

Thus in the light of Professor Creel's "non-technical account" of his *Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung* and above all in view of the fact that the recent and encompassing *History of Chinese Philosophy* by Fung Yu-lan on p. 20 of Vol I also professes to be "untechnical" in so far as it abstains from ascertaining the respective historicity of the Confucian teachings in the various Confucian texts, our position is simply this: The teachings of the

Confucian texts which form part of our subsequent discussion, on the whole, at least existed in their present-day form for more than 2,000 years. Thus they constituted the source of a most powerful tradition in Chinese thought for two millennia. Though it cannot be denied that almost all of them were—as far as the vast majority of copies was concerned—burned in 213 B.C. on the order of Ch'in Shih Huang, the builder of the Great Wall, it is equally sure that immediately after that event they were rewritten by Confucian scholars, who in part used some copies that had escaped destruction. And although the Confucian texts consisting of the *Five Classics* (1) Book of Songs (Shiking), (2) Book of History (Shuking), (3) Book of Changes (Yi King), (4) Spring and Autumn (Ch'un ch'iu), (5) Book of Rites (Liki), and the *Four Books* (1) The Great Learning, (2) The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung Yung), (3) Analects (Lunyu), and (4) Mencius, to which we have to add the Book of Filial Piety (Hsiao King) and the work of Hsüntze, are for the greatest part later compilations or even, as in the case of Mencius and Hsüntze's writings, by authors other than and subsequent to Confucius, the salient features of Confucius' teachings are recognizable in all those parts we particularly use as Confucian tenets.

After all, in our own time we witness the "Shakespeare question" and in 1932 on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Goethe's death a satirical play significantly posed the question: "Did Goethe really live?" The *nihilism* of extreme hypercriticism can safely be countered by the *positivism* of a 2,000-year-old tradition—and even by the picture the most extreme critics, such as Creel, give of the gist of the Confucian teachings (see below . . .). Confucius could hardly have reached the position he held in Chinese thought, had all those texts which record Confucian teachings been later "falsifications." We have witnessed the same aberration in Platonic scholarship, in the criticism of the texts of the Roman lawyers, in the dissection of the Homeric poems. In the latter case none of the transmitted texts could lay claim to an age of at least 2,000 years. So by argumentum *a minori ad majus* we feel justified to treat the subsequently discussed teachings of Confucius with the respect for and the belief in their essential historicity which the theoretical hypotheses of modern criticism cannot impair.[1]

[1] Nor is this basic approach impaired by the latest publication on Confucianism which came to this author's attention only while his essay was in the press: I mean LIU WU-CHI's *A Short History of Confucian Philosophy*. A Pelican Book, 1955, which is still representative of the above criticized method of "Hypercriticism by Dissection and Stratification."

Dr. Liu Wu-Chi's *Confucius, His Life and Time* (New York, April 1956) was published too late for consideration in this article.

The generally prevailing disregard for Aristotle in modern works on Chinese philosophy as one of the main stimuli for a comparison.

One of the main stimuli for a closer comparison of Aristotle and Confucius is to be found in the obvious neglect of Aristotle's work in the most recent publications on Chinese philosophy and Confucianism. It is true that Professor Dubs has drawn the attention of all sinologists to the parallelism between Aristotelianism and Confucianism by calling Hsüntze "The Aristotle of China." And yet, not even Professor Dubs's authoritative and suggestive description of Hsüntze as "The Aristotle of China" led to a closer comparison of Aristotelian and Confucian texts in the recent works on Chinese philosophy and Confucianism.

If we peruse the most recent and encompassing publication on Chinese philosophy, Professor Fung Yu-lan's two volumes of *History of Chinese Philosophy*, we find but scanty references to Aristotle and some of them only in connection with Plato. The bibliography of that large work has in Vol. I only Aristotle's *Ethics* and in Vol. II only Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The same applies—to a still higher degree—to Fung Yu-lan's *Short History of Chinese Philosophy* where the references to Aristotle are definitely outnumbered by those to Plato, although in either case the references are not too numerous. Professor H. J. Creel's *Confucius, The Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949), which presents Confucius in the light of the most advanced higher criticism, has—in its excellent and extensive bibliography—only Aristotle's *Politics*. The references on about twelve pages (out of 354 pages) often only occur with simultaneous references to Plato. Professor Creel's most recent work, *Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung*, (Chicago, 1953) has no references at all to Aristotle, neither in its "suggestions for further reading" nor in its carefully selected bibliography nor in its index, whereas Plato figures with Jowett's translation of his dialogues in the bibliography, which also contains a special enumeration of the *Laws*, *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Even E. R. Hughes, *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*, a particularly handy guide for the introduction to classical Chinese philosophy, only mentions—in the introduction—Aristotle and of course Plato, incidentally, without paying heed to the fact that Hsüntze has been called the Aristotle of China, and consequently without paying further attention to possible parallels in the selection of and comments on the text. This is all the more surprising since Hughes, as we shall see presently, expressly recommended a comparison of classical Greek and classical Chinese texts, but obviously then became oblivious of his own recommendations and suggestions. In view of these facts there seems to be ample reason for a closer comparison of Confucianism and Aristotelianism.

The problem of "latent" and "patent" influence as the final incentive for a comparison.

A comparison of two noted thinkers and their schools of thought necessarily entails various and basic problems at issue. (1) In the first place it is the respective greatness, importance and influence of the thinkers under comparison which calls for a closer examination. (2) In the second place a comparative study tacitly presupposes that the work of the thinkers under comparison lends itself to a comparison, be it that it contains obviously similar basic ideas, or that it exhibits on identical issues divergent views. (3) A third possibility is that the two thinkers might conceivably be in agreement on some basic issues, and yet differ as to further and no less fundamental issues. Within the scope of this essay we have—in the main—to restrict our exposition to the first question at issue: respective greatness, importance and influence of Aristotle and Confucius.

Confucius.

As far as Confucius is concerned, the external evidence seems to leave no doubt on that issue. At the very beginning of this introduction we quoted Fung Yu-lan's statement according to which the Chinese philosophers of the Period of Classical Learning, i.e. the post-classical period from about 179 B.C. down to the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century A.D., felt compelled to attach themselves nominally to one or the other classical school of philosophy and more particularly to Confucian classicism. We have also quoted Fung Yu-lan's statement about the non-professional character of Chinese philosophy which made the study of philosophy everybody's duty, just as in the West everybody should go to church. In other words, Chinese philosophy occupied—in China—the place religion occupied in other civilizations. No less important is Fung Yu-lan's admission that in the old days—which by the way were not too remote from the present days—the first education of a Chinese pupil consisted in philosophy: "When children went to school, the *Four Books* which consist of the *Confucian Analects*, the *Book of Mencius*, the *Great Learning*, and the *Doctrine of the Mean* were the first ones they were taught to read." (*Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 1.) Since these four books constitute the first part of the Confucian texts, the other part consisting of the *Five Classics* (*Book of Songs*, *Book of History*, *Book of Changes*, *Spring and Autumn* and *Book of Rites*), to which there is to be added the *Book on Filial Piety*, we here have the irrefutable evidence for the fact that Chinese education for thousands of years took its origin from and was rooted in Confucianism. The fact that Fung Yu-lan in this connection terms the Four Books "the most important texts of Neo-Confucianism" would seem to have no

bearing on the question of Confucius' importance and influence. For those books contain basic ideas of classic Confucianism regardless of the fact that Hypercriticism denounces them as "Neo-Confucian."

It deserves of particular mention that even Fung Yu-lan in his *Short History of Chinese Philosophy* unconditionally and unrestrictedly recognizes the pre-eminence and influence of Confucius as a scholar and a teacher: "Confucius, however, was already recognized in his own day as a man of very extensive learning. . . By his work of originating through transmitting, he caused his school to reinterpret the civilization of the age before him. He upheld what he considered to be the best in the old, and created a *powerful tradition that was followed until very recent years* (italics mine!), when, as in Confucius' own time, China again came face to face with tremendous economic and social change. In addition, he was China's first teacher. Hence, though historically speaking he was only *a* teacher, it is perhaps not unreasonable that in later ages he was regarded as *the* teacher." (*Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 48.)

Thus even Fung Yu-lan cannot help admitting what for more than 2,000 years nobody in China seriously doubted, namely, that Confucius was *the* teacher of China, though nobody ever denied there existed other teachers in China, too.

There is in addition another fact which clearly reveals the perenniality of Confucius' influence. Up to the very recent past Confucius in China was simply called "The Master" or still more reverently "The Master for all Ages." This has recently again been stressed in a book written by a Chinese scholar and international lawyer in which he described Confucius' lasting influence on the moulding of China. (Dr. Cheng Tien-Tsi, *China Moulded by Confucius, The Chinese Way in Western Light*, London, 1946.)

This prevalence of Confucianism in Chinese thought is also strongly emphasized by Dr. Lin Yutang: ". . . there is a centrality or, shall I say, universality, about the Confucian attitude and point of view, reflected in a joy in Confucian belief that I see even among maturing modern Chinese who have received a Western education. . . During the political chaos and battle of ideas in the centuries immediately following Confucius, Confucianism won the victory over Taoism, Motianism, Naturalism, Legalism, Communism and a host of other philosophies. It maintained this supremacy over the Chinese people for the length of two thousand five hundred years, with the exception of a few periods, and it always came back to its own stronger than ever." (*The Wisdom of Confucius*, p. 1.)

In view of these essentially concurring statements as made by a historian of Chinese philosophy, a noted Chinese international lawyer, and a widely read expert and brilliant translator of classical Chinese literature, we need no further support for the fact that

from such denominations as "The Master" or "The Master for all Ages," as well as from the Chinese basic education in the *Four Books* and from the appeal Confucius even has for modern Chinese who received a Western education, we can safely infer that Confucius and Confucianism represented a most domineering factor in Chinese life and thought up to the very recent past. In this respect the preeminence of Confucius and his school of thought cannot be disputed, even if and when hypercriticism tries to brand Confucian ideals as "Neo-Confucian." Confucian or Neo-Confucian, the man behind those ideas and ideals for two thousand five hundred years has been and is for the Chinese people: "The Master," "The Master for all Ages," "*the* Teacher!"

Aristotle.

With these comparative reflections we must now turn to the question of Aristotle's general position in Western thought and thus start from some of the more recent and general appraisals of his work. It was for very good reasons that we opened this Introduction with Sir David Ross's general statement on the nature and scope of Aristotle's achievements. For there is hardly one scholar of our time who has a more intimate knowledge of all of Aristotle's transmitted works. In that statement Sir David laid particular stress on the fact that Aristotle "fixed the main outlines of the classification of the sciences in the form which they still retain" carrying most of them beyond their former scope and newly creating some of them as, e.g., Logic, in which Aristotle had "no predecessor and for centuries no worthy successor." Sir David regards Aristotle as "one of the greatest of analytic thinkers." This most general evaluation of Aristotle, the classifier and the analytic thinker, is very carefully elaborated and amplified in Ross's Introduction to his *Selections from Aristotle:*

"Aristotle's was an essentially tidy mind. He loved to define, and he loved to classify. Both these tendencies have their merits and their defects. In philosophy at any rate, and to some extent in science, we do not get far unless we train ourselves to use our terms strictly, and to define them when they are definable. But it is a mistake to think that our main work is then over. Aristotle, to do him justice, did not make this mistake. His mistake was rather the opposite one, of supposing that definition was a comparatively easy preliminary task, and that the main work of science lies in deducing conclusions from definitions, whereas the truth is that it is often only after prolonged study of our terms that we are able to make their meaning precise, and that even then we can deduce little or nothing from our definitions. In his logic Aristotle lays it down that science should start with axioms, definitions and hypotheses of the existence of the fundamental objects of the science. There is, I suppose, no science but

mathematics in which this will take us very far. It was certainly not by this method that he reached the success he did in biology. But probably he did not think of biology as a science. By a science he meant just a body of research in which this method *does* work, i.e. a mathematical science, and he never, I think, applies the name science quite deliberately to anything else. Biology, psychology, ethics, politics were rather inquiries than sciences. He expressly disclaims for his results in ethics, for instance, such certainty as he claims for the results of science proper. His results will, he thinks, at best be true 'for the most part.' He says definitely that mathematical exactness is not to be looked for here; and I suppose he would have said the same of biology.

"His love of classification has probably had more fruitful results. To it we owe his doctrine of the categories, which as regards its main members, substance, quality, and relation, remains the foundation of our attempt to inventorize the contents of the universe. To it we owe his classification of the sciences themselves (if we use 'science' in a sense less strict than that assigned to it in his logic). In a dialogue of Plato we are apt to find—and this is part of its charm—metaphysics and ethics, psychology and politics, all present together. And that method has its justification. All things do belong together, and the last word cannot be said about anything till we have the synoptic vision which will make us spectators of all time and all existence. But meantime our progress is aided by a sorting out of our problems into their main groups, and a separate consideration of these groups. This is what Aristotle was the first human being to do with any thoroughness; and to him we owe not only the names of many of our sciences but to a large extent the general lines of division between them. To him again we owe a much more elaborate attempt to classify the faculties of the soul than any that existed before him. Faculty psychologies have been much attacked, and they are open to attack when they think that by assigning a function to a named faculty they have explained it. Aristotle is not, I think, open to this objection. He reasons correctly that if the soul has a certain class of activities, it must have a power to perform these activities, and he makes great use of the faculties as a means of classification of and ready reference to the phenomena. But he does not, or does not as a rule, think that he has achieved his task in so doing. He still brings an unwearied curiosity to the solution of particular problems. Indeed, whatever may be thought of his success in solving problems, few people have ever either described so many, or seen so clearly which are the most important." (Ross, *Aristotle, Selections*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938, pp. XII ff.) Here we realize a much more detailed characterization of the general scope of Aristotle's work in which fairly all his researches and dissertions are scrutinized and character-

ized. To this general evaluation of all sciences as elucidated and classified in the Corpus Aristotelicum we still must add Sir David's careful evaluation of Aristotle's achievements in the domain of natural science and particularly in biology.

"Aristotle is much more successful in his biology than in his physics, his chemistry and his astronomy. But this was not because he thought different methods were appropriate in biology from those appropriate in the other sciences. In both alike his object is to study the phenomena as carefully as possible and to put forward only such theories as will 'save' them. His mind is as much set as Bacon's was on putting observation before theory, and on making the theory fit the facts rather than the facts the theory. But in the physical sciences, more than in biology, he was under the sway of a body of existing beliefs which it did not occur to him to doubt, any more than it did to any of his contemporaries. And he was hampered far more in the one study than in the other by the lack of precise instruments of observation, of measurement and of weighing. It is only at a comparatively late period in the development of the biological sciences that these instruments become necessary if further advance is to be made; and Aristotle was thus able to do much to advance the early study of these sciences. In the more abstract physical sciences everything seems to depend from the start on precise quantitative data; in the absence of these, theory is bound to go far astray and always has done so; if we do not get the quantities right we get nothing right. In the more concrete sciences, which take account of the secondary qualities, much good work can be done in the observation of these long before quantitative exactness is reached, though at a later stage such exactness is a necessary condition of further progress. Before Aristotle's time, the Hippocratean school had made much more valuable researches into the symptoms, if not into the cure, of disease, than any that had been made in physics or in chemistry. Of the physical sciences astronomy alone had made considerable progress; and there the Greeks had inherited the labours of the Chaldaeans and were able to apply to good effect their own wonderful mathematical genius. Thus, in the main, Aristotle's success in biology and his failure in physics and chemistry reflect the general position of affairs in his time, as well as the inherent character of the sciences themselves." (Op. cit., pp. XI f.)

Still in all their encompassing qualities these comments by Sir David are quite detached and scientific and do not attempt to indicate the possible centre of gravitation of Aristotle's thought throughout the ages. But as a general evaluation these reflections of the Nestor of modern Aristotelianism give a very impressive picture of the scope of Aristotelianism.

From Sir David Ross, the dean of contemporary Aristotelianism,

we must now turn to the late Professor J. B. Bury, author of that still classic *History of Greece*. Here we find in the concluding section the following brief evaluation of Aristotle's works and influence:

"It is not an overstatement to say that there is no one to whom Europe owes a greater debt for the higher education of her peoples than to Aristotle. The science of the laws of thought is still taught mainly as he first worked it out. There are no better introductions to ethical and political speculation than his fundamental treatises on ethical and political science. Nor was it a small thing that his system controlled the acutest minds of the Middle Ages, whose reasoning faculties, though cabined by the imminence of a narrowly interpreted theology, were amazingly powerful and subtle." (Op. cit., 819.)

It is the perennial educational value of Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Politics*, and his works on Logic which is here particularly stressed, no less than the general influence Aristotle exerted on Western education.

More than two generations ago, a brilliant evaluation of Aristotle's work and its place in Western civilization has been made by Sir Alexander Grant in the concluding paragraph of his popular Aristotle book:

"Aristotle, the strongest of the ancients and the oracle of the Middle Ages, must always hold a place of honour in the history of European thought. Writings which have interested and influenced mankind so deeply and through so many centuries can never fall into contempt, even though they may be devoid of the graces of style and though the matter in them may be either superseded or else absorbed into the treatises of other authors. Nor is it from mere curiosity—from a merely antiquarian or historical point of view—that the works of the Stagirite continue to be studied. As long as the process of higher education in modern Europe consists so largely in imbibing the mind with the literature of classical antiquity, so long will a study of certain works of Aristotle remain as one of the last stages of that process. Those works—especially the 'Rhetoric,' 'Art of Poetry,' 'Ethics,' and 'Politics'—have a remarkable educational value. They form an introduction to philosophy; they invite comparison of ancient and modern ways of thinking; they offer rich stores of information as to human nature—so much the same in all ages; and they train the mind to follow the Aristotelian method of analytic insight. This method consists in concentration of the mind upon the subject in hand, marshalling together all the facts and opinions attainable upon it, and dwelling on these and scrutinizing and comparing them till a light flashes on the whole subject. Such is the procedure to be learned, by imitation, from Aristotle." (Grant, *Aristotle*, Edinburgh and London, 1877, p. 195 f.)

This appraisal is all the more remarkable, as it stresses not only the merely educational, but also the practical values which a

perusal of Aristotle's works can convey to the student. It is particularly noteworthy that Grant—in this connection—especially mentions the *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, *Ethics*, and *Politics*—in other words those works which—with the exception of the *Poetics* which belongs to the "productive sciences"—entail the practical sciences or the "Philosophy of Human Affairs," as Aristotle called them. This is quite in line with Grant's concluding remark on the *Politics:*

"And however much the views of Aristotle fall short of the requirements of modern times, the 'Politics' will always form a valuable study for one who is likely to take part in the public affairs of his country." (Op. cit., p. 129.)

In his above-quoted conclusion Grant, in a quite prophetic manner, saw the possible danger to Aristotle's place within the scope of Western civilization. For he expressly remarked that Aristotelian studies will be generally fostered "as long as the process of higher education in modern Europe consists so largely in imbibing the mind with the literature of classical antiquity."

Those days—thus far!—belong to the past! For in modern education the main stress—thus far!—has been laid on "science" and/or "vocational" education at the expense of the humanities. It is, therefore, of greatest interest to witness how Aristotle's work is today evaluated by "scientific-minded" thinkers.

The prototype of this category of thinkers is the well-known Nobel prize winner, mathematician and philosopher, Earl Bertrand Russell. Bertrand Russell in his widely read *History of Western Philosophy* judges Aristotle in a way which is greatly at variance with the approach of such authorities as Professor Gilbert Murray, Sir David Ross, Professor Bury, and Sir Alexander Grant. There is, however, one fact which in itself is characteristic enough. Bertrand Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy* and *Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the earliest Times to the Present Day* (4th printing, New York 1945) covers, as its title indicates, a very wide ground. Accordingly, in his preface, he states: "in attempting to cover such a vast stretch of time, it is necessary to have very drastic principles of selection" (p. X.). Even within the scope of this necessary selection, Bertrand Russell devotes to Aristotle out of 836 pages of text no less than almost 50 pages, i.e. with the exception of the 55 pages devoted to Plato, the largest space allotted to the work of a single philosopher. Already from this purely external fact we realize the weight Aristotle's work still carries even with those who do not agree with him.

The introductory lines of Bertrand Russell's Aristotle part sound fair enough: "In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways: with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In

the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous. For his demerits, however, his successors are more responsible than he is" (p. 159). Bertrand Russell's subsequent comments, however, show that he did not quite heed the warning against undue depreciation which is inherent in his introductory remark.

As to Aristotle's Metaphysics, one sentence by Bertrand Russell speaks for itself: "Aristotle's metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense" (p. 162). This remark is strikingly reminiscent of another attack on "common sense," as made by another and no less famous Nobel prize winner: Dr. Albert Einstein. In *The Universe and Dr. Einstein* (New York, 1952 (reprint)), which is foreworded by Dr. Einstein, the author, Lincoln Barnett, with the physicist's obvious approval, quotes Einstein's remark on common sense: "Common sense is actually nothing more than a deposit of prejudices laid down in the mind prior to the age of eighteen." (Op. cit., p. 63.) Is it? Dr. Einstein, in a letter of reply to Viscount Samuel, which Viscount Samuel in his *Essay in Physics* (New York 1952, pp. 157 seq.) published as a significant conclusion, tried to evade some very searching and fundamental questions as put to him in that essay. In that letter of reply, Dr. Einstein resorts to a rather "super-metaphysical" way of argumentation. He ultimately invokes mere *Intuition* as the basis and foundation of such new and startling hypotheses as defy both common sense and scientific explanation and proof. Thus Einstein in belittling, ridiculing and rejecting "common sense," in the end succeeded in replacing it by "Intuition." However, in this connection of a requested explanation of *elaborated* hypotheses, his *Intuition* has nothing in common with Aristotle's "intuition" as "the originative source of scientific knowledge" (Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, 19, especially 100 b 15), that divine spark which initiates the elaboration of a scientific theory and thus leads to knowledge! For here Einstein substituted "intuition" for "knowledge," thus raising *intuition* to the level of a revived "*abracadabra*" of what turns out to be modern and mere "scientific agnosticism."

There is one thing certain: mathematical subleties and above all modern mathematics and physics have but little to do with common sense. Indeed, as Aristotle pointed out, mathematical knowledge and competence can already be acquired at a comparatively early age. This is borne out by the fact that a great part of mathematical geniuses showed highest ability in their branch of learning, when still in their teens and early twenties. On the other hand "common sense," "the sound human intellect," "der gesunde Menschenverstand" needs ripening for reaching its apex.

Lately Bertrand Russell in his more general and popular publica-

tions seems to have put his trust in "common sense." And since we do not for a moment believe that there exists two Bertrand Russells —just as Bertrand Russell denounced the existence of two Leibnizes (1) the popular philosopher on the one hand with his best of all possible worlds and (2) the true, profound and sincere philosopher— we think that Bertrand Russell found some fault with his previous attack on "common sense." In any case, we see at once why Bertrand Russell, originally, when writing his *History of Western Philosophy*, felt antagonistic towards Aristotle: for common sense and Aristotle —apart from his errors mostly, though not exclusively, due to the lack of precision instruments in the field of science—blend in a far-reaching harmony. Thus Bertrand Russell says of Aristotle's *Ethics:* "The book appeals to the respectable middle-aged and has been used by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling, it cannot but be repulsive" (p. 173). He concludes his section on the *Ethics* with the statement: ". . . in my judgement, his *Ethics*, in spite of its fame, is lacking in intrinsic importance" (p. 184). (To this remark see Hamburger, *Morals and Law, The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory*, especially pp. 117, 152 ff.)

No less typical is Bertrand Russell's introductory verdict on Aristotle's *Politics:* "Aristotle's *Politics* is both interesting and important—interesting, as showing the common prejudices of educated Greeks in his time, and important as a source of many principles which remained influential until the end of the Middle Ages. I do not think there is much in it that could be of any practical use to a statesman of the present day . . ." (loc. cit.).

It is most fortunate, however, that we possess a recent verdict on the *Politics* as made by one of the greatest political scientists of our day, Sir Ernest Barker:

"What has been, and still is the nature of the legacy which it (i.e. the *Politics*) bequeathes to the common thought of Europe . . . the answer may almost be compressed in a single word. The word is "constitutionalism." . . . Aristotle taught St. Thomas: through St. Thomas he taught Catholic Europe: through St. Thomas he also taught Richard Hooker, who drew from this origin the theory of law and government enunciated in the first book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*. The "judicious Hooker" (the term is Locke's own) was in turn one of the masters of Locke, and one of the great sources of the two *Treatises on Civil Government*. . . There is thus a long line of transmission which runs from Aristotle to St. Thomas, from St. Thomas to Hooker, from Hooker to Locke, and so eventually to Burke." (Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Oxford, 1946, pp. LXI f.)

We can safely assume that, if Aristotle had no other merits than being the father of modern constitutionalism, his fame would seem to

be secured and his *Politics* topical enough for our time—and for any age!

Nor can it be any longer denied that Aristotle really was the father of jurisprudence, not least by his epoch-making explanation of the essence of such juridical concepts and devices as equity (*epieikeia*) and its relation to strict law, the definition of the sources of the law such as statute law and unwritten law, political (municipal law) and its relation to natural and universal law, the theory of culpability, the theory of construction, the law of evidence, the theory of community, parnership and contract, etc. (See Hamburger, *Morals and Law; The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory*, Yale University Press, New Haven and Oxford University Press, 1951, and Hamburger, "Equitable Law, New Reflections on Old Conceptions," *Social Research*, December 1950, and Hamburger, "Aristotle's Legal Theory," ibid., Spring 1953.)

The most surprising proof for Aristotle's perennial influence and power, however, consists in the fact that Bertrand Russell in the concluding chapter of his book—when describing his own philosophic system, i.e. *Philosophy of Logical Analysis*—in one and, as we hold, decisive point, unwittingly turns completely Aristotelian. For in summarizing his philosophy he remarks: "Modern analytical empiricism . . . is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy . . . I have no doubt that, insofar as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble.

"There remains, however, a vast field traditionally included in philosophy, where scientific methods are inadequate. This field includes ultimate questions of value; science alone, for example, cannot prove that it is bad to enjoy the infliction of cruelty. Whatever can be known, can be known by means of science: but things which are legitimately matters of feelings lie outside its province" (p. 834).

Aristotle, as to be seen from Sir David Ross's above-quoted remarks, has in his ethics emphatically stressed the impossibility of mathematical and scientific precision in matters of human feeling and action, of morals and law. (See also Hamburger, *Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory*, pp. 152, 164 f. and the therein quoted passages of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics:* I. 3.1094 b 11–27; I. 7 1098 a 25 ff.; II. 2. 1104 a 1—7; VII. 1. 1145 b 2—7; IX. 2. 1165 a 12–14.)

Already this aspect of Aristotle's *Ethics* as adopted by Bertrand Russell would seem to invalidate Russell's negation of its intrinsic value! Bertrand Russell's evaluation of Aristotle is particularly typical since it clearly demonstrates the basic difference between "latent" and "patent" influence which plays so important a part in

the approach to Aristotle's philosophy. Bertrand Russell tries to denounce and minimize the intrinsic value of Aristotle's work. This particularly applies to Aristotle's "Philosophy of Human Affairs" but also to his *Metaphysics* and his logic. (We can, of course, understand Bertrand Russell's criticism of Aristotle's physics and astronomy, although the lack of precise instruments makes many mistakes of Aristotle's in that field understandable and pardonable.) And yet in spite of his antagonistic attitude towards Aristotle, Bertrand Russell himself succumbed to Aristotle's *latent* influence inasfar as he denied the possibility of applying scientific precision and scientific laws to matters of value judgement, in other words to ethical, political, and esthetical thought, to the "Philosophy of Human Affairs." If this happens to so noted a thinker and philosopher as Bertrand Russell, Aristotle's position in our time seems to be fairly well elucidated. However much the worshippers of pure science may object to Aristotle, he still holds a powerful position—even if of *latent* influence—in the minds of modern men.

It is in this connection that the now almost proverbial statement made by the German critic Friedrich Schlegel, acquires a new significance: "Every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian." This remark primarily referred to the famous feud between the so-called "Nominalists," on the one hand and the "Realists" on the other. This dispute practically engaged the minds of the leading thinkers of the Middle Ages and even led to political feud at the beginning of the so-called Renaissance.

It goes back to Aristotle's antagonism against Plato's theory of ideas. In Plato's philosophy, the idea or form of a thing was more and more made independent of the thing itself which bore its name. Thus Plato conceived of the independent existence of the abstract idea of the good, of man, of horse, etc. Aristotle in the main, objected against this separation of the name of a thing from the thing itself it was meant to denominate. Plato on the other hand, in principle, believed in an eternal existence of the world of ideas as opposed to the constant flux and always changing phenomena of our sense perceptions.

This is in a very rough outline the origin of the controversy, although Plato's Theory of Ideas is in itself rather complicated by the fact that in his *Parmenides* Plato himself advanced powerful arguments against the independent existence of the world of ideas. (See in this connection Sir David Ross's *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford, 1951, which constitutes the latest thorough elucidation of this difficult problem viewed from a strictly scholarly angle.)

The ideas were above all in the Middle Ages denominated universals (*universalia*). The realists—in the main following Plato—believed that the universals existed prior to and independent of the real things

they denominated: *universalia ante res*. The nominalists on the other hand, believed that the universals only denominated, and therefore only existed in the things they denominated: *universalia in rebus*. They were supposed to express Aristotle's opinion on the subject-matter. There was in addition a third school of thought which considered the universals only existing subsequent to the things they denominated and for which they gave the names or denominations: *Universalia post res*.

These divergent opinions so much engaged the minds of the medieval thinkers that they not only intruded into the field of theology, but even gave rise to political factions and struggles. In other words, not only the Pope intervened, but also worldly princes such as, e.g., Louis XI of France as late as 1473 took sides in this struggle. Today the question at issue to us seems of a secondary importance, the more so as neither Aristotle nor Plato—if we study the texts—exclusively adhered to one or the other of the two basic issues.

Nevertheless, Schlegel's characterization according to which men are either Platonists or Aristotelians still holds good. This becomes particularly manifest if we consider the rift between "pure science" on the one hand and the philosophy of human affairs, i.e., above all, moral science, political science, legal science on the other. This is borne out by the fact that the adherents of "pure science" deny the possibilities of applying the name of science to such branches of learning as ethics, politics and jurisprudence. The most striking instance for this fact is to be seen in Bertrand Russell's above illustrated approach to Aristotle. At the same time, however, Bertrand Russell unmistakably demonstrates that even the strictest adherents of the laws of pure science, cannot help admitting that those laws are of no avail, if and when human feelings and actions are at issue.

It is in this connection that in fine we should like to reproduce Dr. A. H. Armstrong's summary on Aristotle's contribution to philosophy as set forth in his *Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, the more so as it frankly expresses the intimate connection between Aristotelianism and common sense on the one hand and the hence resulting difficulty of departing from Aristotelianism in our ways of thought:

"It would be absurd to try to summarize Aristotle's contribution to philosophy. Perhaps no other man has made such serious additions to so many branches of knowledge by his own single effort. In every part of philosophy his thought is still a living force. Sometimes it has penetrated so deeply into our inherited ways of thinking that Aristotelianism seems to the ordinary man the merest common sense, and we can only think in an un-Aristotelian way by a deliberate, conscious effort. To traditional Christian philosophy he has made a double contribution, through the large Aristotelian element in that

later Platonism which so deeply influenced the first Christian thinkers, and through the study and use of his philosophy by St. Thomas. His influence on Greek thought after his own time was patchy. By a curious chance his later fully original works, with which we have in this survey been entirely concerned, went out of circulation so completely soon after his death that their very existence was almost forgotten; and they only emerged again in the last century before the Christian era. His school developed into an exclusive community of research scientists who had little influence on the general development of philosophy. But there is no important school of thought after his time which does not owe him some considerable, though often unacknowledged debt." (Op. cit., London 1947, pp. 112 f.)

All these considerations seem to converge in one point: Confucius' almost incessant *patent* influence on subsequent Chinese thought and Aristotle's no less continuous *latent* influence on Western thought make Confucianism and Aristotelianism equally topical and thus adequate subject-matters for a comparison.

The main topics and facts that lie at the root of an apposite comparison.

The need for a real comparison of our Western ideals of civilization in general and literature in particular, on the one hand, and the Chinese classics on the other, is—apart from Professor Dubs's reference to the Confucianist Hsüntze, as the Aristotle of China and the perenniality of Confucian "patent" and Aristotle's "latent" influence —particularly well characterized in a brief remark by E. R. Hughes. When referring to our pride in Western literature such as the world of Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides on the one hand and Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on the other, Hughes, with a definite emphasis on Confucius' pre-eminence, declares: "Here are matters for comparison with the judicious mind, the human-hearted mind, as China's most honored teacher, Confucius, would urge." (Hughes, op. cit., p. XVII f.)

The subject-matter under comparison, i.e. the essential and perennial features of Confucius' teachings, is incidentally adumbrated by Professor Creel, who in his Confucius book by way of most advanced textual criticism tried to explode "Confucius the Myth" and to restore "Confucius the Man." For the concluding page of that essay displays the perennial features of Confucius' teachings in such a way that that summary—although preceded by a rather extensive amount of hyper-criticism—cannot help being an apotheosis of Confucius, "the sage throughout the ages." "Confucius seems to have recognized the threefold danger that is risked by him who lays down, for the guidance of society, any unalterable standard, whether it be a system of metaphysics, or books, or laws, or merely principles. First, it stifles

initiative. Second, it may do harm, when conditions arise that were not foreseen by the lawgiver. Finally, if criticism (which cannot be stifled in a co-operative society) destroys the people's faith in the standard, they may be left completely without guidance. Confucius did not seek to impose any absolute authority.

"Yet some authority there must be if the state is not to lapse into anarchy. That authority Confucius was willing to confide to men. Not to just any men, but to men imbued with the Way. The Way was not, however, a fixed code; still less was it concerned with metaphysics. It was a body of ideals which men had made and which men must continue to develop . . . Confucius put his faith in men. Not in all men, he was not so naïve. But he believed that most men were honest. He did not think that all men were capable of taking part in the government. He did advocate, however, that all of them should be given some education, to make them truly members of the co-operative state, and he proposed that those among them who showed themselves able and virtuous should be given further education and placed in positions of authority. Once there, he was willing to permit them to govern according to their own best judgement. And he believed that in the long run the people in general would be able to distinguish the good official from the bad.

"He trusted the human race." (Creel, *Confucius The Man and the Myth*, p. 289.)

Everyone who has studied Aristotle realizes from this summary the inherent similarity of what here is supposed to be the fundamental character of Confucius' approach to Man, Society, and State on the one hand, and Aristotle's *Philosophy of Human Affairs* on the other. This will become all the more convincing if—in conclusion of this essay—we enumerate basic concepts of Confucianism and—at the same time—confront and compare them with corresponding or related concepts and notions of Aristotelianism, and, above all, of Aristotle's *Philosophy of Human Affairs*.

There is *Tao*, the Way ("sageliness within and kingliness without") which came very close to the Aristotelian *Orthos Logos* (Right Rule or Reason) bound up with *Phronesis* or Practical Wisdom, that integral part of the general notion of virtue as well as of every single one of the moral virtues.

There is *Jen* (Humaneness, Benevolence) which is very much in line with Aristotle's *Philia*, or social sympathy, the *life force* of all human relations.

There is the *Doctrine of the Mean* which reminds us of Aristotle's *Meson* or *Mesotes*, the right mean as the *basis* of all virtuous action.

Chüntzu, the cultured gentleman who derives his excellence from his study of the ancients and application of their principles to his ways of life, is another notion which also reminds of Aristotle's

preoccupation with education as a means for making men better and wiser men in thought and action.

There is *Li* (Propriety, principle of Social Order) which lays stress on the observance of right customs and habits which primarily should guide men and at the same time serve as a complement and corrective to merely legal rules. This far-reaching concept seems to reoccur in Aristotle's *Philia* as well as in his *Epieikeia* (Equity, Fairness, Reasonableness and Humanness), the *leitmotiv* of human action.

In addition we find in both philosophic systems the intimate interconnection of Ethics and Politics and above all, the acknowledgement of the value of men, the respect for and trust in men provided it be good men, *Chüntzu* or Aristotle's *Spoudaios* the good man who is the measure of all things.

And last, not least, we realize in both systems the *dynamics* of thought which refrains from static ideals and puts its trust in the flexibility and adaptability of such concepts as *Tao*, the way of perfection corresponding to *Orthos Logos*, right rule or reason, the *Doctrine of the Mean* as in part co-extensive with Aristotle's *Meson*, the right mean between two extremes, the principle of propriety or social order, *Li*, as similar to Aristotle's *Philia* (civic friendship or social sympathy) and his *Politike*, political science or art as the architectonic art encompassing all other human accomplishments, aiming at *eudaimonia*, the *supreme end* of both the state and the individual, i.e. well-being in "happiness through moral and intellectual perfection" (as to *basis*, *life force*, *leitmotiv* and *supreme end* see Hamburger, *Morals and Law, The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory*, p. 183) *Chüntzu*, the cultured gentleman coming very close to Aristotle's *Spoudaios*, the good and fair man as the measure of all things and of course endowed with *phronesis* practical wisdom. All these qualities and phenomena are the aim of an appropriate education which for Confucius was education through reinterpretation of the ancients and for Aristotle education in all those branches of learning which he sifted and in part newly established, such as logic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, economics, poetics, metaphysics, physics, biology, and psychology, etc.

Already from this general evaluation we realize that Aristotelianism was by far more encompassing than Confucianism. For Confucianism, as Chinese philosophy in general, was mainly concerned with the "Philosophy of Human Affairs"—to use an Aristotelian expression—and which primarily entailed moral and political science and their auxiliary branches above all poetry and music as subservient to education.

There is in fine another aspect which seems to link Aristotelianism to Confucianism. We have sufficiently proved that Confucius in the first place was *the* teacher of China. This educational influence of

Confucius was manifest up to the very recent past. For the Confucian *Four Books* constituted obligatory text-books for the first instruction for the Chinese children. It is here that an aspect of Aristotle's work and influence impresses itself upon the student. Apart from the fact that Aristotle in his whole work composed a most encompassing edifice of higher education in all then known branches of learning, of which he first created the science of logic, then later on compiled the text-book on poetry, it was his *Rhetoric*, his text-book on oratory, which in a way conveyed a general outline of education, not only in the art of public speaking, but at the same time in general principles of ethics, political theory, jurisprudence and criminology, psychology, characterology, logic, grammar, syntax and literary criticism. It was through his *Rhetoric*, the model for all subsequent rhetoric text-books of antiquity, that Aristotle exerted his greatest influence on ancient thought which extended to the Middle Ages and is still palpable in the curricula of the humanistic gymnasiums of the European continent. For Aristotle's *Rhetoric* practically gave rise to a higher education simply called rhetoric or rhetorical education which comprised the famous seven liberal arts or branches of classical education consisting:

(1) of the *Trivium* (the three-way branch of learning) i.e. Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric, and

(2) the *Quadrivium* (the four-way branch of learning) i.e. Arithmetics, Geometry, Astronomy and Music.

Everyone who doubts this statement, e.g. with the usual reference to Plato's seventh book of his *Republic* where the "Quadrivium" is outlined and a general description of instruction in dialectics is given, need only glance at Cicero's rhetoric text-books, Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* and the later rhetoric text-books as—in their essential features—compiled in Halm's book on the minor Roman orators.

In the second place Confucianism was particularly influential as to State and Government. This can be seen best from the fact that the six Ministers, namely the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Instruction, of Religion, of War, of Crime and of Work, whose functions are outlined in part V book XX of the *Book of History*, as already existing under the Chou Dynasty, were still recognizable at the beginning of the twentieth century A.D. in the six Boards of the Chinese Government: Board of Civil Office, Board of Revenue, Board of Rites, Board of War, Board of Punishment, Board of Work (see James Legge, the *Shu King* in the *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. III, pp. 278 ff., Oxford 1899.).

Aristotle, too, exerted some definite influence on the political institutions of the West. Accordingly Sir Ernest Barker characterized him as the father of modern constitutionalism (see Barker, *The Politics*

of Aristotle, Oxford 1946, p. LXI f.). Thus already in these introductory reflections we arrive—among other aspects of similarity—at least at two elements of close resemblance:

(1) Confucius, *the* teacher and the originator of Chinese education in the liberal arts up to the very recent past. Aristotle the author of the *Rhetoric*, that text-book which served as a model for practically all ancient rhetoric text-books and thereby as a means of education in the seven liberal arts as recognizable throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages up to the very recent past and even today in some countries of Western Europe.

(2) The Confucian texts and above all the *Book of History* contain model types of the six branches of Chinese Government which existed up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Aristotle through his *Politics* in a way became the originator of Western constitutionalism.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

Operative Logic and Mathematics would appear to be a new venture. Only a few weeks before his premature death Hermann Weyl, one of the most original mathematicians of our time, the author of a *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science* and also of a stimulating book on *Symmetry*, drew my attention to Paul Lorenzen's *Einführung in die operative Logik und Mathematik* (Springer, Berlin). This book had given him new hope, since Gödel had discouraged his endeavour to find the foundations of mathematics. "*Perhaps*," he added, "Lorenzen's approach promises a way of arriving at reliable foundations." Here I cannot do more than draw attention to this ambitious attempt to find new foundations for logic, arithmetic and analysis. The book itself is highly technical, of chief concern to mathematicians to whom a final judgment (which at this stage, as a competent mathematician assures me, is not possible) must be left. This mathematical operationism should not be confused with Bridgman's physical operationism according to which a concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of empirically performable operations. But it shares the vagueness and ambiguity exposed by A. Cornelius Benjamin (*Operationism*), for it defines "operative = to operate according to rules." It is rather based on Hugo Dingler's operationism, on Curry's interpretation of mathematics as a theory of formal systems and on schematic operations with "figures." A calculus is here defined as a system of rules for operating with figures, i.e. with marks on paper. Every sentence (*Aussage*) is interpreted as a figure composed of a finite number of atoms, but not all figures are sentences. This attempt may be of interest to students of linguistic analysis. Whether it will succeed must be left to the future. *Perhaps?* As to logic, it is difficult to see what is gained by saying that logical inferences are "schematic operations." One is left with the impression that it is not a new logic, but rather a reformulation of Symbolic Logic with the express aim of establishing (*begründen*) "the logical rules independently of the logic contained in ordinary language."

Edmund Husserl's *Erste Philosophie* (*1923/24*), I. *Kritische Ideengeschichte* (Nijhoff, Haag), is likewise concerned with foundational problems, but rather with those of philosophy, treating them in a very different manner. These lectures of a remarkably high standard represent an original attempt to bring about a reform of "philosophy in its totality and of all sciences" by going back to Aristotle's concept of a *prima philosophia*, and to establish Husserl's own transcendental phenomenology as a "first philosophy" appropriate to our time. In pursuit of this aim this massive Volume VII of the *Husserliana* becomes a rather personal dialogue with Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Kant, an important document of Husserl's interpretation of the history of philosophy. It raises moreover the interesting question whether a first philosophy which was appropriate to the relatively simple system of sciences in Aristotle's days is still compatible with an era of alternative geometries and logics. Nicolai Hartmann's *Kleinere Schriften*, Vol. I. *Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie* (De Gruyter, Berlin) confirm that he also believed in a "first philosophy." This he identified with his "new ontology," i.e. an ontology "from below," by no means identical with the traditional medieval ontology, but rooted in the analysis of specific problems. But is this attempt still possible or mere anachronism?

These Collected Papers may be recommended as revealing Hartmann's basic intentions in ontology, *Kategorialanalyse* and ethics. I agree with him that "our time stands on the threshold of a new metaphysics which will be very different from the old one, disillusioned, unspeculative, very modest but nevertheless as to its problems a true metaphysics." That Husserl's phenomenology can not only lead to ontology (Hartmann), but also to speculative metaphysics is evidenced by Arnold Metzger's *Freiheit und Tod* (Niemeyer, Tübingen). Metzger interprets "existence" as "response to death," "death" as "paradigm of the identity of being and nothingness" and "freedom" as "the will to be, in opposition to death." Heidegger, it is claimed, did not understand death which ought to be understood as "the transcendent source of the reality of the Universe." But can death be "understood?" Those interested in the problems will find a shortened chapter of the book in *The Review of Metaphysics*, IV, pp. 13 ff. The relapse into Romanticism is the danger of German philosophy, therefore Karl Jaspers's *Schelling, Grösse und Verhängnis* (Piper, München) should exercise a healthy influence. Whereas Schelling is almost unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world, the centenary of his death has on the Continent provided the occasion for a congress devoted to his philosophy (Ragaz, 1955) and for many publications of which this is the most interesting and the most personal. It is a report on the encounter of a psychopathologist-philosopher with a man of genius who occasionally deviated into fancy and nonsense. Jaspers is interested in the "case" Schelling: his precocity, the alleged anticipation of all his later ideas in his youth, the grandiosity of his intentions, the contrast between an early period of less than twenty years of exuberant publication and his almost complete silence in the following forty years. He is likewise interested in his thought without being able to find any real development within it. He acknowledges his "greatness," his problems, conception of philosophy, suggestive ideas and projects, but rejects his professorial claim, his prophecies and revelations. Schelling is accused of having left the Kantian path of reason and of having chosen the path of gnosis that lures us with phantoms of pseudo-knowledge, instead of Jaspers's own way of *Existenzerhellung* which reminds us of our authentic being. The book thereby reveals the present state of Jaspers's own philosophy. If it does not exercise the desired influence, the reason is that it is too personal and arbitrary and open to criticism on historical grounds; the quotations need checking within their original context. To the English reader Jaspers's delightful little booklet *Wesen und Kritik der Psychotherapie* (Piper, München), will probably be of greater interest. Here he speaks with authority about psychotherapy, its scope and limits. He demands superior wisdom, unfailing sympathy and unshakeable hopefulness as the credentials of a psychotherapist. Belonging to the same series Emil Preetorius' *Sprache der Kunst* (Piper) is most enjoyable with twenty-eight pictures from the author's own collection of Asiatic art and stimulating with its aphorisms reflecting the experience of an artist and a well-known *connoisseur*. The publisher deserves to be congratulated on the high standard of his publications.

"La plus utile et la moins avancée de toutes les connaissances humaines me paraît être celle de l'homme." Rousseau's dictum is still valid today despite the extensive work devoted to Philosophical Anthropology in Germany since Scheler published his study *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* in 1928. The history of this subject as well as the contemporary contributions of biologists, philosophers and historians are competently and instructively discussed by M. Landmann in *Philosophische Anthropologie* (De Gruyter, Berlin). His thesis is that the future belongs to *Kulturanthropologie*; man creates civilization and is in turn influenced by it. S. Strasser, Professor of

Philosophical Anthropology in the University of Nimwegen, combines in a unique manner Thomism and Husserl's Phenomenology, rational and empirical psychology. Based on a thorough knowledge of the literature on the subject, his scholarly book *Das Gemüt* (Het Spectrum, Utrecht) analyses the ambiguous term "feeling" into its components, i.e. impulses, passions, emotions, moods, etc., describes them phenomenologically and concludes with the study of attitudes to the Transcendent which are regarded as essential to human existence. A humanism in the Oxford tradition is advocated by the late Ernst Hoffmann in his collected essays *Pädagogischer Humanismus* (Artemis-Verlag, Zürich). He stresses the interdependence of education and culture, and discusses the history of pedagogics from the days of the early Greeks to those of German democracy. An introduction to legal philosophy is given in C. A. Emge's *Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie* (Humboldt-Verlag, Frankfurt). Arnold Toynbee is claimed as a representative of a morphology of culture, and his philosophy of history and of civilization is discussed in great detail by O. Anderle in his *Das Universalhistorische System A. J. Toynbees* (Humboldt-Verlag, Frankfurt). Toynbee has replaced Spengler as the subject of heated discussions. J. Hessen's *Religionsphilosophie*, Vol. I and II (Reinhardt, München) is the second edition of a comprehensive work. Volume I is a discussion of speculative, critical, psychological and phenomenological methods used by German authors; Volume II develops, following Scheler and Otto, Hessen's own philosophy of religion, based on the thesis that the experience of the holy as the religious value is more fundamental than faith and knowledge. The thesis is elaborated in great detail, but hardly convincing because one has to believe in the holy if one is to experience its value. The difference between truth based either on reason or on revelation and the difficulties arising from their combination in Christian philosophy are well brought out by K. Oedingen in *Die spekulative und die geoffenbarte Wahrheit* (Balduin Pick Verlag, Köln).

The ninth edition of K. Vorländer's *Geschichte der Philosophie* is thoroughly revised, Vol. I. *Altertum und Mittelalter*, by E. Metzke, Vol. II. *Die Philosophie der Neuzeit bis Kant*, by H. Knittermeyer (R. Meiner, Hamburg). The extensive new bibliographical notes are of special value, and the text has gained by being brought up to date. The same publisher presents us with a new edition and translation of D'Alembert's famous *Discours Préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie* (1751). A corresponding English edition of this important and most influential text would be of great value. Students of Hegel's political philosophy will be grateful for the new revised edition of his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* by J. Hoffmeister (F. Meiner, Hamburg). It differs from Lasson's edition in that it includes Hegel's own marginal notes, but leaves the later additions printed by Lasson for a second volume. J. Hoffmeister publishes simultaneously, with the same publisher, a *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe*. It is a one-man dictionary of philosophical concepts, with stress on their etymological history. The enormous amount of work which has gone into its composition calls for recognition. But I must confess uneasiness in face of the considerable influence which such dictionaries exercise on students. Etymologies are often deceptive, and the Hegelian bias of the author opens the door to a new Romanticism. If for instance truth is essentially defined as self-realization, I wonder what a student will make of it. The dictionary is revealing for the German use of terms, but compared with it Lalande's *Vocabulaire*, the collective work of the *Société Francaise de Philosophie*, remains a classic. Dr. Meiner would certainly do a service to philosophy by adding a translation of it to his famous "Philosophical Library."

A healthy anti-romantic movement is inaugurated by F. J. von Rintelen and for this reason his book, *Der Rang des Geistes, Goethes Weltverständnis* (Niemeyer, Tübingen) may be commended. It is a well-documented study of Goethe's *Weltanschauung* as a classical antidote against the romantic despair of some existentialists. For a full-length review of the book cf. *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger*, IX, 2. The classical tradition prevails likewise in the late Erich Frank's collected essays published under the title *Knowledge, Will and Belief* (Artemis-Verlag and Regnery, Chicago). Quite a few of them are written in English, among them some of special interest referring to the religious origin of Greek philosophy, to the fundamental opposition of Plato and Aristotle and to Plato's view of the state. P. Vogel publishes a booklet on *Theodor Litt* (De Gruyter, Berlin), on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday. He presents him as someone basing his philosophy on the reality of the mind, continuing the German idealist tradition and attempting to lay a new foundation of the *Geisteswissenschaften.*

Evidently it is impossible to review books which have not been received and equally impossible to give a complete survey of all new German publications. Those interested in them must be referred to the German periodicals; in addition to the above mentioned *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, Scholastik* gives comprehensive surveys of different subjects. Articles and reviews will also be found in *Archiv für Philosophie, Kantstudien* and *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung.*

Oxford. F. H. Heinemann.

NEW BOOKS

Some Main Problems of Philosophy. By George Edward Moore. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1953. Pp. xii + 380.

These lectures of Moore were given at Morley College, London, in the winter of 1910–11. They are now published with some corrections and additional notes. There are twenty lectures in all, and the first ten are, as Moore tells the reader, the unpublished writings to which Russell referred in his *Problems of Philosophy* (1912) as having been of assistance to him over the question of the relations of sense-data to physical objects. It is most interesting to have them before us now. But one cannot help wishing that they had been published at the time, when what they had to say was fresh and apposite and would have been assimilated more readily into the body of philosophical thought than it can be now. After a first lecture on "What is Philosophy?" we have five lectures on knowledge, five on space, time and reality, and eight further lectures on imagination, memory, belief, truth, universals, resemblance, etc. They are not easy reading. Moore never makes things easy for the reader; in fact, I doubt whether he thinks of the reader at all. He is concerned to "get clear" about things and there is unrelenting exactitude in everything he writes. All the lectures bear the imprint of a patient, penetrating and subtle mind, ready to accept whatever the argument seems to enforce.

No reviewer could hope to consider the detailed solutions to many problems throughout the book. It is more profitable to look at Moore's conception of philosophy. In Chapter 1, "What is Philosophy?" Moore tries to describe the whole range of philosophy. The first problem of philosophy, he says, is to give a *general* description of the universe; other problems are concerned with the different ways in which we know things; and yet others with classifying the sorts of characteristics which make things good or bad, right or wrong. Most of the first chapter is devoted to the first (metaphysical) question. Since many philosophers have disagreed with common sense about the kinds of things in the universe, Moore begins by stating certain views "which are held, now-a-days, by almost everybody" (p. 2), and which, because they are so held, may fairly be called the views of common sense. Common sense, we are told, holds that there are "enormous numbers of material objects" (p. 2) including our own bodies. Further, we believe that we have minds, and that one of the chief things meant by saying we have minds is that we "perform acts of consciousness." As well as immense numbers of material objects there are also "in the universe at any moment millions of different acts of consciousness being performed . . ." (p. 4), and Moore adds "It is, I think, certainly common sense to believe all this" (p. 4). It follows that "Common sense believes that there are in the Universe at least two different kinds of things" (p. 4), material things and acts of consciousness.

To accept all this is, I think, difficult. If Moore had said "My view is that there are in the Universe at least two different kinds of things," it would be easy to accept that it was his view, and profitable to consider whether there are in fact at least two different kinds of things in the universe. But when he tells us not that this and the other propositions he enunciates are *his* views but that they are the views of common sense, and implies that by this he means they are views held nowadays by "almost everybody," I am rather surprised. How have the views of so many people been ascertained? Or is this a claim to know *a priori* what people believe? Philosophers have, of

course, claimed to know all sorts of things *a priori*. But the claim to know what "almost everybody" nowadays believes is a very considerable one.

If the particular views mentioned were such as to be greeted as true by any Englishman, this in itself would not go far towards proving the claim. But in fact when reading them one is inclined to say of some of them: "I might come to agree with this if you argued with me. But it isn't what I believe now." And surely many peoples of different cultures would have more markedly different reactions. Surely there must be a great many primitive peoples who have no expression in their language for "acts of consciousness"? And perhaps there are numbers even of Englishmen who, so far from believing in "acts of consciousness," have never heard the expression? If it is said that they have heard of seeing and hearing, and believe they see and hear, and these are acts of consciousness, therefore they believe in acts of consciousness, is not this the great non-sequitur which lies at the bottom of the attempt to defend common sense and practise analysis on it? Moore says: "At all events we are certain that we do perform them (sc. acts of consciousness) and that these acts are something very different from material objects. To hear is not *itself* a material object, however closely it may be related to certain material objects, and so on with all the rest—seeing, remembering, feeling, thinking, etc." (p. 4).

What are the facts? I sometimes hear people talking, etc., and if asked whether hearing is a material object, I should regard the question as very peculiar but I might, I think, answer: "No, it isn't." If asked whether talking were a material object I should, I think, answer: "No, it isn't." I make a distinction between people on the one hand and the things people do, such as hearing and talking; and I don't call the things people do material objects. Of course, I am not saying that there is no difference between walking, talking, etc., on the one hand and seeing, hearing, etc., on the other. I don't think, however, that we should readily put this distinction in the form of saying that there are two different kinds of things in the universe. Why? If someone says: "There are two different kinds of things in that bag" we expect to be able to extract apples or toys, or . . . etc. Suppose Moore were to send me into a room and say: "There are two different kinds of things in that room" and suppose when I went in there was a large room with three people standing looking at me. I might say "There aren't any *things* at all in the room; there are only three people there." Or I *might* say "There are three bodies there, but that's the only kind of thing." If Moore now said "There is another kind of thing, viz. the acts of seeing which they are all performing" I should be inclined to say "Oh! that's what you mean. Oh! yes, they are all *looking* at me." But someone might equally well have said "There is another kind of thing, viz. the acts of standing which they are all performing."

Moore thinks that common sense not only believes that acts of consciousness are a class of thing other than material things, but also (in contrast with most philosophers who hold that acts of consciousness do not occur in any place at all) that common sense holds that my acts of consciousness occur in the place where my body is. Later he adds that we believe with certainty that all acts of consciousness "do take place somewhere or other in our bodies" though he expresses some hesitation by adding "At all events we all constantly talk as if we believed this" (p. 7). What he has in mind, as he explains, is that we no longer think, as some savages used to think, that while I am asleep in London my soul may be absent enjoying views of Paris. Now the points on which we disagree with the savages (if savages in fact hold the beliefs which Moore attributes to them) here seem to me (i) that we

believe that when a person sees something, he sees it from the place in which he is, i.e. the place where his body is; (ii) that when he sees something, there is some process going on in his body. But this seems to me to fall a long way short of holding that seeing occurs somewhere or other in our bodies; and quite consistent with holding that it does not occur *in* any place at all. "Seeing" is not *in* any place in the sense that it does not make sense to ask: Where did your seeing Great Gable take place? It *does* make sense to say Where were you when you saw Great Gable? or From what point did you see Great Gable? To answer the second question by saying "From the point where I was at the time" is true but not informative. I cannot see things from any point which cannot be so described. To answer either question by saying "The summit of Bow Fell" is to give an informative answer. To answer "I saw it from the summit of Bow Fell when I was on the summit of Skiddaw" would be absurd.

Starting from the (supposed) common-sense view that there certainly are in the universe material objects and acts of consciousness Moore proceeds to consider the general description of the universe that might be given by saying that these two kinds of things are the only kinds of things in the universe or that they are the only kinds we know to be in the universe, though there may be others. Many people—philosophers and others—have held one or other of these views to be true, says Moore. But such people "can hardly deny that there certainly are in the Universe *also* at least two other things beside these . . . namely, Space and Time themselves" (p. 16). Then Moore proceeds as follows: "But those philosophers who have spoken as if material objects and acts of consciousness were the *only* kinds of things known by us to be in the Universe, have, I think, not really meant to deny this. They have meant, rather, that material objects and acts of consciousness are the only kinds of things known to us which are in a certain sense *substantial*: substantial in a sense in which Space and Time themselves do not seem to be substantial" (p. 16). And Moore gives his own assent to this view. Nor I do not know who the philosophers are who have thought that acts of consciousness are substantial things. But if there have been such philosophers—and Moore does not claim that there have been any philosophers who *said* this, only that there have been philosophers who *meant* this—they were using the expression "substantial thing" in a wholly unusual sense. For who would say that an *act* is a *substantial* thing? And who would hold that an act of consciousness, e.g. seeing something or wondering about something, is a substantial thing? Thoughts have, from time immemorial, been taken as the very type of the insubstantial. It is easy to see how someone, holding that seeing, hearing, thinking, etc., are acts, and at the same time holding that they are not acts of a material thing, might suppose that there must be another kind of substantial thing, mind, of which they were the acts. But this is not, according to Moore, what either common sense or the philosopher he has in mind, have held. (But is it not more plausibly represented as the common-sense view than the view Moore attributes to common sense?) It is true that, when Moore began stating the common-sense view he said: "We believe that we men, besides having bodies, also have *minds*; and one of the chief things that we mean by saying we have *minds*, is, I think, this; namely, that we perform certain mental acts or acts of consciousness" (p. 4). But at once mind drops out of the picture and only acts of consciousness remain. But if we are to speak in this way surely we must give up the notion of another kind of substantial thing other than material things and attribute the acts of consciousness, like acts of walking, talking, etc., to a material thing. I do not suggest that this is either common sense or right, only that it

is the appropriate corollary to Moore's replacing *mind* as substance (in effect) by mind as *acts* of consciousness. But, of course, what Moore has offered us as common sense is only one amongst a number of claimants. It could with as great (or as little) plausibility be claimed that common sense holds that there are two different kinds of substantial things in the Universe, mind and matter; and whereas it is matter which performs acts such as rolling, sliding, bumping, etc., it is mind which performs acts such as seeing, hearing, thinking, etc. (See, for example, the first few pages of Professor Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, where this sort of view is attributed to common sense.) If this is common sense, Moore is contradicting common sense, since he is implying that there does not exist substantial mind over and above its operations or acts. Suppose we ask: Does common sense hold that mind is a substance and performs acts of consciousness, or does it hold that acts of consciousness are themselves substantial things? The answer surely must be that as most people have never asked the question, they have never had occasion to answer it? The whole language in which Moore states what he takes to be the views of common sense—material thing, substantial thing, acts of consciousness, etc.—is the sediment of scientific, philosophical and theological theory which has invaded, but not conquered, the language of the ordinary man. The language of matter and mind, body and consciousness, is the end-result of a process whereby the physical and chemical study of nature has set aside certain phenomena as non-material. I don't wish to suggest that these ways of thinking are not to be found at all in common sense. But there seems to me to be a third and more common way of looking at these matters different both from that which Professor Moore recounts with approval and from that which Professor Ryle recounts with disapproval.

Since it is reckless to speak of what almost everyone today believes he knows—which is what Moore understands by common sense—I shall speak instead about common convictions, meaning by common only that they are widely held in this country, not necessarily held by nearly everyone or even by a majority.

A very common conviction about the kinds of things in the universe—more common, I think, amongst people whose acquaintance with science and philosophy is negligible, than either the views approved by Moore or those condemned by Ryle—is that there are two kinds of things in the universe, inanimate things, such as rocks and chairs, and living things, such as daisies, cats and human beings; and further, that amongst living things there are two kinds, plants and animals, and amongst animals there are two kinds, those that are and those that are not conscious. People who hold this sort of view could, I think, be *pressed to admit* that, where there is consciousness, there are things going on which can't be observed; and they might on this basis be *brought to admit* that you could divide into (*a*) observable things—living or non-living things—and their observable goings-on, and (*b*) another non-observable class of goings-on such as the experiences and thoughts of conscious beings. This latter division is something like Moore's; but it is not a division into two kinds of (substantial) things, but a distinction between a class of goings-on and everything else, whether things or goings-on. On this view it is people (observable) who have experiences (unobservable).

What now about Space and Time? Many of us would not ordinarily speak of Space and Time as "things in the universe." But if I were persuaded to extend the use of the word "thing" so as to include Space and Time, I should probably want to include also "the things that happen" and "the things people do," "the things people see," "the things people feel" and so on.

Moore's philosophy, which on the face of it seems to be the assertion of

common sense against the wild sayings of philosophers, has not quite the innocence of common sense. It is common sense moulded by philosophical categories, such as substance and consciousness having only a distant relationship to the ordinary usage of those words in everyday discourse. From time to time even technical concepts enter in (e.g. sense-datum). Just how this formalised common sense affects the problems considered and the solutions suggested can be detected only by the scrutiny of each particular problem. The ingenuity, the pertinacity and the honesty with which the problems are tackled give to Moore's treatment of particular problems unusual value. That is why for any one who has the patience to unravel the complexities of Moore's thinking there are great rewards.

This is one of the first volumes to appear in the Library of Philosophy since it changed its name to the Muirhead Library of Philosophy. The new editor, Professor H. D. Lewis, is to be congratulated on securing the work for the Library. It is a good start to the new series of volumes which we have been promised.

WINSTON H. F. BARNES.

Kant. By S. KÖRNER. (Penguin Books. 1955. Pp. 230. Price 2s. 6d.)

I

Professor Körner is to be congratulated on having written the best English introduction to the Critical Philosophy; and so too is Professor Ayer, as editor of the Pelican Philosophy Series, on having asked him to write it. I am even a little inclined to congratulate myself since I no longer feel under any obligation to undertake a task which was so badly needed and has now been so successfully performed.

It is always difficult to expound Kant's doctrine, and supremely difficult to do so within a short compass, but Professor Körner has been able to maintain a firm grasp both of the details and of the whole: he is equally good on each of the three Critiques and, what is more, on their relation to one another. Always sympathetic to his author, he is also critical, so far as space allows; and alike in exposition and in criticism he is careful, fresh, stimulating, sensible, and clear. He has succeeded in freeing himself from traditional misinterpretations, and he is able both to speak in the modern idiom and to relate what he says to the philosophical problems of today. I found his work easy and pleasant, and indeed exciting, to read. A novice in these matters may find rather more difficulty, if only because of the compression that is necessary; but it is to be hoped that all who approach the study of Kant for the first time will make thorough use of a book which more than any other will help them to get off to a good start.

Needless to say, there will always be room for differences in emphasis among commentators; but in the main such criticisms as I feel inclined to make all spring from one source—from the fact that the spatial limits set are too narrow. Although the book is a marvel of condensation from which nothing could profitably be omitted, there are further points of doctrine which might have been brought in with great advantage. My sole regret is that only one volume has been allotted to a subject which really requires two.

Among the novelties of Professor Körner's interpretation is the stress he lays on the distinction made in the *Prolegomena* between judgments of experience and judgments of perception. Most commentators have supposed this to be an afterthought inconsistent with the main doctrine and not repeated

in the later works. On a first reading I am not convinced that he is right in taking a contrary view, but he is certainly plausible and interesting.

Professor Körner explains very clearly why Kant regarded space and time as particulars, but he fails to make it equally clear that the doctrine of their subjectivity (or their transcendental ideality), whether sound or unsound, is at least an attempt to mediate between Newton and Leibniz. Whatever Kant may have held earlier, in his Critical Philosophy he always takes space and time to be relational and not absolute. On the metaphysical deduction I should have been grateful for some reference to the remarkable work of Professor Reich on the table of the forms of judgment. Again, Professor Körner holds—and this view is almost universally accepted—that Kant's list of categories could be extended; but it is not obvious to me that the two examples he gives to confirm this are really categories in Kant's sense—that is, concepts which must apply to any object if it is to be an object of experience. Must Whitehead's concept of four-dimensional events apply, for example, to states of mind? Even the concept of probability seems to me, perhaps because I am not sufficiently familiar with its modern scientific use, to be on a rather different footing from that of the categories proper. As to the difficult problem of the schemata, the account given of them as referential rules is most illuminating; but here again I should have liked rather more on the function of imagination, which is far too much neglected in modern philosophy. The short note on the Anticipations of Sense-Perception is incomplete without some reference to the fact that degrees of intensity are to be found, not merely in sensations, but in the objects of sensation and so in the physical world. It is this which distinguishes Kant's doctrine from that of the atomists, who maintained that everything must be composed of atoms and the void.

Less can be said here on Professor Körner's interpretation of Kant's moral and aesthetic and teleological theories, though I would repeat that it is as sound as his interpretation of the First Critique. His view of Kant's ethics is perhaps rather more intellectualistic than my own. One of his best points about teleology is that for Kant there is no opposition, as is often thought, between mechanistic and teleological methods of explanation. Kant never abandons the view that every object of experience must fall under causal law. What he maintains in the Third Critique is that it may be possible and proper to superimpose a teleological explanation on a causal one.

Here, too, a good many topics are omitted which could have been discussed with great advantage. Even so important a concept as that of the kingdom of ends is not mentioned, and I should have welcomed some reference to Kant's legal and political theory, to his application of moral principles in the *Metaphysik der Sitten*, and to his views about genius, to mention no others. But perhaps Professor Körner suffered here from lack of space even more than in the first half of his book, and it would be churlish to complain when he has already given us so much.

Of actual errors I have detected very few. By some slip, on p. 58, the adjectives are reversed in the well-known statement that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind. On p. 19, in the discussion of analytic and synthetic judgments, there is a failure to distinguish between the subject and the subject-concept. I confess that this traditional error makes me feel petulant when it is continually repeated in spite of my most strenuous protests. It does not really affect Professor Körner's own interpretation, but in itself it not only makes the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments unintelligible: it also contradicts the very foundation of Kant's thought and obscures the whole basis of his disagreement with Leibniz.

There are misprints—all omissions of a single letter—on pp. 190, 201, 203, and 204.

It is a rare pleasure to be able to commend a book so whole-heartedly; and although my criticisms have touched more on its few omissions than on its many positive merits, I hope I have made it clear that in spite of its brevity it is not only the best English introduction to the subject, but also an important and original contribution to Kantian scholarship.

H. J. Paton.

II

This book in the Pelican Philosophy series is intended as an Introduction to Kant; it does not profess to give any account of the development of his views prior to the first *Critique*, and Professor Körner says that in deciding how to use his space he has given preference to those of Kant's discussions which are relevant to the philosophy of today.

This preference has been judiciously exercised, and it seems unlikely that anyone will be dissatisfied with the proportions of the book. After a preliminary account of the plan of the critical philosophy, four chapters are devoted to the *Critique of Pure Reason;* two to ethics and the philosophy of religion; and one each to aesthetic and teleological judgment. The last chapter opens with an excellent and concise passage in which Kant's views on teleological explanation are placed in their historical setting.

It is suggested that, in the light of later developments, some reformulation of Kant's views is necessary. (1) The *Critique of Pure Reason* must be modified to admit the possibility of scientific theories other than the physics of Newton. Because he assumed this to be final, Kant thought that he had given an exhaustive table of the categories. What he in fact achieved was to set an example of a method of reasoning whereby it is possible to make explicit those principles of a scientific theory which are necessary to its objectivity, and yet are neither generalizations from experience nor analytical explanations of the meaning of terms. (2) As regards Kant's account of moral experience a somewhat similar change is required. On some points, Professor Körner prefers his analysis to that of contemporary moralists; he also finds a good word to say (p. 157) for Kant's reconciliation of causal necessity and moral freedom. But he argues that Kant's moral principle cannot do what it was designed to do, viz., show whether the maxim of an action is in accordance with duty. It has a more negative use, namely to show when maxims of conduct do or do not come within the moral sphere. Moreover, Kant took his examples from only one "moral code," just as he took for granted the science of Newton. His system needs to be modified to accommodate diverse systems of moral observance. (3) It is a mistake to think that by this replacing, in both the theoretical and the practical sphere, the absolute objectivity which Kant defended by a relative sort of objectivity either science or morality would *ipso facto* become matters of taste.

These are proposals which call for more extensive examination than is possible here. The emendation of Kant's theoretical system may be allowed to pass. As regards making allowance for "alternative moral codes," I am doubtful both whether Kant could have been brought to consent to this, and whether it is what is really demanded by the widening of our horizon which has taken place since the eighteenth century. Two distinct points are concerned—the existence of these alternative systems, and the suggested use of Kant's principle as a means of distinguishing between what is, and what is not, of a moral nature.

If in comparing the "codes" we can assume progress by reference to some

standard, then the proper task of a metaphysic of ethics, or of its fundamental principles, would be to ascertain how we come into possession of this standard; and, if so, the alternative codes do not greatly affect Kant's reasoning. The actual description of them would be assigned by him to anthropology. If, however, they are simply treated as alternatives, each valid in its own way, then, however much it is insisted that each is binding upon those who have been habituated to it, Kant might say that moral judgment had been thrown to the winds.

To the suggestion that his principle might be used to show which maxims of conduct were of a moral order and which concerned the a-moral aspects of human life, I think he might have answered that he did not need a principle to teach him this, and that it could be more easily learnt from the study of history, from ancient literature, from narratives of voyages in the Pacific, etc. This shows well enough which of the various demands made by society are of local origin and which are more fundamental to human nature.

Kant certainly seems to have been mistaken in thinking that it followed from his principles that particular rules of duty such as that of telling the truth, admit of no exception; and perhaps, as has been recently suggested (*Philosophical Review*, Oct. 1954) he was himself misled by the word "categorical," and so has been misinterpreted from the beginning.

The book would, I suggest, be improved by a number of minor changes. In the Preface it is said that quotations will be made from the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and its date is given. On p. 16 we have Kant's "so-called pre-critical period," but the date of the first edition is given only on p. 219, and then there is nothing to indicate what difference, if any, there is between the two editions. Some general works on Kant, besides commentaries, might be included in the bibliography. German equivalents of English terms are rightly given at some points, and would seem to be required elsewhere, notably at p. 60 "connection," "synthesis," and p. 214–16 "matters of fact," "matters of faith." On p. 89 "the postulates of empirical thought . . . correspond to the categories of *relation*": this seems to be a mistake for modality. On p. 100, the influence of Kant is illustrated from some arguments of contemporary English philosophers, none of them Kantians even in a looser sense of the term. "The influence of a great thinker is not properly measured by the number of those who profess to be his disciples," etc. I cannot see the justice of this. It may be applicable to scientific truth, but in philosophy if there has been such influence, how can it have been communicated except through the despised few who have made the effort to understand and interpret Kant? P. 123: I question whether Kant says that the logical maxim of syllogistic ordering "enjoins us to ascend from premiss to premiss in a series of syllogisms *which has no last term.*" Logic would have moved far from its Greek origins if it had ever required this; and it seems to me that Kant is more cautious. He twice says "as far as possible." Does he not mean to make the dialectical error consist in supposing the chain of reasoning to be complete at its lower end? Pp. 134–142: "A maxim is moral if it accords with the moral law," etc. Throughout this discussion the word "moral" is too frequently used, sometimes in a sense which seems to be both un-English and un-Kantian. In Kant we find, in addition to the adjective *sittlich*, such an expression as *moralische Wert* or *moralische Beurteilung;* but he does not seem to describe a maxim or action which is not in conflict with duty as "moral." Nor is it correct English to use "moral" as equivalent of "morally allowable or praiseworthy"; a moral action is simply one which is a fit subject for moral judgment. (Sometimes a person is called moral in the sense of "strict in morals," and I think the same use exists in French, but in both languages it is a colloquial use.) P. 161: Quoting Aristotle's dictum, "Thought

by itself moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end and concerned with action," Professor Körner contrasts his psychology of action with Kant's and asks which more closely represents the facts. In this passage, however, Aristotle was maintaining that reason has a twofold use, theoretical and practical, and thus far he is surely on the same side as Kant? If he had meant "thought does not move us to action, but desire does," he would have said so. It is clear from the structure of the sentence itself that by "thought itself" he means to refer to the theoretical thinking of the sciences. In support of this, see A. E. Taylor's essay in *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Second Series), and his letter in *Mind*, Vol. XXXVI (1927), p. 123. The opponent of Kant here is not Aristotle but Hume, the patron of modern irrationalism. Aristotle did maintain that thought, in order to be practical, must be conjoined with rational desire, but his view is that this desire must get its direction from practical thought.

D. J. Allan.

Religion and the Moral Life. By A. Campbell Garnett. (The Ronald Press Company, New York. Pp. 223. Price $3.50.)

This book is a lively and readable attempt to present a point of view, in the philosophy of religion, that is not very popular today but which had a considerable vogue at the turn of the century. It owes little directly to the recent work of outstanding Catholic and Protestant writers. The author defines religion as devotion to an object deemed to have supreme worth. The opposite of religion is secularism, examined in this book with special reference to the writings of John Dewey. Humanism is itself a form of religion, and in the work of thinkers like Erich Fromm has much to commend it. To both these attitudes Professor Barnett opposes his own religion in the form of a simplified theism, theism shorn of ritualistic and dogmatic accretions. He admits that ethics is logically independent of theism and makes the point that the notion of an object having supreme worth presupposes initial judgments of value. But he thinks humanism fails to give an adequate account of motivation where pursuit of the ideal imposes a serious strain. The main argument here is that humanism must, in the last resort, appeal to some form of enlightened self-interest, an argument which seems to me not to take due account of the work of deontologists like Ross or Broad in whose writings the notion of the performance of duty for its own sake has much centrality. The transition from humanism to religion is effected by insisting that in moral experience we find ourselves in the grip of a "Higher will than ours," the self, in surrendering to the "constraining sense of duty," finding itself "unified within and in harmony with what is most ultimate and real in the meaning of life." "Men find God" in this way, "they do not merely come to believe in the existence of something represented by an abstract idea," for the God a man thus "finds seeking him is the embodiment of the moral law." Professor Garnett has little regard for the traditional arguments for the existence of God, and he believes that reliance upon them betokens an authoritarian dogmatic attitude not consistent with the real "leap of faith." Objective certainty would in fact be most injurious to faith, for it would deprive man of the exercise of his freedom and responsibility in choosing the good for its own sake without the succour of religion and thereby attaining to the subjective certainty which is the achievement of faith. This is how we are to understand the principle that some measure of doubt is a precondition of faith. But Professor Garnett does supplement these considerations by an argument designed to show that

mental activity has "teleological continuity with a more general subjective activity of the world antecedent to it." This gives us the hypothesis of a "world mind" which accords well with the assurances we have in moral experience. This mind is not omnipotent, it has only "limited control over matter," and we are thus spared the desperate expedients of regarding evil as punishment for inevitable sin. "The doctrines of creation and omnipotence are accretions to theology," but Professor Garnett thinks there is a case for immortality or that at least we may "*hope* for immortality," not indeed as an essential part of "simple theistic faith" but as "an afterthought" of devotion to God. He retains in the same way beliefs about the "person of Jesus" and revelation in history which are as near a rationalization of traditional views as is possible short of out and out unitarianism.

It cannot be denied that there is much which is very attractive in this programme of which I have presented only the briefest outline. The author seems to me right in acknowledging the points of affinity between some recent forms of humanism and an enlightened theism, and I also warmly endorse his insistence on the centrality of moral experience for religion and the suspicion of authoritarian dogmatic accretions which are apt to take the place of creative religious living and be inimical to ethics. Some of the points at which the argument is open to strain will also be found to have been anticipated and discussed at more length in previous and more elaborate works by the same author. Nevertheless it seems to me that the enterprise as a whole is not successful and that the aims the author has in mind could be better achieved by a new examination of the experiences out of which traditionalism arose. I find the two main positive points in the author's thesis the weakest of all. We surely can not be content to be told that God is "the embodiment of the moral law." A theist at least finds in religion more than objective duty, and we are entitled to a more explicit statement of what this is. Just how does the voice of conscience become the voice of God, and what are the epistemological issues involved in such a claim and how must they be handled?—these are the questions which ought to be given most prominence in a philosophical presentation of a thesis like that of Professor Garnett. I likewise doubt very much whether the argument from mental acts to a cosmic mind has force except as a reflection of notions presented more adequately in the traditional arguments. If we consider afresh what lies behind these arguments, in the manner of several recent writers on the philosophy of religion of whom no mention is made in this book, we may arrive at a notion of God's transcendence which will not have the unfortunate consequences which Professor Garnett fears and which may be made the basis of an account of morals and religion which will do justice to both without attenuating the claims of either. To complete that programme, we shall need, I believe, to have a higher regard than Professor Garnett for the teaching of Otto and be less ready to dispose of the practices of primitive peoples in terms of superficial magic which has only bequeathed to subsequent religion the encumbrance of unnecessary complications. But while I disagree for these reasons with the main themes of this book there is a great deal in the substance of it which I believe should be retained in a sound view of religion, and it is moreover good for students of religion to have this refreshing statement of a point of view apt to be neglected today.

H. D. Lewis.

Literary and Philosophical Essays. By JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Translated from the French by Annette Michelson. (Rider and Company, 1955. Pp. 239. Price 18s.)

These essays are translated, and well translated, from Sartre's *Situations* I and III. The first seven concern respectively Mauriac, Camus, Giraudoux, Blanchot (and Kafka), Faulkner (two essays) and Dos Passos. These are followed by three essays on subjects relating to the United States; individualism and conformism in the United States, American cities, and "New York, the colonial city." The last three papers deal respectively with Bruce Parain on language (a critical discussion of *Investigations into the Nature and Function of Language*), Cartesian freedom, and materialism and revolution (modern Marxism). I propose to confine my brief remarks about these essays, some of which were written before the war and none of which appear to have been written very recently, to the first and third groups. For I possess no first-hand knowledge of the United States and am not in a position to make any useful comments on M. Sartre's American impressions.

The terms "literary" and "philosophical" in the title of this work presumably belong respectively to the first and third groups of essays. But this is not, of course, a rigid distinction. For M. Sartre is a philosopher and in the literary essays he is dealing either with writers who are themselves philosophers (this is true of Camus) or with writers to whom a philosophy, in some general sense of the word, is or can be attributed. Thus, in the essay on Mauriac, prompted by *La Fin de le Nuit*, we find echoes of M. Sartre's theory of freedom and in one of the essays on Faulkner of his theory of time. Yet perhaps it might be more accurate to say that if one is already acquainted with Sartre's philosophy one finds it implicitly in these essays. "Do you want your characters to live? See to it that they are free." This quotation from the essay on Mauriac could obviously be made by a critic innocent of all academic philosophy; but, as a remark made by Sartre, it comes to us laden with the latter's theory of freedom. In any case M. Sartre's literary criticism is, as one would expect, both intelligent and provocative, He is certainly forthright in his judgements. "*La Fin de la Nuit* is not a novel. . . . M. Mauriac is not a novelist." "God is not an artist. Neither is M. Mauriac." On the other hand, "Dos Passos' world—like those of Faulkner, Kafka and Stendhal—is impossible because it is contradictory. But therein lies its beauty. Beauty is a veiled contradiction. I regard Dos Passos as the greatest writer of our time" (a judgement made in 1938).

In his essay on Parain M. Sartre rejects the attempt to show that language is inexplicable without God. "Language is being-for-another. What need have we for God? The Other is sufficient, any other." There is no metaphysical problem of language. At the same time "the great problems of language may turn out to be only a regional specification of the great ontological problem of the existence of the Other." I presume that we have to understand this distinction in terms of the distinction between metaphysics and ontology which we find in Sartre's *L'être et le néant*.

In the penetrating paper on Cartesian freedom M. Sartre brings out well the intellectualism of Descarte's conception of freedom. He also shows how Descartes hypostatized in God his original concept of freedom, reducing human liberty to a primarily negative function. But the statement that "at a time when Bacon was teaching the English to look to experience," Descartes was "the first to call upon the physicist to give precedence to hypothesis" seems to stand in need of some qualification.

M. Sartre's essay on Marxism (1946) is perhaps slightly marred from the point of view of an English reader by polemical references to certain French Marxists of presumably small importance. But it is an interesting piece of

work. The author is certainly critical of dialectical materialism. "It sets science against metaphysics and, unknowingly, metaphysics against science. All that remains is ruins." In other words, Marxism tries to combine positivism with metaphysics, the denial of metaphysics with concealed metaphysical assertions. Again Sartre tries to show how Marxists, in the process of setting Hegel on his feet, make nonsense of the dialectic and nonsense of materialism. And the Marxist ideas of freedom and truth come in for some hard knocks. "The ambiguity of materialism lies in its claim to be a class ideology at one time and the expression of an absolute truth at another." But Sartre is not exclusively critical, nor is he willing to accept the necessity of choosing between idealism and materialism. He points the way, rather vaguely, to another "revolutionary" philosophy which transcends the choice which Marxists try to force upon us, a philosophy of freedom. If I have understood him, he claims that the "revolutionary demands" of the concrete historical and social situation point the way to an existentialist social philosophy. This is, of course, a matter of importance for M. Sartre. For his Marxist critics have maintained that existentialism is an individualistic philosophy, an extreme expression of the condition of the bourgeoisie in a state of crisis. But the author does not develop his positive suggestions in this essay.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

The Deep Things of God. Essays in Liberal Religion. By SIDNEY SPENCER. George Allen and Unwin. Pages 118. Price 8/6.

This book consists of a number of short but incisive studies of a variety of closely related religious subjects, the theme which connects them all being the importance of an inner spiritual experience of union or contact with God. The author writes as a modernist and unitarian, but he has a scholarly understanding of traditional Christianity and wishes to salvage what is important in it; he does not attempt a crude rationalization of Christian claims, but seeks to penetrate behind them to the reality they reflect as understood in terms of the soul's experience of union with God. An attempt is made to find a middle course between the crudities of belief in the literal inspiration of the Scriptures and the attenuation of religious experience which equates it with any apprehension of truth. There are, it is held, particular kinds of experiences, the content of them "often wholly unexpected," which provide the pattern *par excellence* of religious inspiration. There is a continuity of this divine inspiration, and no religion can claim a monopoly of it.

In presenting this view the author draws upon an extensive knowledge of Eastern religions, and this is perhaps the most interesting feature of the book. But beyond this, it cannot be said that the subject is sharply advanced at the level at which it will be of most interest to philosophers. Little is said directly about the criteria of religious experience or the form which the union with God takes, and while the discussion of specific questions like "miracles" and "prayer" and "healing" poses the problem effectively for us, it leaves us somewhat uncertain as to what sort of answers are being suggested. The question of God's omnipotence, in the face of appalling evil, is not effectively disposed of by merely insisting on the ultimate triumph of "uncoercive love," our doubts about miracles are not set at rest by noting that "Jesus laid down the laws of the spiritual life"; nor is intercessory prayer made understandable by a general reference to a man's participation "in a hope immeasurably greater than his own." Allusion to the "indwelling" of the divine Spirit in man is only the starting point for reflection which will seriously advance the subject and while we

need to be pointed in the right direction and be warned against crudities in the understanding of religion, it is the close analysis of what "indwelling," "Union with God" and spiritual "power" mean that will most help a serious intellectual concern with religion today. It is perhaps too much to expect this in short studies designed for a fairly popular audience, but I think it is time that even popular studies should reflect better the patient analysis which can do more than point us in the right direction.

I should like to mention in addition the interesting treatment in this book of the question whether a unitarian should describe himself as a Christian.

H. D. Lewis.

A Symposium on Kant. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. III. (Tulane University, New Orleans. 1954. Pp. 161. $2.00.)

Like several other transatlantic universities the University of Tulane has sought to recognize in a fitting way the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Kant's death, and the present modest but stimulating volume of essays is the result. So far as a general tendency can be descried in authors so diverse, it would seem to be in the direction of what is now called ontology, but used to be called metaphysics. An attempt to estimate Kant by the standards of modern ontology is bound to produce some startling interpretations of his doctrine. This is most notable in a long article on "Kant and Metaphysics" by Professor Feibleman, who calls for a revision of Kant's system on the ground that if the phenomena did not "fit over the noumena like the skin over an animal so that when one moved the other moved, then we would quickly run afoul of the noumena." It is interesting to see how Kant can look to someone who takes as beyond dispute the very assumptions Kant is trying to overthrow. The same observation applies, though in a lesser degree, to Professor Ballard's article on "The Kantian Solution to the Problem of Man within Nature." It is strange, for example, to be told that for Kant the principles which serve to explicate man are unknown.

An ontological bias is less dangerous in dealing with non-metaphysical subjects. Professor Lee has a suggestive, if rather too simple, paper on "The Rigidity of Kant's Categories," which is partly concerned with the metaphysical deduction (called by him the transcendental deduction) but ignores the work of Klaus Reich on the table of judgements. Professor Barber discusses "Two Logics of Modality" in a rather exciting way: even if, as it seems to me, he misses the point of what Kant is saying, he does raise some new and interesting questions. Professor Louise Roberts gives us some useful "Notes on the Judgement of Taste," while Professor Whittemore provides a careful collection of passages in "The Metaphysics of the Seven Formulations of the Moral Argument." There is also an article of a rather different type by Professor Hamburg on "Kant, Cassirer and the Concept of Space."

Even if the writers do not always carry conviction, there is in their efforts to wrestle with Kant's problems a certain freshness and vigour on which the University of Tulane is to be congratulated. H. J. Paton.

The True and the Valid. (Friends of Dr. Williams's Library. Éighth Lecture 1954). By Richard I. Aaron. Geoffrey Cumberlege. Oxford University Press, 1955. Pp. 22. Price 3s. 6d. net.

Earlier lectures in this series have been on such topics as the trial of Jesus, the Book of Common Prayer, and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Professor Aaron, there-

fore, breaks quite new ground with this introductory but closely and clearly argued discussion of the notions of validity and truth and of the difference between what is factually ("This is a fine day") and what is logically true ("This evening it will rain or it will not rain"). Professor Aaron's main concern is with this latter notion. After noticing various characteristics of logically true statements he picks on *consistency* as the most important feature common to all of them and considers various theories about what consistency is. His own view is that when we feel constrained to reject any statement that is inconsistent we have been influenced by "experience of the world" to the extent of assuming that "the real world is such as to enable us to think of it in this way." He concludes from this that there is necessarily a factual element in logical truth but, having by this time reached the end of the lecture, does not elaborate the suggestion. Professor Aaron makes a number of judicious references to the literature of the subject but it is rather a pity that, although he says that Quine, Morton White and Waismann have questioned the value of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, he has not put in a footnote indicating the very interesting papers in which they do so.

H. B. Acton.

The Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by J. A. K. Thomson. (Penguin Books. 1955. Pp. 320.)

This translation, first published in 1953, now appears in the Penguin Classics. It is more lively, perhaps more readable, than any of its predecessors. Professor Thomson is not afraid to use a lot of words to make clear what he thinks to be Aristotle's meaning, nor to recast the form of expression. Thus on p. 38 "Now let us assume for the moment the truth of the following propositions" represents "But if," and what in Ross's literal version is "There remains then an active life of the element that has a rational principle" becomes "We are left, then, with a life concerning which we can make two statements. First, it belongs to the rational part of man. Secondly, it finds expression in actions." He relegates to footnotes sentences or even paragraphs that he regards as breaking the context, although this hardly seems consistent with his admirable advice to the reader: "let him not think that he is reading a book, but that he is listening to a man speaking."

This freedom of approach is a legitimate device to capture the interest of the modern reader, but it should be openly acknowledged. Otherwise it may give a false impression of Aristotle's style, character, and even thought. It is Professor Thomson's wish, apparent in his preface, to present Aristotle as a human, sympathetic character: so he makes him say that "we want to kick" men who are in fact merely characterized as "open to contempt." Other typical examples of slight distortion by the heightening of colour are these:

"Living the kind of life which is a succession of unrelated emotional experiences" (p. 28).

"Their view would hardly get a respectful hearing were it not that those who occupy great positions sympathize with a monster of sensuality like Sardanapallus" (p. 30).

"Dipsomaniacs, who get drunk quickly" (p. 212).

"The dictates of passion" (p. 210).

For comparison, Ross translates these phrases as follows:

"Living and pursuing each successive object as passion directs."

"They get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus."

"People who get drunk quickly."
"Pleasure."

With this reservation the translation can be recommended as stimulating to the reader who knows Greek and in the main easy reading to one who does not. The latter would be helped by an occasional note, and perhaps have got more profit from the preface if it dealt with the *Ethics* alone instead of attempting a summary of Aristotle's life, work, and influence: for all this there are encyclopaedias, even if they are less provocatively written. In particular there is need of an explanation of certain words like "soul," "virtue," and "contemplation," which are conventionally used throughout the translation in senses that they do not bear today.

F. H. Sandbach.

An Introduction to Organic Philosophy: An Essay on the Reconciliation of the Masculine and the Feminine Principles. By Lawrence Hyde. (The Omega Press, Reigate, Surrey. 1955. Pp. xi + 201. Price 15s.).

Mr Hyde believes that the only way of solving the ethical and intellectual problems with which our age is distracted, is by making a serious attempt to understand certain fundamental truths about man and his relation to the universe. He aims to construct a philosophical system which will synthesize art, science and religion—in short a philosophy of life. This he tells us cannot be achieved by intellectual effort alone, the insights given by the intuitive feeling side of our nature need also to be taken into account. Mr. Hyde therefore stresses the important part played by feeling and intuition in enabling us to adjust ourselves to the realities of existence. Modern culture, he argues, is dominated by an intellectualistic approach and tradition, which he describes as the masculine principle, and he contrasts this with feeling and the appreciation of the sensible world, or the feminine principle. He believes we can only get a true and unified vision of reality when thought and feeling are synthesized. This he claims will lead to a better appreciation of the organic wholes in nature and to an increased capacity on our part for acting creatively.

Though one sympathizes with Mr. Hyde's demand that both feeling and analytical thought be taken into account in our descriptions of man and nature, this applies more to the human sciences than the natural ones, where feeling has sometimes turned out to be a most unreliable guide. His designation of thought and feeling as the masculine and feminine principles, brings in a well-worn metaphor which by now seems to have outlived its usefulness, and probably hinders more than helps his position. Mr. Hyde's book is clearly and simply written and is innocent of modern semantic refinements. It will appeal more to the enlightened layman than to the professional philosopher.

W. Mays.

The Development of Plato's Ethics. By John Gould. (Cambridge University Press, 1955. Pp. xiii + 241. Price 25s.)

This book, an expanded version of a Fellowship dissertation, does not pretend to give a systematic account of Plato's ethical theory. Its aim is to contrast, as two extremes, Socrates' "personal idealism" and the "social ethics" of Plato's *Laws*, and to explain Plato's gradual "abandonment" of the Socratic position as due to "a progressive coming to terms with the

possible," where "the possible" means the practical possibility of realizing an ideal of goodness as a general ideal in society, taking into account all the weaknesses of human nature. The first part of the book deals with Socrates. Taking as "Socratic" those dialogues of Plato generally considered to be earlier than the *Meno*, Gould discusses the meaning of the propositions that "virtue is knowledge" and that "no one does wrong on purpose." With regard to the first, he argues, using Ryle's distinction, that Socrates' ideal was "knowing how" to be moral, a form of moral ability, and not an ideal of theoretical "knowing that." His argument rests largely on the terminological point that the verb *ἐπίσταμαι* (know) and the noun *ἐπιστήμη* have as their primary meaning "efficiency in practice" and not "knowledge of facts," and he supports this by many references to pre-Platonic literature. But this is a short-sighted view. One thing that seems quite clear from Xenophon's and Plato's accounts is that Socrates did not distinguish "knowing how" and "knowing that," and that his conception of *ἐπιστήμη* included both. The mixture of the two is especially noticeable in Xenophon's account (part. *Mem.* 3, 9; 4, 6), and Plato's account confirms Xenophon's in this respect. And in view of the emphasis in both accounts on Socrates' search for definitions, for knowing *what* a thing is, we may infer, as Aristotle did, that the resultant "knowing that" formed one important aspect of Socrates' ideal of knowledge. We find that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle almost always use verbs other than *ἐπίσταμαι* for "knowing what" in reference to Socrates' ethical inquiries, but we surely cannot assume that this fact makes the references irrelevant to the meaning of "virtue is knowledge." Gould unduly neglects the part played by definition in Socratic ethics. Indeed, he seems to think that the fact that proposed definitions of moral concepts in Plato's early dialogues are all "negatived" (though not so, incidentally, in Xenophon), is an argument against the view that Socrates aimed at explicit definition. This is a curious argument. One consequence of Gould's thesis is that, in addition to neglecting the many clear "intellectualist" implications of Plato's account, he has to dismiss Aristotle's account as a complete misrepresentation. Yet though it is possibly true that Aristotle, for his own purposes, deliberately over-emphasizes the "pure intellectualist" aspect of Socratic ethics, one cannot simply dismiss an account which finds confirmation in earlier accounts and is pretty clearly based, in large part, on Plato's dialogues. The discussion of the paradox that "no one does wrong on purpose" suffers similarly from a pre-occupation with Ryle, whose phraseology is evident at many points (see part. p. 52). A reference to a passage in the *Meno* (77–8) would have been useful. The reason for its absence is presumably that the dialogue falls just on the wrong side of the sharp dividing line adopted for marking off Socrates from Plato. Gould does promise us a discussion of the Greek terms both for "desire" and for "capacity" in elucidating this paradox, but of "capacity" there is no further mention.

The second part, dealing with the *Laws*, aims to show the difference in outlook between Socrates' "subjective ideal," which considered the individual as a "self-sufficient unit of existence," and Plato's ideal in the *Laws* for "the common people in society" as a whole. There is a useful exposition of Plato's conception of this "lower-level" virtue, and emphasis is rightly laid on the supremacy given to education and law as means of "canalizing the emotions" of the common people and enabling them to achieve their proper virtue. But the significance of all this is exaggerated. Gould appears to have been led by enthusiasm for his thesis to argue from one aspect of Plato's ethical theory, as set out in a work with a very particular and practical purpose, to the nature of his ethical theory as a whole. He continually emphasizes that the *Laws*

"sets the general good of society above the individual," and concludes that Plato has now completely abandoned the individual as the "unit of virtue," and that society has taken the individual's place as "the entity which is striving towards virtue." Most scholars will find it difficult to accept this Hegelian interpretation of Plato's political philosophy, for which there seems to be no real evidence anywhere in the dialogues. Gould further assumes that Plato only very gradually abandoned Socrates' "personal idealism," and that the *Laws*, in its realization that only an "emotional" level of virtue, divorced from "personal insight," is attainable generally in society, is the culmination of a "search for an ethical society" which "occupied the rest of Plato's life" from the *Republic* onwards. Yet in view of the evidence that practically at the beginning of his interest in philosophy Plato was thinking about the reformation of society as a task essentially for the philosopher (see *Letter* VII) it is hard to imagine that he ever himself accepted Socrates' "personal idealism" without awareness of the impossibility of realizing it as a general ideal in society, or that he did not very soon appreciate the need for a systematic "emotional" education of the people from above. The dialogues certainly suggest a much earlier development of Plato's thought in this direction than Gould would have us believe. And granting that the later dialogues show a realization of the practical necessity of a more or less fixed code of laws in society, and a more realistic attitude in political philosophy, this is a far cry from a gradual abandonment of "personal idealism," and the adoption of society in place of the individual as "the unit of virtue."

The third part of the book fills in the gap between Socrates and the *Laws*. After a discussion of the significance of the introduction of the idea of "true conviction," as opposed to knowledge, in the *Meno*, Gould deals at some length with the *Republic*, where society assumes great importance "as setting and illustration," but does not yet overshadow the individual. In discussing Plato's theory of the relation between belief and knowledge, he raises the "philosophical predicament" that, by his separation of the two worlds of belief and knowledge, Plato "seems to have cut away the foundation of his whole effort in the *Republic*," since the mind of the philosopher, after attaining insight into the real world, would seem to be henceforth "imprisoned" in that world and incapable of having any influence in "solving the problems of the physical world." This "predicament" is assumed to be connected with "the general despair and pessimism of the last dialogues" (p. 164). What is surprising about this is not simply that Gould should select the passage from "higher" to "lower" world as the predicament and not equally the reverse passage (on this latter he says simply that the possibility of it is "guaranteed by the whole conception of the *Republic*"), but that he should raise this as a point of such great significance when he has really so little evidence from later dialogues to substantiate his assumption of a connection between this predicament and Plato's "pessimism." He tries to find his evidence in the *Timaeus*, the *Politicus*, and the *Philebus*, and to show that implicit in Plato's view of "necessity" in the *Timaeus* and in the *Politicus* myth, and in his view of knowledge in the *Philebus* (part. 62a ff.), is a growing "sense of reality," an "acceptance of the conditions of human life," which itself "implies, to some degree at least, abandonment of his scheme of values." In most of this he clearly goes too far in drawing moral inferences from ideas of a very much more general significance (a tendency evident throughout this part of the book, e.g. in the discussion of the Line, in the *Republic*), and he never takes proper account of the many indications in the late dialogues that Plato, though well aware of the problem of "communication" between distinct "worlds" (*Parmenides*, 133a–135c), did not consider the problem to be an

objection fatal to his ideals and to his assumption of the possibility of "transition" from one world to the other. The exaggerations in Gould's thesis come out most clearly in the discussion of the *Philebus*, which, of all the dialogues discussed, fits least satisfactorily into his theme. His attempt to find in it "pessimism" and "tension," as Plato's "sense of reality" struggles with his "aggressive allegiance to an admittedly impractical contemplation" is a gallant one.

Despite its many faults this is a stimulating book. It has much of interest to say, particularly on Plato's approach to the psychology of "social ethics," and on the development of his views in this field. Its emphasis on the fertility of Plato's ideas in the *Laws*, and on the great psychological insight he shows there, is specially welcome as a corrective to the frequent assumption of the "dullness" of the work.

There are Greek and English indices, and a bibliography.

NORMAN GULLEY.

Formal Logic. By A. N. PRIOR. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, O.U.P. 1955. Price 35s.)

"Designed primarily as a textbook" and containing three parts to deal with The Classical Propositional and Functional Calculi, Traditional Logic of Terms, Modal, Three-valued and Extensional Systems, this book assembles a great deal of historical and technical material that is not otherwise readily available. To suggest a succession, J. N. Keynes (1906), W. E. Johnson (1921), A. N. Prior (1955) would not be misleading, but the considerably greater excess of calculation over philosophy in Professor Prior's work reflects the impression that modern formal logic has made on a thinker who retains traditional interests without being a die-hard traditionalist. For Professor Prior evidently has a strong liking for the minutiae of logical calculation while at the same time retaining a fondness for intuitive meaning and philosophical relevance. The result, while fully modern, accordingly retains the flavour of "traditional" treatises, and seems likely to be palatable to teachers and students who undertake a course of logic mainly as a prescribed ingredient in a course of general philosophical study. Professor Prior surveys a great number of systems, propositional and other, and gives plenty of examples of their development in axiom-theorem form, so that the student who uses this book as an introduction has every opportunity to develop an understanding of this aspect of logic. He may even be led on to "do" logic, instead of merely following logical texts. In this connection the appendix containing a variety of postulate systems is useful as well as informative.

The four chapters of Part I deal with truth-functions, various forms of complete and partial propositional calculus, some completeness proofs, and (last chapter) quantification theory. This last finally reverts to propositional calculus and some considerations about definitions, lifted with acknowledgement from Łukasiewicz's exquisite paper, *Der Aquivalenzkalkül*. Absence of a completeness proof for lower functional calculus, in spite of a promise that such proofs will be specially considered, is a defect. The subject of quantification is resumed in Part II under the heading "Existential Propositions," so that the topic is not skimped so much as might appear at first sight. A dialogue (pp. 100–1) provoked by the existence of different bases for a single body of laws would have been helpfully augmented by the Hilbert-Bernays propositional axioms without definitions, or some similar set. Curiously that set is not listed even in the appendix which contains so many bases.

Since Part I is the most thorough and likely to be the most studied, we give some further desiderata. P. 30, time factors in the examples are distracting, and similar informality of expressions spoils the example on p. 34–5. P. 32, the point of Quine's correction of Jørgensen—occult substitution in defined abbreviations—is more important than the proof itself, but is not stated. A novice would probably be puzzled by the proof line of 5 ibid. P. 33, the sole D-axioms of Łukasiewicz and Wajsberg are not merely an improvement on Nicod's because they employ, as stated, fewer variables, but because they are organic. To say that "the few derivations given above follow from Łukasiewicz's axiom in exactly the same way as they do from Nicod's" could be extremely misleading. Pp. 33–4, it is implied that the rule of detachment in A–N and K–N systems is on a par for simplicity with that for C–N, by contrast with that for D-systems. In fact, the C–N rule, while using only two schematic variables by contrast with the three of the D-rule, uses only one operator, C, by contrast with the A–N and K–N rules, which is an aesthetic point in favour of C–N systems. P. 34, an immediate transition is made from systems with axioms to systems with only rules, no mention being made of systems with axiom schemata. P. 41–2, no strict proof is given, but it is made fairly clear that and how Hilbert-Ackermann normal forms may be produced. An adaptation of Łukasiewicz's process in Chapter V of *Aristotle's Syllogistic* would have been clearer and simpler. To say (p. 46) that p follows from $AAppp$ by $CAppp$ is just the kind of misleading or at least insufficient indication that mars the sort of informal sketch which this long treatment sets out to improve on. On the whole, clarity would be gained by distinguishing (here and elsewhere) equivalence and deductive equivalence, asserted and hypothetically asserted expressions, expressions and types of expression. P. 48, if the author's intuitive formulation of "if" is correct, $CpCqp$ is not paradoxical at all, and in any case is mistranslated by "a true proposition is implied by any proposition at all." P. 49, the translation of $CCCpqpp$ by "If p's implying q implies p, then p" sufficiently exemplifies the colloquial usage that is adopted. There is something to be said for it for purposes of the lecture-room, but in a text-book it could be improved upon. It is strange that in all this there is no discussion of Modus Ponens. P. 73, the notation ϕ' rather than ϕ if used throughout would help understanding and be more consistent. It would also, we think, make for betterment of the substitution-rule on p. 88—how obscure is the manner of its application is shown by the example ibid. P. 77 line 11, "x is bound in 4" should read "in the antecedent of 4."

The 82 pages of Part II cover Aristotelian and traditional logic, not indeed in an exhaustive but in a satisfactory and highly informed way. Another writer might have devoted rather more space to scholastic developments, rather less to those of the nineteenth century, but the time has not yet come when the former can be quite easily assessed, and the choice of topics is harmonious, issuing finally in Russell's theory of descriptions. *Errata:* p. 111, 8 lines from the end, for "third" read "fourth"; p. 134, line 10 (author's correction) for "opposite" read "the same."

Part III, covering 75 pp., deals with Lewis and von Wright modal systems, three-valued systems and intuitionist logic, predominantly from the propositional point of view. Łukasiewicz's recovery of the classical within the intuitionist system is traced in some detail. The author hints at a liking to view this as their natural relationship (p. 254), and while there are obvious pedagogical reasons for teaching the classical system first, the encouragement of this point of view is probably the soundest logical training.

The final 40 pp. (Part III) are given to a "somewhat concentrated" considera-

tion of "the logic of classes and relations in extension, considered as a foundation upon which arithmetic, or something very like it, may be built." This is carried through to the extent of sketching the genesis of "cardinal number" in *Principia Mathematica*. Statements on pp. 280–1 might easily suggest to the uninformed reader that a complete basis had been provided for number theory. After a discourse on paradoxes and type-theory (as exemplified in the *Principia* and Ramsey's simplification) a *bonne bouche* is provided in the form of 8 concluding pages on Lesniewski's Ontology and Mereology, information about which is still not readily come by. Further author's corrections follow. P. 17, (viii) and (ix) should respectively read *CKosCqAos* and *CoCqs*; p. 18 line 14, for *Cos* read *CoCqs*; p. 306, system 6.5 has been proved trivial by Łukasiewicz; p. 311, the sole axiom for Mereology should have the initial *C* of the third line transferred to precede the second *K* of the first.

IVO THOMAS.

Books also received.

G. C. FIELD. *Political Theory*. Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1956. Pp. (xvii) & 297. 18s.

MICHAEL BURN. *Mr. Lyward's Answer*. Hamish Hamilton. 1956. Pp. 288. 21s.

SIVAMYAM. *Introduction to Tirumular's Tirumantram*. Tiruvavaduthurai Adheenam. 1956. Pp. (iii) & 81. No price given.

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KARL JASPERS. *Reason and Existenz*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1956. Pp. 157. 14s.

ED. ERNST CASSIRER and others. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. The University of Chicago Press. (England: Cambridge University Press.) 1956. Pp. (vi) & 405. 14s.

AMOS IH TIAO CHANG. *The Existence of Intangible Content in Architectonic Form*. Princeton University Press. (England: Oxford University Press.) 1956. Pp. 72. 28s.

GEORGE F. HOURANI. *Ethical Value*. George Allen & Unwin. 1956. Pp. 233. 18s.

RICHARD KRONER. *Kant's Weltanschauung*. Trans. by John E. Smith. University of Chicago Press. (England: Cambridge University Press.) 1956. Pp. (xi) & 118. 15s.

RUDOLF BULTMANN. *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting*. Trans. by the Rev. R. H. Fuller. Thames & Hudson Ltd. 1956. Pp. 240. 18s.

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VARIOUS AUTHORS. Ed. by Antony Flew. *Essays in Conceptual Analysis.* Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1956. Pp. 265. 18s.

VARIOUS AUTHORS. Ed. by H. D. Lewis. *Contemporary British Philosophy.* (3rd Series.) George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1956. Pp. (xiv) & 501. 35s.

STUART HAMPSHIRE. *Spinoza.* Faber & Faber. 1956. Pp. 176. 15s.

Ed. H. ST. J. HART. *S. T. Coleridge. Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.* A. & C. Black. 1956. Pp. 120. 8s. 6d.

Ed. H. E. ROOT. *David Hume. The Natural History of Religion.* A. & C. Black. 1956. Pp. 76. 6s. 6d.

Trans. and selected by HENRY CHADWICK. *Lessing's Theological Writings.* A. & C. Black. 1956. Pp. 110. 8s. 6d.

W. H. THORPE. *Learning and Instinct in Animals.* Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1956. Pp. 493. 55s.

RUDOLF JORDAN. *Bridges to the Unknown.* The Saint Catherine Press Ltd. 1956. Pp. 109. 10s. 6d.

JOSEPH NEEDHAM. *Science and Civilisation in China.* Vol. II. Cambridge University Press. 1956. Pp. (xxii) & 696. 80s.

FREDERICK MAYER and FRANK E. BROWER. *Patterns of a New Philosophy.* Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. 1955. Pp. (vi) & 112. $3.25.

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MAURICE NATANSON. Intro. by H. M. Kallen. *The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead.* Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. 1956. Pp. (vii) & 102. $2.50.

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GILBERT VARET. *Manuel de Bibliographie Philosophique.* I Les Philosophies Classiques. Presses Universitaires de France. 1956. Pp. (xx), 494 & (v).

DOMENICA PESCE. *Il Concetto Dell'Arte in Dewey e in Berenson.* La Nuova Italia, Florence. 1956. Pp. 110.

FRANCESCO ALBERGAMO. *Introduzione Alla Logica Della Scienza.* La Nuova Italia, Florence. 1956. Pp. 167.

GIOVANNI GENTILE. *La Filosofia di Marx.* G. C. Sansoni, Florence. 1955. Pp. 165.

INSTITUTE NOTES

The following lectures will be given at 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, at 5.30 p.m.:—

Michaelmas Term, 1956

October 19th. "Philosophy and Theology."
Professor John Wisdom (Trinity College, Cambridge).

October 26th. "Induction."
Professor C. D. Broad (Trinity College, Cambridge).

November 2nd. "Descartes and Hume on the Relation between Belief and Will."
Professor H. H. Price (New College, Oxford).

November 9th. "The Justification of Beliefs."
Professor L. J. Russell.

November 16th. "Speculative Truth."
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Halsbury, F.R.I.C., F.Inst.P.

November 23rd. "Religious Assertions in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy."
A. C. Ewing, Litt.D. (Trinity Hall, Cambridge).

November 30th. "Matter and Material Things."
G. J. Warnock, M.A. (Magdalen College, Oxford).

December 7th. "Explanations in Terms of Social Function."
Professor Dorothy Emmet (University of Manchester).

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
(3) Proposes to form a philosophical library.
(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Newcastle and Durham. A centre has recently been established at Los Angeles.

Students of philosophy are reminded that they may become Associates of the Institute at a reduced fee of 8s. 6d. per annum, provided they are full-time students studying for a degree or diploma at a university or university college and are not engaged in a gainful occupation. Present or past Members of the Institute are not eligible to become Associates.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

PRESENTATION TO MR. SYDNEY E. HOOPER

At the Annual General Meeting held on 20th July, a cheque for £376 3s. 6d. was presented to Mr. Hooper by Lord Samuel on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy and Members who had subscribed to the Fund in recognition of his services over the past thirty years.

VICE-PRESIDENT

At a meeting of the Council held in July, the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Halsbury, F.R.I.C., F.Inst.P., was elected Vice-President of the Institute.

THE LATE MISS MARGARET MACDONALD

Friends and colleagues of Margaret Macdonald, who died in January 1956, feel that they would like their esteem for her work as a writer and teacher to take a permanent form. Her own money she left to Bedford College, for the Susan Stebbing Memorial Fund from which the Susan Stebbing Studentship is financed, and it has therefore been suggested that it would be appropriate, in the light of her tastes and interests, for the memorial to take the form of a painting which would hang in Bedford College where she had been both student and teacher. Those who would like to contribute are asked to send their donations to Professor H. B. Acton, Bedford College, Regent's Park, London, N.W.1.

PHILOSOPHY

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Leibniz Manuscripts

Students who are interested in Leibniz will be pleased to know that the University of London Library, Senate House, W.C.1, has recently acquired a microfilm of a substantial part of the collection of Leibniz manuscripts which is housed in the State Library in Hanover. The manuscripts were microfilmed on behalf of the library of the University of Pennsylvania by kind permission of the director of the State Library, Hanover.

The letters and manuscripts microfilmed amount to more than 100,000 handwritten pages, and include all of the unpublished, or inaccurately published, manuscripts and letters that were judged to be of interest to scholars. The selection was made by Professor Paul Schrecker on the basis of the three catalogues published by Eduard Bodemann. The microfilms are contained on thirty-three 35-millimetre spools, and include a concordance linking the microfilmed items with Bodemann's catalogues.

The University Library is well equipped with microfilm readers, and it is planned that the films will normally be available for use in the Library.

The Cornell University Press propose to publish a series of short books under the general title of "Contemporary Philosophy." The editor of the series will be Professor Max Black (Cornell), with the assistance of an editorial board composed of Professors Charles A. Baylis (Duke), William Frankena (Michigan), and Morton G. White (Harvard).

The books are intended to be original discussions of selected philosophical problems, though occasional surveys or translations may eventually be included. It is hoped that the series will encourage the preparation especially by younger authors of studies of particular topics of contemporary interest that are neglected or merely summarized in full length treatises. Able expositions in any philosophical dialect will be welcomed, and no restriction upon subject-matter is contemplated. The length of the studies will normally be between 75 and 200 printed pages: the public aimed at will consist primarily of professional philosophers and graduate students, though not to the exclusion of the interested layman.

Philosophers who have work in progress or in preparation that might fit the aims of the series are invited to communicate with the editor, Professor Max Black, at the following address: Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

(Suggested)

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge of the same.

BIBL. LONDIN. UNIV.